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The Yiian Dynasty in China was one by-
product of the great Mongol conquests of the thirteenth cen-
tury. Its founding date seems a matter of choice. It began, 
perhaps, in 1215 when Chinggis Qan (Genghis Khan) seized 
what is now Peking from the Jiirched Chin Dynasty, although 
North China was not fully conquered by the Mongols until 
1234. One can also date the era from 1260, when the China-
based prince Qubilai (Kublai) seized the position of Great 
Qaghan of the Mongol empire, and established its capital 
in Peking. The Mongol occupation had no Chinese-style 
dynastic name, however, until 1271, when Qubilai ordered 
that it henceforth be known as the Yiian. Finally, only by 
1279 was south China brought entirely within the Mongol 
fold. If its formal beginning date is 1271, its equally formal 
ending date is 1368, when, chased by the armies of the Ming 
founder Chu Yüan-chang, the emperor and part of the Yiian 
court evacuated Peking and retreated to the steppes. 
For a period of time, the larger political entity of the Mon-
gol world empire overshadowed China, which was simply 
one of its component parts. As is well known, however, the 
Mongol empire did not preserve its unity for very long. The 
rise of Qubilai and his establishment of the imperial center 
in Peking after 1260 is usually taken as the fateful first step 
in transforming the larger Mongol entity into a number of 
mutually independent Mongol conquest states: the Yiian 
Dynasty in China, the Chaghatai Khanate in Central Asia, 
the Ilkhans in Persia, and the Golden Horde in Russia. 
The present offering is a political study of the Mongol con-
quest state in China after the Yiian Dynasty seceded, as it 
were, from the larger Mongol empire. It attempts to show 
that, although the leading political personalities in this later 
period were Mongols and se-mu (i.e., Turks, Tanguts, etc.), 
they had become actors in a political drama that was not 
really of their own making. They came to take leading roles 
on both sides of a Confucian dispute that was Chinese in 
Introduction an<^ w e n t back at least three centuries to the Northern 
Sung period (960-1126). The conquerors were now largely 
Confucian adherents themselves. Some of them, however, 
were Confucians of the "reformist" variety, ideological heirs 
of the Northern Sung reformer Wang An-shih; and others 
were Confucians of the "conservative" variety, after the style 
of Ssu-ma Kuang. In the late Yiian period, the Mongol and 
se-mu conquerors in China fought each other as champions 
of two profoundly opposed Confucian conceptions of the basic 
nature and fundamental purpose of the Chinese imperial 
state. The issues over which they fought were of more rele-
vance to Chinese history than Mongol history. The results 
of the struggle appear to have strongly influenced the Confu-
cian political orientation of the successor Ming Dynasty (1368-
1644), a native Chinese house. The present offering is, there-
fore, intended primarily as an essay in Chinese history. 
For the purposes of this study, I found it necessary to 
attempt to define politically a "later Yiian period." Tine first 
two chapters argue the case for the years 1328-29 as a con-
venient beginning point. Chapter I tries to explain the final 
processes of transition from Mongol empire to Chinese-style 
dynasty from an external point of view, while Chapter II pro-
vides parallel analysis from an internal point of view. Succeed-
ing chapters then cover the development of Confucian politics 
down to the year 1355, when the Yiian state began to break 
apart. The emphasis of the present work, then, is put upon 
the twenty-seven years between 1328 and 1355, when Con-
fucianism rose to be the controlling ideology of state. The 
final chapter attempts to show that after 1355 the central 
control of the Yiian court over the country had broken down 
to such an extent that one can no longer speak of a unitary 
Yiian Dynasty in China. 
The segment of an era of "barbarian conquest" here under 
consideration is one in which the conquerors came more and 
more to speak and act as Confucians. As a privileged ruling 
caste, the Mongols and their non-Chinese (se-mu) allies 
became Confucianized to a high degree, but they were 
scarcely on that account absorbed or swallowed by the Chin-
ese majority, for Confucianism through its insistence upon 
the principles of ancestral loyalty and filial piety tended to 
preserve rather than level ethnic and national distinctions. 
In this connection it must be noted that "Confucian-
ization"—the adoption by outsiders, even Chinese outsiders, 
of a certain system of ethical and political behavior—was as a 
process distinct from "Sinicization," which involved not only 
the loss of national or linguistic identity, but also a most 
un-Confucian denial of the facts of ancestry, and in the Yiian 
period carried an additional burden of loss of caste as well. 
The purpose of this study, however, is not primarily to 
explain why Mongol and se-mu bureaucrats became Con-
fucians; rather, its purpose is to show that a violent Confucian 
political debate took place in the late Yuan period, in which 
the leading protagonists happened to be Mongols and se-mu, 
and that this debate is of some importance for Chinese history 
in general. The high point of this debate came in the years 
1340 to 1355, when reformist and conservative Confucian 
administrations succeeded each other at roughly five-year 
intervals, each with a completely different idea of the proper 
aims and conduct of political life. If the Yiian Dynasty col-
lapsed for any overriding political reason, it was because Yiian 
institutions were inadequate to control or contain the con-
troversy. 
Many historical monographs owe their origin and concep-
tion to a process of back-treading; one is originally interested 
in a different set of problems, but in order to understand 
them properly, one has to go back in time and study what 
came before. This monograph derives from an original inter-
est in the founding of the Ming imperial despotism under 
Chu Yiian-chang, many of whose political choices seemed 
inexplicable except as personal idiosyncrasies or aberrations. 
The thrust of the present study is therefore forward; late Yiian 
political history is considered as if it were a preface to Ming 
history, which I think it is. I think, and hope in a future 
work to show, that some idea of the Confucian debate of 
the late Yiian period is essential to a sound understanding 
of the early Ming. But that is a project for the future; for 
the present, I have attempted to make Conquerors and Con-
fucians stand as a work complete in itself. 
Introduction 
The Yiian period is a difficult one for the non-Mongolist, 
because the sources bristle with names and terms of Mongol 
or Turkish derivation cumbersomely garbed in long strings 
of Chinese characters used purely for their phonetic values. 
However, at least two generations of philological study by 
Pelliot, Cleaves, and others have made it possible for out-
siders such as myself to use these sources. I have repeatedly 
acknowledged their philological reconstructions in the notes. 
Unfortunately, for Mongolian, as for Chinese, several sys-
tems of Latin transcription exist. For Mongolian, I have tried 
to follow the system used in the Harvard Journal of Asiatic 
Studies, with these simple modifications: C-hacek, J-hacek, 
S-hacek, and gamma are replaced by "CH," " J , " "SH," and 
"GH" respectively. The consistent use of this system accounts 
for such correct but perhaps unfamiliar spellings as "Qubilai" 
(for Kubla, Kublai, Khubilai, etc.), "Chinggis Qan" (for Geng-
his Khan,), and "Qaraqorum" (for Karakorum). The "q" is 
not a glottal as in Arabic but a guttural like the "ch" in "Bach." 
Asterisks prefixed to names (e.g. *Chong'ur) indicate a 
hypothetical spelling devised by one or another philological 
authority. I have also tried to retain the generally accepted 
distinction between the qan (khan), originally a clan chief, 
but also a steppe ruler who holds sway over a "khanate"; 
and the qaghan (khaghan), a supreme overlord or emperor, 
whose corresponding imperial realm is the "Qaghanate." 
Chinese transliteration follows the Wade-Giles, and 
Korean the McCune-Reischauer system. 
Down to 1380, the official organization of the Ming Dynasty 
was closely modeled on that of the Yiian. In translating the 
Chinese titles of bureaucratic offices, I have therefore for 
the most part followed the English nomenclature given by 
Charles O. Hucker in his "Governmental Organization of the 
Ming Dynasty," HJAS, XXI (1958), 1-66, with index in HJAS, 
XXIII (1960-1), 127-51. My main deviation from Hucker is 
the use of Central Chancellery instead of Secretariat for 
Chung-shu-sheng; Chancellor of the Right instead of Chief 
Councilor of the Right for yu-cKeng-hsiang; and Chancellor 
of the Left instead of Chief Councilor of the Left for tso-
chyeng-hsiang. For the Yiian emperors, I have used their per- introduction 
sonal names rather than their posthumous or temple names. 
A convenient table of Yiian emperors, with their various 
names and dates, devised by A. C. Moule, may be found 
in the Journal of the North China Branch of the Royal Asiatic 
Society, XLV (1914), 124. An abbreviated table of the Yiian 
imperial house together with biographical notes on the lead-
ing personalities of the late Yiian, may be found at the end 
of this book. 
Chapter I 
The Decline of the Steppe in Yiian Politics 
The civil war and imperial restoration of 
1328-29 in many ways marks a watershed in the political his-
tory of the Mongol Yiian Dynasty in China. Looking backward 
in time from that point to Qubilafs ascent to the throne in 
1260, a stretch of about seventy years, one can discern at 
least one tenuous but continuous thread running through the 
entire period. That thread is the involvement, both friendly 
and hostile, of the steppe zone (i.e., the original Mongol 
homeland together with its western neighbor, the Central 
Asian realm of the heirs of Chaghatai and Ogodei) in the 
internal and external politics of China. To be sure, Qubilai 
himself laid the basis for an eventual disengagement of the 
Chinese realm from the steppe when he moved the capital 
of the Mongol world empire from Qaraqorum in Mongolia 
to Ta-tu (Peking) in China shortly after his accession. But 
the implications of this move did not become fully apparent 
until 1329. Down to 1329, the emperor of the Yiian Dynasty 
in China still remained in some degree Great Qaghan of the 
Mongol Empire precisely because the all-important question 
of succession was not one necessarily to be determined by 
domestic Chinese political considerations alone. Until 1329, 
those who occupied, or operated in, the steppes retained 
at least a potential voice in succession matters, and as long 
as they did, there remained the possibility of a continuing 
involvement on the part of China, Mongolia, and Central 
Asia in each others political and economic affairs. This mutual 
involvement, whether friendly or hostile, bespoke a continu-
ing reality of an eastern Mongol commonwealth, larger than 
any of its three parts, over which a qaghan, in some way 
chosen by common consultation in a princely diet (quriltai), 
should rightfully rule. 
j 
Looking ahead from the same vantage point of 1329 down 
to the end of the Yiian Dynasty in 1368, a span of about 
forty years, one finds the succession problem completely 
geared to the situation of the Mongols and their allies in 
The Decline China. After 1329 the steppe zone was not even hostile, it 
of the Steppe w a s simply irrelevant. The Mongolian homeland, fully ab-
in YUan Politics sorbed into a dynastic system whose power center lay in 
China, proved incapable of supporting nomadic dissidence 
or of exerting independent influence in Yiian political life; 
the Chaghatai Khanate of Central Asia, having failed in an 
attempt to place a favored candidate upon the Yiian throne, 
thereafter saw better opportunities on its western, Islamic 
flank and took no further interest in the affairs of the Mongols 
of Yiian China. The Yuan Dynasty, having isolated itself from 
external Mongol concerns, lived out the remainder of its exist-
ence as a full and willing participant in the Confucian moral 
and political culture of China. 
This "withdrawal" of the Yiian Dynasty from the larger 
Mongol empire was, to be sure, no sudden occurrence, but 
an intricate and gradual process whose beginnings antedate 
even the Great Qaghan Qubilai s overt preference for a power 
base centered upon China. I have elsewhere attempted an 
analysis of the transition from the Mongol steppe empire to 
the sedentary Yuan Dynasty from the point of view of 
economic and territorial structure and administrative prac-
tice.1 Here, the focus is on the effects of this transition upon 
the monarchy. The present inquiry is primarily concerned 
not with the origin of the Yiian Dynasty, but with its later 
development as a ruling establishment irreversibly commit-
ted to the Confucian persuasion. Consequently this first chap-
ter seeks only to show how it was that by 1329 the monarchical 
institution lost all vestige of its former importance within the 
larger pan-Mongol community, and fell complete prey to the 
desires and preferences of the Mongols and other conquest 
elements based in the Chinese realm alone. 
It is important to establish this point. As long as even a 
remote possibility remained that extraneous Mongol ele-
ments could select a Great Qaghan and Yiian emperor and 
impose their candidate upon the Mongols in China, or other-
wise gain acceptance for him there, the monarchical institu-
tion could hold in reserve against complete immersion in the 
Chinese milieu some vital remnant of its traditional universal-
ism and aloofness from any one particular religious, cultural, d 
or ideological system. On the other hand, once it became The Decline 
definitely established that no monarch was acceptable unless 0f the Steppe 
he was selected and backed exclusively by forces within the in Yiian Politics 
Yiian order, from that point the monarch as qaghan lost all 
remainder of his true constituency and for all practical pur-
poses moved fully into his alternate persona as emperor 
(huang-ti) of the Yiian Dynasty in China, formally established 
by Qubilai in 1271. When that happened, the Mongols and 
their foreign allies domiciled in China could easily proceed 
along their own path and assimilate themselves into native 
Confucian culture, safe in the knowledge that their legally 
protected dominance could not be preempted or threatened 
by elements from outside the Yiian system. The total integra-
tion of the monarchy into the Yiian system by 1329 prepared 
the way for the full Confucianization of political life that 
characterized the later Yiian period. 
The tensions of political choice between a qaghan oriented 
toward the steppes and the larger Mongol empire, and a 
huang-ti brought up in China and more closely attuned to 
the desires of the conquest establishment there, were no 
mere figments of the analytical imagination but realities in 
a most concrete and dramaturgical sense. Twice in the early 
decades of the fourteenth century the two opposing monarchi-
cal options found living embodiment in conflicting imperial 
candidacies. The first such instance took place in 1307, the 
brothers Qaishan and Ayurbarwada, who were great-
grandsons of Qubilai, personifying the options. The second 
and last instance came about in 1328-29, with Qaishan s sons 
Qoshila and Tugh Temiir repeating the situation. The final 
processes of transition from universal kingship to China-
centered monarchy may be discussed in terms of these two 
dynastic events. 
In 1299 the Great Qaghan and emperor of the Yiian 
Dynasty in China appointed a new princely field commander 
for the continuing campaign against the conservative and dan-
gerous alliance of the heirs of Chaghatai and Ogodei in 
Central Asia. The reigning emperor and Great Qaghan was 
Temiir, grandson and successor of the great Qubilai; the new 
The Decline commander was Qaishan, the emperor's nephew. 
of the Steppe The Central Asian alliance had come into being in 1268 
in Yuan Politics or 1269 on the banks of the Talas west of Lake Balkhash. 
Its driving spirit was Qaidu, a grandson of the qaghan Ogodei 
(r. 1229-41), whose descendants had lost the headship of the 
Mongol Empire to Mongke of the line of Tului in 1251. At 
the diet, Qaidu and his Chaghatai allies among other things 
made a mutual pledge to retain the nomadic life and customs 
of their ancestors. This pledge, while related to the exigencies 
of the moment, had a certain conservative appeal because 
long ago Chinggis Qan had appointed his son Chaghatai to 
be the special guardian of his sacred laws, the "yasa" (jasa&l)> 
which the Great Qaghan Qubilai of the Tului line in Ta-tu 
(Peking) had notably but tacitly forsaken. Together, the allied 
Mongols of Central Asia under Qaidu maintained a stern 
defiance of Qubilai's pretensions to the qaghanate. Qubilai's 
armies in the steppes had defeated Qaidu and his allies on 
at least four occasions between 1264 and 1293. Nevertheless, 
when Qubilai died in 1294, Qaidu was still alive and his 
armies still dangerous.2 
When the eighteen-year-old prince Qaishan departed for 
the steppes in 1299 to command the anti-Qaidu operation, 
there were two young men in his entourage whose association 
with him in the war effort would prove to be politically crucial 
to them about thirty years hence, at a very different stage 
in Yuan history. One of the young men was EI Temiir, a 
Qipchaq, whose forebears had been chieftains of sorts in the 
steppes north of the Caspian at the time of the Mongol attacks 
of 1223 and 1237; the other was Bayan, a Mongol of the Mer-
kid tribe. Despite their political importance later, their con-
tributions were definitely of a minor order at this time. 
Qaishan's job was to position himself at Qaraqorum and 
take whatever measures were necessary to prevent the steppe 
homeland from falling into Qaidu's hands. In this he was aided 
by two senior commanders, the Grand Preceptor (t'ai-shih) 
*Yochichar and El Temiir's father *Chong'ur. Qaishan's first 
action was a retaliatory attack upon Qaidu's base camp in 
the western steppes east of Lake Balkhash in September and 
October 1300. Following this, in August and September 1301, 
Qaidu and his ally Duwa, chief of the Chaghatai Khanate, r j w jjecj¡ne 
together with some forty princes of the Ogodei and Chaghatai ofthe Steppe 
lines, marched eastward through the Altai mountains for what in Yiian Politics 
turned out to be their last major offensive against the eastern 
steppes. Qaidu's forces gained an initial victory on a hill prob-
ably somewhere west of the upper Orqon River on September 
5, and on the following day surrounded a part of Qaishan's 
army there. Qaishan, who was observing from a distance, 
grew excited. Only with difficulty did a young member of 
his personal guard, the Qangli Toghto, of whom more will 
be heard later, prevent him from rushing personally into the 
foray. The Merkid Bayan, apparently caught inside the encir-
clement, fought bravely and hard. Finally *Yochichar and 
a myriarch led a successful escape from the trap, and the 
Yiian forces were then able to retreat. But while Qaidu gained 
a victory, his ally Duwa lost a simultaneous encounter a short 
distance away to El Temiir's father *Chong'ur, and withdrew 
nursing a wounded knee. Although they had gained a partial 
victory in their campaign, the Central Asian forces did not 
press the attack further but marched back west again through 
the Altai mountains to their winter quarters. That winter 
(1301-2) Qaidu died, and the Central Asian Mongols there-
upon gave up their aggressive strategy.3 
With Duwas support, Qaidu's son Chapar succeeded to 
the Ogodei Khanate in the spring of 13CX3 and, as is well 
known, the two sued for peace, sending envoys to Ta-tu 
where Temiir was ruling as well as to Maragha in Persia where 
the Il-khan Oljeitii was in charge in an effort to reopen the 
trade and communications among the various parts of the 
Mongol world empire that the recent wars had disrupted.4 
Although Qaishan, since promoted to the second-class prince-
dom of Huai-ning, willingly acted as an intermediary in the 
peace negotiations between the Central Asian allies and the 
Great Qaghan in Ta-tu, he was also eager to heed Temiir's 
secret instructions and intervene in the civil war that broke 
out between Duwa and Chapar in 1305-6.5 Temiir backed 
Duwa in this affair, and together they all but destroyed the 
Ogodei Khanate. In obedience to Temiir's orders, Qaishan 
12 marched west through the Altai in August and September, 
The Decline capturing several ranking members of Chapar s family, 
of the Steppe P^us Pa r t Chapar s horde and their tents. After that, he 
in Yuan Politics advanced to the Irtysh River and brought two other Mongol 
princes to surrender. Chapar fled and Rave himself up to 
Duwa, who had defeated him earlier in Transoxania and had 
seized his lands. Prince Qaishan then withdrew and entered 
winter quarters in the Altai.6 
Such, in brief, was the record of Qaishan's accomplish-
ments as princely overseer of the Yiian forces in the steppe. 
In the course of his eight years* guard duty in Mongolia, 
Qaishan had assembled a staff of veteran advisers and young 
adherents who proved themselves by defending the territory 
of the Great Qaghan against a spent but dangerous rival. They 
had the good fortune to confront Qaidu not at his prime but 
in his old age, after he had already suffered severe defeats. 
After Qaidu's death, they easily helped administer the coup 
de grace to what remained of the Ogodei Khanate. But in 
the present discussion what matters is not how much of the 
credit for putting down the Ogcidei line should be assigned 
to Qaishan and his men; what is important is that a set of 
primary personal loyalties had been formed around Qaishan 
during the course of the operations. In short, a Qaishan clique 
had come into being, and this clique would have a major 
political role to play in future Yiian history. 
The Qaishan clique did not have to wait long before making 
its first entry into Yiian dynastic politics. The emperor Temür 
had been ailing for some time and died without an heir on 
February 10, 1307. News of this event reached Qaishan and 
his men in the Altai in the spring of that year. Qaishan at 
once marched back to Qaraqorum where he held an assembly 
of imperial princes and sons-in-law to decide upon rewards 
and plan strategy. It was at this time that the Merkid Bayan 
was granted the title of haatur for his efforts in capturing 
two of Chapars adherents the year before.7 No doubt 
13 
Qaishan's issuing of such rewards at this time was linked to 
his designs upon the throne. 
There were, however, two other candidates. One was the 
prince of An-hsi Ananda, grandson of Qubilai through his 
third son Manggala, who held a momentary advantage in that T jw Dcc¡ ine 
he was already on the scene in Ta-tu. From the point of of the Steppe 
view of seniority, he had a strong claim to the throne. He in Yiian Politics 
had even once been heir apparent, from 1285 down to 1293, 
when Qubilai removed him and replaced him with Temiir. 
The empress dowager Bulughan backed him, as did the Chan-
cellor of the Left Aqutai and some others. But beyond a few 
court figures and handful of imperial princes, some of them 
former steppe enemies of the Yiian, Ananda commanded little 
support. He was rather unpopular. Although he had partici-
pated in the Yiian wars against Qaidu, mainly by defending 
west China and the Tangut territory, his disorderly and 
expensive administration of his princely fief in Shensi had 
on several occasions displeased the court and the bureauc-
racy.8 He was, moreover, a pious Moslem.9 The power 
realities dictated the need for some other choice. 
All eyes fell upon two brothers, Qaishan and Ayurbarwada, 
great-grandsons of Qubilai through his second son Jingim, 
who had been a popular heir apparent, but had died in 1285 
before reaching the throne.10 It was widely agreed that the 
imperial succession should lie with Jingim's heirs; Qubilai 
had decided as much when he named Temiir, who was 
Jingim's third and youngest son. The father of Qaishan and 
Ayurbarwada was Jingim's second son, Darmabala. 
Qaishan's younger brother Ayurbarwada, the second can-
didate, commanded substantial support, much more than his 
distant cousin Ananda; and the sources of his support were 
such as to place his candidacy in conflict with that of his 
brother in the steppes. Unlike Qaishan, Ayurbarwada had 
no experience of the steppes. In 1305, when he was twenty 
years old, he was assigned his late father's fief at Huai-ch'ing 
(Ch'in-yang, Honan), and Ayurbarwada took up residence 
there with his and Qaishan's mother, the Qunggirad *Targi.21 
Several well publicized acts served to establish his reputation 
for Confucian piety and virtue. His filial devotion to his 
mother, for example, was touching and reassuring. His con-
^ spicuous refusal to accept the sumptuous hospitality of the 
local officials through whose districts he passed on the way 
The Decline t o P o i n t e d UP his tender and solicitous concern for 
of the Steppe the burdens such extravagances imposed upon the common 
in Yuan Politics people. Another sign of the same concern was his appoint-
ment of one of his Chinese staff members to see to it that 
his military escort did not molest the villages.12 All of this 
was in large part show, calculated to have a certain political 
effect within a geographically Chinese context. He had a 
chance to exhibit more calculated behavior on his way to 
Ta-tu in March, 1307, having been secretly summoned by 
the Chancellor of the Right Harghasun and others. Arriving 
at the supposed tomb of Pi-kan, loyal counselor to the "bad 
last" king of the Shang Dynasty in the second millennium 
B. c., he reminded his entourage that the ancient king's lust 
had lost him his empire, and ordered a temple built in Pi-
kan's honor, "as an encouragement to later ages." That was 
in Wei-hui (Chi-hsien, Honan). Farther along, at the Chang 
River, Ayurbarwada and his party encountered a heavy snow-
storm. An old peasant appeared with an offering of coarse 
gruel, which the prince's aides spumed. "Anciently when 
emperor Kuang-wu of Han was hard-pressed by the enemy," 
lectured Ayurbarwada, 'lie ate bean gruel. A man who has 
never fully experienced hardship never learns of the toil 
involved in agriculture and as a result he becomes idle and 
arrogant." Ayurbarwada then ate the gruel and rewarded the 
old peasant. At Han-tan he told the local officials his fear 
that his guards and the clerical subbureaucracy might force 
too many exactions from the population, and assured them 
that he would have his staff watch out for these things.13 
These anecdotal reports of Ayurbarwada's behavior—his filial 
piety, his understanding of the primacy of agriculture, his 
openness to loyal advice (or to clique pressure), his concern 
for the peasantry, and his acquaintance with Chinese histori-
cal precedent—made it clear enough to all who cared to 
observe that as an imperial candidate he was offering a con-
ception of empire which was essentially China-centered. It 
was focused not upon the problems of the Mongol common-
wealth, of which China was one part, but upon the problem 
of the Mongol dynasty in China as an entity in itself. It was 
designed in large part to appeal to those conquest elements 
that had built their careers within the framework of the Yiian 
bureaucratic state, and not in steppe war. 
The elimination of Ananda as a candidate posed no special 
difficulty. Ayurbarwada and his supporters, who arrived in 
Ta-tu on March 20, 1307, arranged his removal by storming 
the palace, killing the Chancellor of the Left Aqutai, and 
arresting Ananda together with the empress dowager 
Bulughan, Temiir's widow.14 But the choice between Ayur-
barwada and Qaishan was momentarily an agonizing one. The 
mother of the two candidates consulted fortunetellers and 
thus betrayed her quandary. If Ayurbarwada was on the spot 
in Ta-tu and commanded the allegiance of the majority of 
the bureaucrats, Qaishan surely held a military edge; his 
steppe warriors might conceivably declare for an independent 
khanate in Mongolia, or make common cause with the 
Chaghatai Khanate, even if they did not undertake an inva-
sion of China. After frantic consultations it was decided that 
Ayurbarwada should voluntarily cede the throne to Qaishan, 
on condition that Ayurbarwada and not one of Qaishan's sons 
should be made heir apparent. Qaishan was notified of this 
decision, and after his initial suspicions were allayed, he 
marched south to the Yiian summer capital of Shang-tu (To-
lun, Chahar), where Ayurbarwada met him. He was already 
assured the backing of the steppe princes, with whom he 
had been in session in Qaraqorum. A second diet at Shang-tu 
gave him the support of the China-based princes, and on 
May 21 he formally assumed the throne.15 
In the edict Qaishan issued on this occasion, he listed his 
three qualifications for the imperial dignity: his military 
record, his genealogy, and his election by a diet of the imper-
ial princes. He strongly implied by this that he considered 
his credentials better than Qubilai's, for everyone knew that 
Qubilai's election to the throne in 1260 was essentially illegal 
because he was backed by a rump diet which he had hastily 
convened and not by a full assembly of princes. The collapse 
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of the Ógódei-Chaghatai alliance, moreover, came about 
while Qaishan was commanding; and in his edict, Qaishan 
likened his accomplishments to those of Chinggis Qan in a 
way which was indirect but obvious to anyone who knew 
The Decline ^ a s i c ^acts t ' i e r e c e n t Past- Chinggis Qan, he said, 
of the Steppe "bY military success pacified the empire (t'ien-hsia)." Qubilai, 
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attempted invasions of Japan and Southeast Asia were a mat-
ter of public record, "by civilized (i.e., nonmilitary) virtue 
harmonized all within the four seas."16 The contrast Qaishan 
was making was in large part spurious. Chinggis's military 
efforts fell short of empire (t'ien-hsia) in the usual Chinese 
sense; that was actually Qubilai's work. But Chinggis did 
pacify the nomad t'ien-hsia, and so too, in a sense, did 
Qaishan. 
The new emperor of course brought his personal adherents 
with him when he came to take the throne, and he saw to 
it that they received generous rewards and important posts 
in the new administration. To give some notable examples, 
among the principal beneficiaries of Qaishan's enthronement 
were the Tangut Ch'i-t ai-p'u-chi and his sons Yeh-erh-chi-ni 
and Li-jih. During the steppe wars, the father had organized 
a special military unit for Qaishan and had served him as 
an adviser. The first son was a guards commander, and the 
second, originally a follower of the Prince of Chin Kammala, 
Qaishan's cousin and nominal superior, went so far out of 
his way to keep Qaishan's household supplied with meat and 
his troops with grain that Qaishan eventually decided to lure 
him away from Kammala's staff and attach him to his own. 
All three at various times obtained the very highest bureau-
cratic positions in the Yiian state after Qaishan became 
emperor.17 The Qangli Toghto and his older brother A-sha 
Buqa, both of whom had performed a crucial diplomatic role 
in Qaishan's enthronement by maintaining a communications 
link between the steppe and the capital, received their due 
rewards; Toghto at various times held the positions of Chan-
cellor of the Left, head of the Chief Military Commission, 
and Censor-in-Chief.18 A-sha Buqa, who unlike his brother 
did not accompany Qaishan into the steppes, received the 
lesser position of Chief Administrator but was also made com-
mander of a newly created Qangli guard.19 The Qipchaq 
*Chong'ur was especially close to Qaishan, and as emperor 
Qaishan did more than provide him with bureaucratic 
position; as a reward for his defeat of Duwa's army in 1301, 
Qaishan married to him a girl of the imperial house, and 
made him commander of the Qipchaq guards.20 In 1309, 
moreover, *Chong'ur was invested with the newly created 
sixth-class princely fief of Chii-jung.21 *Chong'ur spent most 
of the rest of his career not in bureaucratic positions but 
in command of Yiian troops in the steppes. *Chong'ur's third 
son El Temiir was made a Vice Commissioner in the Office 
for Imperial Cuisine (Hsüan-hui yüan).22 The Merkid Bayan 
during Qaishan's reign became successively President of the 
Board of Civil Office, Vice Censor-in-Chief, Chief Adminis-
trator in Qaishan's new secretariat (the Shang-shu sheng)y 
and was for part of this time concurrently imperial commissar 
(clarughachi) of the newly organized right Asud (Alan) 
Guards.23 
The point to be drawn here is this: the Qaishan enthrone-
ment meant that military service in the steppe in this one 
instance constituted a public stepping stone, a means of joint 
entry, into the Yiian central bureaucracy at various levels 
depending upon individual age and experience. Yet such ser-
vice was by no means an ordinary prerequisite for those aspir-
ing to higher bureaucratic position. For the Mongols and their 
foreign (se-7nu) allies in China, service in the imperial guard 
at Ta-tu followed by a regular scale of upward promotion 
through the bureaucratic ranks was by far the most common 
route to high office.24 It was chiefly bureaucrats of this sort 
who provided support for Qaishan's brother Ayurbarwada. 
The position of the Qaishan group in the Yiian state depended 
entirely upon the unusual and essentially irregular circum-
stance of Qaishan's promotion from princely field commander 
to emperor. Had he not come to the throne, it is safe to 
guess that most of the clique would have ended their days 
in one or another obscure military post. What welded the 
members together was a common realization of their having 
participated in a significant event in the steppe, but even 
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more, of their singular good fortune in riding into high office 
on Qaishan's coattails. It is therefore not surprising that the 
clique later on came to revere Qaishan as a virtual dynastic 
founder, the father of an imperial line of succession. 
The Decline While much seems to have given the Qaishan clique a sense 
of the Steppe of common identity as the emperor's "old ministers," circum-
tn Yuan Politics stances acted to produce a split within this group. After a 
reign of four years, Qaishan died in January, 1311, at the 
age of thirty, and was succeeded by his younger brother Ayur-
barwada. He left two sons, both by secondary wives; the older 
was Qoshila, born in 1300, and the younger Tugh Temür, 
born in 1304.25 In the sources as we have them, there is 
no conclusive evidence of any agreement having been made 
on the question of the succession to Ayurbarwada. Perhaps 
the matter was left hanging, to be decided by some future 
diet of the princes. Only by Qaishan's partisans was it 
definitely asserted that one of Qaishan's sons was according 
to the agreement of 1307 to succeed Ayurbarwada.26 Their 
witness, however, is not unimpeachable. In any event, Ayur-
barwada, his mother, and their supporters decided that the 
succession should stay in Ayurbarwada's line. In August, 
1319, accordingly, Ayurbarwada's second son Shidebala was 
confirmed as heir-apparent, and in March, 1320, upon Ayur-
barwada's death, he succeeded to the throne as emperor.27 
In 1315 Ayurbarwada began to prepare the way for 
Shidebala's succession by taking steps to remove Qoshila from 
the political scene. In that year, he conferred upon Qoshila 
the first-class princedom of Chou, together with a large 
princely office (ch'ang-shih fu) consisting of forty-three 
ranked officials, and contributed a handsome sum of 400,000 
ingots (ting) in paper cash for the maintenance of his escort 
guards. The Merkid Bayan was originally made one of the 
seven chief officials (ch'ang-shih) in Qoshila's establishment, 
but for reasons which are obscure he was shortly afterwards 
transferred to be Vice Censor-in-Chief of the Kiangnan Cen-
sorate.28 Thus in 1316, when Qoshila was ordered to proceed 
with his officials to the distant southwestern province of Yun-
nan and take up residence there, Bayan did not accompany 
him and all further contact between the two came to an end. 
Qoshila never reached Yunnan, his proper destination, for 
events brought a radical change in his itinerary. Late in the 
year 1316, Qoshila and his party arrived in the city of Yen-an 
in north Shensi. There they met three of Qaishan's old fol- 1 9 
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pact with Li-jih and the others; they then made contact with 
the Shensi provincial capital of Feng-yiian (Sian) to the south, 
and got the leading officials of both the provincial administra-
tion and the Shensi Branch Censorate to join them in a plan 
to stage a rebellion in the name of Qaishan. The leading 
Shensi officials were inclined to go along in this, for they 
were enemies of Ayurbarwada's court officials, who had driv-
en them from the capital into what they considered to be 
political exile. The rebels' apparent aims were to force the 
removal of some of the high court officials and probably also 
to persuade the emperor, Ayurbarwada, to change his plans 
for the succession.30 An army was gathered; the rebels began 
to march east from Shensi, but the expedition ended when 
two of the lower ranking Shensi officials abruptly decided 
that the venture was bound to end in disaster and so mur-
dered their leaders.31 
The abortive uprising in which Qoshila's staff involved him 
bears all the hallmarks of poor planning and an unrealistic 
assessment of the current political situation. This fact may 
have contributed to a desire on the part of Qaishan's old 
ministers who stayed behind in China to dissociate them-
selves from their colleagues who followed Qoshila. Probably 
more important in engendering the split in the ranks of the 
Qaishan clique, however, was Qoshila's flight to the steppes 
after the failure of the uprising, and his subsequent isolation 
from China. Instead of proceeding to Yunnan, Qoshila and 
his group marched northwest into the grasslands, where on 
the western side of the Altai the reigning prince Esen Buqa 
of the Chaghatai Khanate warmly welcomed them. As an 
important political refugee from China, and as a claimant to 
the throne of the Great Qaghan, Qoshila might be of some 
possible future use to the Chaghataids. They assigned him 
summer and winter campgrounds and space for the planting 
of spring crops somewhere in the Tarbagatai.32 From here, 
in 1328, Qoshila would emerge again as a candidate for the 
Yuan throne. 
The Decline Qaishan's second son Tugh Temiir would also emerge in 
of the Steppe 1328 as an imperial candidate and an alternative rallying point 
in Yiian Politics for those of Qaishan's old followers who did not accompany 
Qoshila into the Tarbagatai. Ayurbarwada's son and successor 
Shidebala removed this younger heir of Qaishan's to the sub-
tropical island of Hainan in 1321 in order to forestall the 
incipient gathering of disaffected elements behind him.33 He 
was entirely isolated there; apparently none of the Qaishan 
clique was permitted to accompany him. In 1324, however, 
the emperor Yesiin Temiir recalled Tugh Temiir from Hainan, 
gave him the designation prince of Huai, and sent him out 
to reside in the Yangtze city of Nanking, surely a more favor-
able and central spot than Hainan.34 There he was able to 
patronize several well-known Chinese artists and litterateurs 
and demonstrate in his own way a sensitivity for Chinese 
cultural values.35 In this he resembled strongly his uncle 
Ayurbarwada. As twin candidates, one from the* steppe and 
the other based in China, Qoshila and Tugh Temiir in 1328 
appeared to be replaying the roles Qaishan and Ayurbarwada 
had played in 1307. The difference was that in 1328-29 the 
"Chinese candidate" and his backers did not have to compro-
mise with their rival, but were able to force him off the political 
stage entirely. 
This peculiar repetition of events on the dramatic but 
superficial level of dynastic politics leads one to suspect the 
existence of some more basic conflict of interest between the 
Mongols of the steppe and those settled in China, of which 
the recurring dual candidacies were in some way a reflection. 
But the very different resolution of the dual candidacy prob-
lem in 1328-29 would seem to indicate that an important 
realignment of forces in favor of China and to the disadvantage 
of the steppe had taken place over the preceding twenty 
years. In fact, as the discussion below should make clear, 
Qaishan in 1307 and his eldest son Qoshila in 1328-29 found 
themselves in profoundly different political circumstances 
largely because of the political and administrative transforma-
tion of the Mongolian steppe homeland. 
For the gradual imposition of administrative control over 
the steppe regions, as with almost everything else in Yiian ^ Decline 
history, the origins inevitably go back to Qubilai. One major 0f the Steppe 
result of Qubilai's accession in 1260 was the transfer of the in Yiian Politics 
political center of the Mongol empire from Mongolia to North 
China. This transfer entailed a basic reorganization of the 
state along traditional Chinese bureaucratic lines, whereby 
a tightly centralized regime built on the Chinese model came 
to exercise a predominant authority over the collection and 
disbursement of revenues. Regular official taxation collected 
by a centrally controlled bureaucracy came finally to replace 
the earlier irregular exactions of Mongol commanders, 
princes, and their Moslem tax farmers. While the state did 
not confiscate the North China appanages earlier parceled 
out to the princely descendants of Chinggis Qan and his 
brothers, it did gain the ability to interfere more and more 
in the administration and taxation of these appanages.36 Con-
sequently, from Qubilai's accession in 1260, the Mongol 
princes who remained in the steppes or who were domiciled 
in other parts of the Mongol empire found a China-based 
bureaucratic state, with a Mongol emperor as its chief execu-
tive, controlling direct access to their individual sources of 
revenue in China. To finance their struggles against Qubilai, 
they had to look to other, less lucrative sources of revenue. 
But Qubilai's strategy of locating the seat of the Great 
Qaghanate of the Mongol empire somewhere in the vicinity 
of its economic center of gravity in China meant that he had 
eventually to sacrifice the political and military leverage over 
the other parts of the world empire that the more central 
location in Mongolia had afforded. By moving into China, 
he lost forever the ability of his predecessors to manipulate 
succession in the Khanate of Chaghatai in Central Asia, and 
he transformed for a time the Mongolian homeland from the 
imperial center to an unstable and anarchic frontier zone. 
A number of important "rebel" movements were organized 
across the whole breadth of Inner Asia after Qubilai's ascent 
to the throne; these ranged from Manchuria in the east across 
Mongolia to the Chaghatai Khanate in Central Asia, precisely 
in those areas where political and administrative control was 
forfeited after the Great Qaghan\s removal to China. The lead-
The Decline rebels were Arigh Boke in Mongolia and Central Asia 
of the Steppe (1260-64); Nayan in upper Manchuria (1287); and Qaidu in 
in Yiian Politics Central Asia (1269-1301).37 
The fundamental issue in Qubilai's confrontation with these 
dissident movements was the proper ordering of the Mongol 
empire, or at least its eastern parts. Was it more advantageous 
to control the agrarian realms from a power center in the 
steppes, or to control the steppes from a power center in 
the agrarian realms? Qubilai's younger brother Arigh Boke 
made the first attempt to preserve the older political and 
administrative order, with its headquarters in Qaraqorum. 
His surrender to Qubilai in 1264 symbolized the collapse of 
an independent steppe regime in Mongolia before the 
superior military forces of a qaghan who had the supplies 
and resources of China at his disposal, and who could directly 
subsidize those princes who took his side as well as offer 
relief and remissions of levies and tributes to the steppe tribes 
who came over to him.38 Arigh Boke's greatest weakness lay 
in his inability to gain access to any major source of agrarian 
revenue; the Chaghatai khan Alughu (r. 1261-66), jealous of 
his newly gained independence, resisted Arigh Boke's 
attempt to secure the resources of Central Asia, and Arigh 
Boke in his extremity was forced to resort to savage measures 
in an unsuccessful effort to prevent defection in his camp.39 
It was under these circumstances that he decided to give 
in to Qubilai. Qubilai hoped to make an object lesson of Arigh 
Boke by treating him leniently. He received an agreement 
from Berke of the Golden Horde, Alughu in Central Asia, 
and Hiilegii in Iran that Arigh Boke should be spared.40 No 
doubt he hoped to impress upon the other steppe princes 
the futility of revolt and to encourage them to depend upon 
the benevolence of the Great Qaghan and his administration 
in Ta-tu for sustenance and leadership. 
Qubilai's gesture, however, was clearly insufficient to alter 
the nature of an entire frontier. While he turned to busy 
himself with the conquest of South China and other projects, 
Qaidu was able to put together another steppe movement 
which was a little more firmly based than Arigh Boke's had 
been. Qaidu's own patrimonial state, the ulus of Ogodei, cen-
tered between the Altai and Lake Balkhash, was not in itself 
sufficiently productive an area to permit the organization and 
supply of an armed force large enough to threaten Qubilai 
to any degree. But from the famous diet of 1269, held on 
the Talas, Qaidu imposed himself upon the Chaghatai 
Khanate to the extent that, unlike Arigh Boke, he was able 
to influence the basic orientation of that state and gain access 
to the agricultural resources of Transoxania and the oasis cities 
of the western Tarim basin. In 1274, as we have see, Qaidu 
helped place Duwa upon the Chaghatai throne, and thus 
cemented even more closely the Chaghatai and Ogodei pat-
rimonies.41 Qaidu's initial strategy appears twofold: to gain 
control of all of the oasis region west of the Yellow River 
in order to expand his resource base, and to seize Mongolia 
for its geographical advantages and its supply of military man-
power. Having gained this, he would possibly be in a position 
to begin dictating terms to Qubilai in China. Qaidu's effort 
peaked in the 1270s and 1280s. Qubilai lost the Uighur oasis 
cities of Beshbaliq and Qaraqojo; his Pacification Office 
(Hsiian-wei ssu) in Qaraqorum defected to the enemy; the 
walled grain depot of Ying-ch'ang (in present-day western 
Jehol province) did the same, and most threatening of all, 
in response to Qubilai's attempt to impose a centralized pro-
vincial administration over his territories and subject tribes, 
Nayan rebelled in upper Manchuria in 1287 and allied himself 
with Qaidu.42 
Qubilai's ability to put down Nayan and turn Qaidu out 
of Mongolia derives in large part from his richer supply base 
and greater administrative capabilities. Qaidu and Nayan 
were obliged to rely heavily on the thin margin of surplus 
that the steppe tribes, such as the Ba'arin on the Irtysh, or 
hunters and fishers, such as the Water Tatars (Shui Ta-ta) 
and Jiircheds of upper Manchuria and the Sungari region 
were able to provide.43 When this did not suffice, they had 
to make raids into settled areas—Nayan into Korea and the 
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Liao valley of lower Manchuria, and Qaidu into the eastern 
Tarim and Tangut territory.44 When Qubilai campaigned in 
^ the steppé regions, however, he first assembled his horses, 
weapons, and supplies in China; and far from having to rely 
The Decline o n e x a c ^ o n s from the tribes, he was able to cancel their offi-
of the Steppe obligations, provide them with relief, and in some cases 
in Yiian Politics resettle them.45 Moreover, as soon as Qubilai recovered an 
area, he secured communications by organizing horse relay 
stations which served to deny the possibility of rapid com-
munications and mobility to the opposition.46 By the time 
he died in 1294, Qubilai had secured Manchuria from Nayan 
and his allies and reestablished the province of Liaoyang 
there, and had succeeded in gaining the upper hand over 
Qaidu in Mongolia. For the Yuan Dynasty, tlie* crisis period 
of steppe reaction was definitely over with. It remained only 
to complete the process of shifting the imperial center from 
Mongolia to China by bringing the Mongolian steppe region 
under the direct administrative control of Ta-tu. Qubilai 
initiated this process in Manchuria; it was left to Qaishan, 
after the death of Qaidu and the collapse of the Central Asian 
opposition, to impose a similar provincial regime over Mon-
golia itself when he became emperor. 
Qaishan's integration of the Mongolian homeland into the 
Chinese administrative system made it all but certain that 
another opposition movement of potential danger to the Ytian 
state could not be raised in the steppe regions. His reduction 
of Mongolia to provincial status in 1307 combined with the 
construction in 1308 of a new imperial walled capital called 
Chung-tu (north of present-day Kalgan) were the two most 
obvious steps taken in this direction.47 Qaishan's imposition 
of a centralized bureaucratic network over Mongolia was 
important in a number of respects: it confirmed the policy 
trend begun earlier under Qubilai and Temiir of securing 
and extending the postal relay system; of ensuring military 
control through the use of Chinese garrison troops, par-
ticularly at Qaraqorum; and of extending this control through 
the development of military agricultural colonies (t'un-t'ien) 
in certain favored spots in the northern steppes.48 Equally 
important, the establishment of a provincial capital at 
Qaraqorum and a provincial bureaucracy staffed partly by 
Chinese afforded the central government an effective means 
of intruding into the relations between the steppe princes 
and the native tribesfolk. Owing to its near monopoly of grain 2 5 
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portion of the population to themselves as new recruits.49 
At the same time that he sought to alleviate popular distress 
directly, Qaishan also continued to provide relief grants and 
subsidies to the steppe people through the mediation of their 
ruling princes so that the princes and the provincial adminis-
tration might to some degree keep each other in check. 
Qaishan furthermore undertook to draw the steppe princes 
themselves closer to China by awarding them fiefs for the 
most part named after, and nominally identified with, ter-
ritorial divisions inside China. To be sure, Qubilai and Temiir 
had begun to award such fiefs, although on a limited scale. 
It was Qaishan who first gave them out in large number.50 
His intent seems to have been to substitute for the older 
generalized ranks of prince (wang) and grand prince (ta wang) 
a new and more precisely graduated scale of princely ranks 
of Chinese origin through which the emperor could control 
promotions and demotions.51 The net result of this dual 
strategy—of bureaucratizing Mongolia, and integrating the 
princes into a Chinese-style prestige system of rank and 
nomenclature, while granting jurisdiction over the settlement 
of princely disputes to one or another government agen-
cy—was to reduce the northern steppes to a postion of politi-
cal, economic, and administrative dependency upon the 
central government in China.52 
With the steppe lands of Mongolia swallowed into the 
Chinese imperial system, the zone of anarchy and instability 
which permitted the existence of opposition movements such 
as those of Arigh Boke and Qaidu, not to speak of Nayan 
in Manchuria, was severly reduced. For fifteen years after 
the administrative assimilation of Mongolia, however, frontier 
anarchy continued to exist along the Altai and Tarim border 
between the Yiian Dynasty and the Chaghatai Khanate, 
where intermittent raids and counterraids took place through 
the first half of the reign of the Chaghatai qan Kebek (r. 
^ 1318-28).53 The Prince of Chou Qoshila was posted in 
Chaghatai territory west of the Altai, as we have seen; and 
The Decline w^ a t w e know of him at this time is scant, it is 
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Dynasty.54 The raids stopped after 1323, when Kebek offered 
peace to the Yiian court. The reigning emperor Shidebala 
was happy to accept. "I do not at all want his land or his 
people," he remarked. "It is enough of a blessing if mv people 
do not suffer frontier disturbances and my troops are not 
overstrained. Now that he has come to submit, we should 
make his reward generous to put him at ease,"55 In 1325 
Shidebala's successor Yesiin Temiir sent a friendly embassy 
to Qoshila, treating him not as a prince subordinate to Yiian 
control—in spite of his title Prince of Chou—but as an 
autonomous prince on a level with the Chaghatai house, the 
Ilkhans of Persia, or the Golden Horde on the Volga. This 
fact can be seen in Qoshilas two return embassies to Ta-tu, 
where, according to the terminology employed, he presented 
"tribute" of furs and other items.58 Clearly, by the 1320s, 
sixty years after Qubilai's emergence, the Yiian empire had 
achieved its territorial maximum and was reaching adminis-
trative maturity behind a closed and stabilized frontier. 
It was in these circumstances that Qoshila came forth as 
the "steppe candidate" for the Yiian throne in 1328-29. The 
death of the emperor Yesiin Temiir in Shang-tu in Sep-
tember, 1328, precipitated a civil war between his partisans 
and another faction based in Ta-tu, spearheaded by several 
of Qaishan's "old ministers," most prominently the Qipchaq 
El Temiir. By November, Yesiin Temiir's partisans were 
crushed. Qoshila's younger brother Tugh Temiir was brought 
up to the capital where he provisionally assumed the throne 
on October 16, voicing an intention to abdicate as soon as 
his elder brother could be reached. The Ta-tu court duly 
made contact with Qoshila, who set out eastward from the 
Tarbagatai. On February 27, 1329, north of Qaraqorum, he 
assumed the throne as emperor. On May 5, El Temiir came 
in person to deliver to him the imperial seal. Tugh Temiir 
stepped down and became heir apparent.57 It was then 
arranged that Qoshila should move south from Qaraqorum 
while his younger brother traveled north from Ta-tu, and 
that they should meet each other in joyous reunion at a place 
roughly equidistant between Shang-tu and Ta-tu.58 It is evi-
dent, however, that Tugh Temiir and his supporters did not 
intend Qoshila's reign to be a long one. Qoshila may have 
suspected something; once inside China he ordered stricter 
night watches.59 The meeting of the two brothers took place 
on August 26; four days later, at the age of twenty-nine, 
Qoshila was dead. The annals (pen-chi) explicitly state that 
the death was by violence; outsiders suspected the use of 
poison.60 Tugh Temiir became emperor once again. 
Behind the candidacy of Qoshila, however, lay Chaghatai 
support, and an episode in Chaghatai history which the stan-
dard accounts neglect. Qoshila's candidacy was one last case 
of major political interaction between two major realms of 
the Mongol empire. As is well known, the Chaghatai Khanate 
was hard put to achieve internal stability owing to the striking 
political, geographical, and religious polarities that existed 
within the confines of its realm. It first of all freed itself from 
the political manipulation of Qaraqorum only after 1260 when 
Qubilai transferred the Great Qaghanate to China. Shortly 
after that, however, the Chaghatai realm fell under Qaidu's 
domination. Qaidu's general policy of drawing in orderly fash-
ion upon the revenues of both Transoxania (Moslem) and the 
Tarim oases (Moslem, Buddhist, Nestorian) in order to help 
finance the conquest of Mongolia as a central point from 
which to control the conquered agricultural areas round 
about, succeeded for a time in providing some inner logic 
and consistency to Chaghatai affairs. But after the passing 
of Qaidu, the Chaghatai Khanate regained its independence 
only to fall victim to the latent contradictions within it. The 
rulers were confronted with the choice either of partial 
denomadization, leaning westward towards Transoxania and 
Islam, with the possibility of lucrative raiding operations into 
Persia, Afghanistan, and India; or of retaining the full nomadic 
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regime and looking eastwards from the Ili and the Tarbagatai 
towards China and the possibility of political intervention in 
Yiian affairs. Qoshila, of course, personified this second alter-
2 8 native. His enthronement, supported by the Chaghatai 
The Decline khanate, would demonstrate the viability of the eastern alter-
ofthe Steppe n a t i y e and would serve to show that the Mongol empire was 
in Yiian Politics still in some sense a living reality, greater than any of its 
component parts, precisely because the key issue of succes-
sion to the throne of the Great Qaghanate could be settled 
on the basis of common consultation among all the leading 
Mongol princes, and not purely on the basis of political man-
euvering within the Chinese Yiian realm alone. 
A few facts may help illustrate the Chaghatai options. The 
Chaghatai qan Kebek, after making peace with the Yiian 
Dynasty in 1323, turned his attention to the western or Trans-
oxanian portion of his realm where, without accepting Islam 
himself, he posed as a protector of the faith and entered into 
the settled administrative life of the country to a sufficient 
degree to build a palace near Nakhshab and strike in his 
own name the first Chaghatai coinage.61 After his death in 
1326 or 1327, his successor Eljigitei apparently turned the 
whole orientation of the state away from Transoxania back 
to the Ili region, where he joined Qoshila with a view to 
supporting the latter's claim to the Yiian throne. The 
"Chaghatai prince" who escorted Qoshila eastward to 
Qaraqorum was apparently Eljigitei himself.62 In April, 1329, 
Qoshila, who had assumed the throne and was still at 
Qaraqorum, informed an emissary from the Ta-tu govern-
ment that he planned to convoke a grand Mongol diet for 
the purpose of confirming his accession. "When I arrive at 
Shang-tu," he ordered, "the princes of the various khanates 
(tsung-fan chu-wang) will definitely all come to gather 
together. This is not to be compared to an ordinary court 
assembly. The Chaghatai prince, for one, has followed me 
for a long distance. The authorities must make all preparations 
to receive him. You and your colleagues in the Central Chan-
cellery (chung-shu) will discuss the matter."63 
The diet was never held, and Qoshila's nominal reign as 
Yiian emperor ended four months later with his assassination 
at the hands of his younger brother's partisans. Apparently 
Qoshila had not expected any major hindrance to his 
enthronement in China, since it seems clear that he and his 
Chaghatai ally were not prepared to invade that country in 2 9 
case of opposition.64 It would probably have been difficult ^ _ , 
r .. , , . I he Decline 
in any case tor Qoshila to gather a large army on the spot 0f the Steppe 
in Mongolia because there was a severe drought there in in yfl(in p0HtiCS 
the summer of 1329, and when Qoshila ordered the issuance 
of grain relief, he did so through the administrative agencies 
back in China, which indicates that he probably had no mas-
sive stocks of grain himself.65 One is tempted to conclude 
that Qoshila and his backers had no knowledge or grasp of 
the power realities inside China and were led to believe that 
Mongol political unity could be restored from within, as it 
were—through the automatic operation of the laws of succes-
sion, without a determined and organized movement behind 
them to substantiate their claim. They seem to have been 
unaware that the workings of Yiian domestic politics were 
responsible for the civil war that cleared the way for the resto-
ration of Qaishan's line, and that the Mongol and se-mu 
bureaucrats in China who guided that effort might oppose 
Qoshila's exploitation of their victory in the interest of an 
extraneous group that had no part in the affair. Tugh Temiir's 
partisans were too clever flatly to oppose Qoshila's assumption 
of the throne; to do so might have given Qoshila an excuse 
to organize a determined steppe opposition. As it was, 
Qoshila's backing dissolved immediately after his assassina-
tion. Eljigitei apparently went home without a struggle, for 
he entered into amicable relations with Tugh Temiir's court 
which lasted until his own death or removal in 1330 or so. 
It is significant that Qoshila made plain in his imperial pro-
nouncements his intention to preserve in its entirety the 
administrative organization of the Yiian empire.66 In 
Qaraqorum he dismissed Yesiin Temiir's provincial officials 
and replaced them with his own appointees, but he made 
no effort to wreck the administration his father had created.67 
In 1307 his father had emerged from an autonomous and 
anarchic Mongolia to assume the Yiian throne in China. Had 
he been assassinated at that time the consequences might 
have been serious for Ayurbarwada and his supporters. 
Qaishan was in command of a battle-tested army, which at 
the time was the key to determining whether Mongolia fell 
30 within the Yiian or the Chaghatai-Ogodei orbit. He had the 
The Decline suPPor t °f ^ e steppe princes, who were expecting certain 
of the Steppe benefits from his enthronement. To a very great degree, 
in Yiian Politics therefore, Qaishan's accession was the product of an as yet 
unstabilized frontier. But Qaishan himself created the condi-
tions that would make it impossible for his eldest son to follow 
in his footsteps. By 1328 Mongolia was integrated into an 
imperial system whose controlling levers lay in China and 
not in Mongolia. Unless Qoshila had somehow been willing 
to demolish this structure, his steppe candidacy lacked all 
substance. Since he did not attempt to demolish it, and thus 
reduce the steppe zone to anarchy once again, his idea of 
reaffirming the unity of the Mongol empire was completely 
unreal. His assassination proved that the Yiian Dynasty had 
triumphed over the Mongol empire. Thus did Yiian domestic 
politics win at the expense of Mongol unity; thus was it finally 
determined that the Mongol ruler in China was Yiian emperor 
first and foremost and Great Qaghan only in name. 
Chapter II 
The Restoration of 1328 
The transition of Mongolia from imperial 
center (until 1260) to a state of anarchy (1260-1307) and finally 
to a position of administrative subordination to the Yiian 
Dynasty (after 1307) was mirrored in China by an almost 
inverse process: from subordination to rule from Mongolia 
(until 1260) to the consolidation of a centralized bureaucratic 
state under Qubilai in China (1260-94), and finally to the 
extension of this political and administrative centralism over 
the Mongolian steppe region (after 1307). The abortive 
attempt of Qoshila to become emperor in 1329 shows that 
the decline of steppe anarchy and independence had 
destroyed any further possibility of using Mongolia as a base 
from which an extraneous force might seize power in China. 
After the enthronement of Qaishan in 1307, Yiian political 
and dynastic history was almost entirely a reflection of 
struggles internally generated. This was certainly true of the 
restoration of 1328, which put Qaishan's younger son Tugh 
Temiir upon the Yiian throne. 
The restoration of 1328 not only marked the definite pass-
ing of the steppe frontier as a factor in politics; it constituted 
an important turning point in the internal political history 
of the Yiian Dynasty as well. The event involved a major 
turnover in bureaucratic personnel at the higher levels of 
the central government. It erased an earlier set of cliques 
and alliances, and brought into prominence a new group of 
individuals and clans, many of which retained their influence 
down to the end of the dynasty forty years later. Perhaps 
more significant, the restoration signaled the beginning of 
a new shift in the ideological orientation of the Yiian state. 
The year 1328 laid the groundwork for the thorough Con-
fucianization of government, which, except for a short reac-
tionary period under the Merkid Bayan from 1335 to 1340 
characterized Yiian rule down to its end. 
On the face of it, there was little that could he termed 
32 Confucian in the tumultuous events of 1328 and 1329. The 
Qipchaq El Temiir and the Merkid Bayan, the coup leaders, 
toration w e r e themselves hardly Confucian in orientation, and they 
of 1328 ¿id not consciously strive to achieve Confucian ends. Nor 
was the imperial line they restored, that of Qaishan, at all 
historically associated with the promotion and encouragement 
of Confucian bureaucrats or their doctrine. The restoration, 
nevertheless, opened the way to the emergence of Confucian-
ism as the dominant working ideology of government. The 
time was ripe for it. The Mongol war machine had completed 
its tasks, and the point had long since been reached where, 
in the traditional scheme of things, the conqueror on horse-
back must step down and the peaceful administrator take 
over. For the Yiian, this also meant that side by side with 
the gradual shift from war to peace there must come a change-
over in bureaucratic groups. The finance experts who had 
made up the earlier ruling cliques had been essential in 
gathering the revenues necessary to support the monarch as 
commander in chief during wartime. Yet once the need for 
warfare on the frontiers declined, the role of the finance 
experts became less obviously important. Always the incarna-
tions of evil in the Confucian typology of official morality, 
the finance experts increasingly became vulnerable to attack 
from within the bureaucracy. 
That Yiian leadership had to change as historical conditions 
changed was perhaps clear enough. However, the circum-
stances prior to the restoration of 1328 which allowed the 
specific emergence of Confucianism, or rather Neo-
Confucianism, require some preliminary explanation, inas-
much as Neo-Confucianism, the former heresy of Southern 
Sung times, was not the only possible ideological alternative 
to the Legalism or crypto-Legalism of the ruling financial 
ministers. There was, for example, the Tung-p'ing school, 
or as it is sometimes termed, the "literary faction." As its 
name indicates, it was a regional group of Northern Chinese 
officials from Tung-p mg in present-day Shantung province. 
It achieved its high point of influence early in Qubilai's reign. 
In 1262 its patron, the prime minister Wang Wen-t'ung, 
accused of conspiracy with the Shantung satrap Li T an, was 
executed, and the Tung-p'ing faction was in time replaced 3 3 
in power by another group, the finance experts, largely but ^ 
not entirely of Central Asian origin. Tung-p'ing men, how- Restora 
ever, remained prominent in government, especially in the 0fl328 
Han-lin Academy, down to the beginning of the fourteenth 
century. The Tung-p'ing school and its ideology served for 
a time as an important counterfoil to the Neo-Confucians. 
Tung-p'ing thought, vaguely Confucian rather than insistently 
and stridently Neo-Confucian, was less narrowly moralistic, 
concentrating as it did upon the cultivation of the purely liter-
ary Chinese art forms, both new and traditional, as well as 
upon the reintroduction of traditional Chinese methods of 
administration (Han-fa) into the Mongol conquest regime. 
For reasons which remain to be explored, however, the Tung-
p'ing school failed to perpetuate itself. By the early fourteenth 
century, the burden of opposition to the ruling administration 
became almost entirely a monopoly of the Confucian group.1 
Confucianism as a bureaucratic ideology enjoyed certain 
long-term political advantages under the conditions of Mon-
gol rule that the incipiently nationalistic Tung-p'ing move-
ment lacked. It was an importation from South China and, 
as such, was less tied to purely regional associations than 
Tung-p'ing thought. This was true even though the Neo-
Confucian movement in its early stages in North China was 
itself organized partly as a regional response to Tung-p'ing 
domination, and eventually took over the Imperial University 
just as the Tung-p'ing men had taken over the Han-lin 
Academy.2 Membership in the Confucian movement was, 
moreover, inherently more open than was the case with the 
Tung-p'ing. Not only was the Confucian movement in the 
bureaucracy eager to overarch regional differences within 
China; it was also eager to cross ethnic boundaries and bid 
for members from among the conquest groups—the Mongols 
and se-mu (mainly Central Asiatics). This it could do partly 
because it did not demand Sinification as the price of admit-
tance. The Confucian approach to the problem of ethnic cleav-
age in the Yiian period was to transcend it. Above Mongol 
and Chinese, conqueror and conquered alike, sat the eternal, 
immutable, and essentially simple political and moral princi-
ples of the doctrine, true in all times and places. While the 
Tjw obligations of filial piety linked Mongols to Mongol forebears 
Restoration Chinese to Chinese, not permitting either to "forget their 
of 1328 origins" (wang-pen), the cumulative demands of the other 
key tenets of Confucianism as a system of moral suasion 
(chiao-hua) required the debasement of national culture, 
Mongol or Chinese, to the level of folk custom (feng-su), 
of which the moral value might range from neutral through 
successive levels down to the positively evil. It was, indeed, 
the duty of chiao-hua to act upon and improve feng-su.3 Far 
from requiring the mastery of the Chinese literary tradition 
for its own sake, as did the Tung-p'ing school, Confucianism 
as a political and moral ideology placed primary emphasis 
upon the the acceptance and cultivation of its behavioral prin-
ciples, considering literary training as no more than one 
means to this end, an ancillary discipline at best. As an 
ideological system to which the national literary tradition 
stood in an ambiguous and not a fundamental relationship, 
Confucianism undoubtedly was the more accessible to the 
alien in China, either directly or through translation. Perhaps 
the movement even welcomed alien blood. "The basic charac-
ter of the Mongol is solid and simple and as yet undif-
ferentiated," the Neo-Confucian Hsii Heng is quoted as hav-
ing said. "He is capable of giving undivided attention and 
effort. If placed in a suitable company of his peers and allowed 
to develop himself for a few years, he will inevitably become 
an excellent servant of the state."4 
It would appear that the Yiian monarchy consistently 
favored Neo-Confucianism over the Tung-p'ing tendency, if 
the record of officially sponsored translation from Chinese 
into Mongolian is any guide. Most popular were the Four 
Books, the Hsiao ching, the Tzu-chih t'ung-chien, the Ta-
hsüeh yen-i and the Chen-kuan cheng-yao, either in whole 
or in part. Conspicuously absent are any translations from 
the masters of Chinese literature: no Tu Fu, for example; 
no Po Chii-i.5 This notable lack of imperial favor, if such 
it is, is difficult to explain in view of the willingness of the 
Tung-p'ing group to help Qubilai achieve a centralized 
monarchy at the expense of the "feudal" establishment, the 
appanaged Mongol nobility (t'ou-hsia), a class whose con- 3,5 
tinued existence Confucian theory tended to favor and to ^ 
whom Confucian bureaucrats often looked for patronage and Restoration 
support.6 It may be surmised, however, that Qubilai as 0f 132s 
monarch found it advantageous to encourage the Confucian 
movement rather than the Tung-p'ing, even though at the 
time the Confucian attitude toward uncontrolled autocracy 
appeared somewhat less favorable. As is well known, Qubilai's 
tightly centralized government in China came to be staffed 
in accordance with a system of ethnic classes which, in order 
of precedence, were (I) Mongols; (2) se-mu; (3) Han-jen, or 
Northern Chinese, plus Sinicized Jiircheds, Khitans, and 
Koreans; and (4) Nanjen, or Southern Chinese. According 
to Meng Ssu-ming's analysis, the system was designed for 
two over-all purposes; to ensure the dominance of the Mon-
gols and se-mu in the Yiian bureaucracy at Chinese expense, 
and to safeguard monarchical leverage over the bureaucracy 
by using one ethnic group to check another within any major 
organ of the government.7 But if in these circumstances fac-
tional divisions should coincide with the ethnic classes—and 
the Tung-p'ing movement looked very much like a strictly 
ethnic Han-jen faction—the system would be in great danger 
of degenerating into bureaucratic civil war. Consequently, 
the monarchy was careful to put members of every faction 
into each level of the ethnic hierarchy. Qubilai, for example, 
saw to it that each faction had its proper ethnic mixture and 
was patronized at the top by Mongols and se-mu.8 The ethnic 
class system itself came to be looked upon as sacrosanct in 
theory. In spite of the large amount of latent dissatisfaction 
with it on the part of the Chinese, it was violated only surrep-
titiously by various modes of irregular and illegal circumven-
tion, and was never raised to the dignity of a major political 
issue. 
A milestone in the Yiian bureaucracy was reached in 1315, 
when Ayurbarwada for the first time in the Yiian period 
instituted the civil service examination system. Its institution 
had long been delayed owing in large part to the dispute 
between the Confucian and Tung-p'ing factions over what 
the proper subject matter should be.9 Ayurbarwada settled 
the issue in favor of the Confucians. He scrapped the tradi-
The tional Sung examination, with its emphasis upon metrical 
Restoration composition, demanded by the Tung-p'ing school, and specifi-
of 1328 cally directed that the contents be restricted almost entirely 
to questions on Confucian ideology, principally the Four 
Books with Chu Hsi's commentary. Metrical composition was 
explicitly excluded on the grounds of its irrelevance and 
frivolity (fou-hua). While acting to prevent a complete 
bureaucratic revolution by restricting the triennial quotas to 
a mere 300 chii-jen and 100 chin-shih, the emperor 
strengthened the multinational character of the Confucian 
movement without prejudicing the ethnic class system itself. 
He did so by dividing the quotas equally among the four 
ethnic groups, thus giving the numerically fewer Mongols 
and se-mu a distinct advantage over the Chinese.10 
In addition, the system of guaranteed recommendations 
(pao-chü)9 put into practice as a bureaucratic recruiting 
device for the first time in 1298, was revived, Confucianized, 
and extended to the prospective examinees. The Tung-p'ing 
faction had originally urged pao-chii upon the government 
as a corrective to the prevailing yin system which provided 
access to office through hereditary privilege.11 According to 
the pao-chü system, officials at various levels were made to 
recommend two or three "honest and capable" men for 
employment, and were held liable for punishment if their 
recommendations turned out to be false or inaccurate.12 The 
system was, however, sparingly used. The revived pao-chü 
system was based upon more typically Confucian qualifica-
tions for office. As a preliminary screening device for examina-
tion candidates, the new pao-chii demanded evidence of filial 
piety, fraternal submission, righteousness, knowledge of the 
classics, and correct behavior rather than "honesty and 
capability."13 The intent behind this change was to replace 
functional criteria with ideological and moral desideratives 
as the more prestigious basis for official recruitment. 
By the reign of Ayurbarwada, only two major factional 
alignments remained in the central bureaucracy: the rising 
Confucians and their bitter opponents, the successors of the 
financial managers of Qubilai's time. Ayurbarwada utilized 
both. He counterbalanced his Confucianizing tendencies by 
simultaneously employing the financier, Temiider, as his 
head of government and chief financial adviser. Temiider's Tjw 
job was not an easy one, however. Since the squeezing of Restoration 
revenues was no longer related to the exigencies of warfare of 1328 
but rather to increasing court and administrative costs, Temü-
der's financial operations provoked an insurmountable resist-
ance in the bureaucracy and in society. In 1276 the financier 
Ahmad had been able to stifle the Confucian opposition to 
his policies temporarily but effectively. Temiider, however, 
had a much more difficult task in 1315. He was not only 
obliged to bargain with his opposition, allowing it to institute 
the examination system, but was forced to cancel a fund-
raising scheme of his own when the landlords of South China 
threatened to rebel rather than submit their tax registers to 
inspection and verification by his agents.14 Temiider and his 
faction managed with the help and support of the monarchy 
to survive this serious defeat, but they found themselves con-
stantly on the defensive against an emboldened Confucian 
enemy, especially within the Censorate. 
Matters came to a severe crisis in 1320. The emperor, 
Ayurbarwada, died on March 1 of that year, and was suc-
ceeded by his son Shidebala, the candidate favored by Temii-
der and Ayurbarwada's mother, the Qunggirad empress 
dowager *Targi.15 The opposition considered the succession 
to be a violation of an agreement supposedly made between 
Qaishan and Ayurbarwada, whereby the throne was to have 
passed from the latter to one of Qaishan's sons. Resistance 
to Temiider mounted; already in 1319 he had been forced 
into temporary retirement as a result of a savage censorial 
attack upon him.16 He returned to power as Chancellor of 
the Right upon Shidebala's accession, and used the opportu-
nity to execute three of his chief detractors.17 In so doing, 
he unwittingly produced a Confucian martyrology for the 
future. 
In 1323 the crisis reached an extreme and ended in the 
assassination of the reigning emperor, Shidebala. When both 
Temiider and the empress *Targi died in 1322, apparently 
of natural causes, Shidebala shifted his political ground, gave 
his blessing to the Confucian opposition, and permitted it 
to undertake a purge against Temiider's relatives and support-
ers in the bureaucracy, executing them and confiscating their 
The Properties." But the purge was arrested in mid course. 
Restoration Temiider's party rallied its forces, assassinated the emperor 
of 1328 and his Confucianizing Chancellor of the Right, and arranged 
to have an imperial cousin, the Prince of Chin Yesiin Temiir, 
come down from his quarters in Qaraqorum to ascend the 
throne as their patron and protector.19 
Yesiin Temiir ruled as emperor from 1323 to 1328. 
Although he repudiated the cabal immediately responsible 
for the murders, he refused to go further and allow an all-out 
purge of the anti-Confucians in the bureaucracy. In fact, after 
disposing of the assassins, he came to base his rule upon 
a policy of reconciliation for all sides. This satisfied Temiider's 
former adherents, but was a severe disappointment to those 
Confucian elements whose memory of Temiider's unavenged 
victims was keen.20 They were eager to resume the purge 
that Shidebala's assassination had ended. 
T H U S did matters stand on the eve of the restoration. The 
bureaucratic conflict, which Yesiin Temiir had succeeded in 
suppressing for five years, came to the surface again in Aug-
ust, 1328, when he died in the summer capital of Shang-tu. 
The desire for revenge on the part of the Confucians, 
unleashed by the emperor's death, was ultimately responsible 
for the success of the coup d'etat which brought Tugh Temiir 
to the throne because it assured the leaders of the coup, 
men not consciously acting for Confucian ends, the indispens-
able element of substantial bureaucratic support. 
It had been known since early spring of 1328 that Yesiin 
Temiir was critically ill. Just before his departure for Shang-tu 
on May 5 a conspiracy was planned and organized. Its aim 
was to put Tugh Temiir on the throne as soon as Yesiin Temiir 
died. Some conspirators positioned themselves at the main 
capital of Ta-tu in preparation for seizing control of govern-
ment. Others were placed among Yesiin Temiir's entourage 
at Shang-tu for the purpose of murdering his chief partisans 
among the high officials and imperial princes there. When 
Yesiin Temiir did die on August 15, however, his supporters 
at Shang-tu managed to outmaneuver the conspirators there, 
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arresting and later executing eighteen of them.22 The other ' ' 
group of conspirators at Ta-tu had therefore to go ahead with ^ 
their part of the plot alone. On September 8, at dawn, the Restora 
leader of these men, the Qipchaq El Temiir, at the time of 1328 
Assistant Commissioner in the Chief Military Commission, 
led a squadron of troops into one of the palaces and arrested 
a group of Yesiin Temiir's officials who were in conference 
there.23 This move gave the conspirators immediate control 
of the central bureaucracy, as well as access to the financial 
resources of the Buddhist monasteries of the capital, which 
ordinarily served as mercantile and banking institutions to 
the imperial household. El Temiir at once appointed a new 
staff of ministerial officials, used the monastic funds to 
purchase military supplies, and made arrangements for the 
defense of the capital. He then dispatched envoys to bring 
the imperial candidate Tugh Temiir up from Chiang-ling on 
the Yangtze.24 Tugh Temiir departed Chiang-ling on Sep-
tember 18 and on October 1, escorted by the Chief Ad-
ministrator of Honan province, the Merkid Bayan, he arrived 
in Ta-tu.25 On October 16 he provisionally assumed the 
throne, pending the arrival of his elder brother Qoshila from 
the steppes.26 
Yesiin Temiir's supporters at Shang-tu were evidently 
caught off guard by this sequence of events in Ta-tu. El 
Temiir had seized control of the government, installed an 
emperor, and by throwing a blockade north of the capital, 
was challenging the Shang-tu party to come south and fight 
its way back into power. One small point in Shang-tu's favor 
was the blatant illegality of Tugh Temiir's accession, together 
with the fact that the conspirators were obliged to issue edicts 
without the validating mark of the imperial seal, which Shang-
tu retained. Responding to the difficulty into which El Te-
miir's swift moves had forced them, Yesiin Temiir's ministers 
proceeded to organize themselves for retaliation. Sometime 
during the ninth lunar month (October 4 to November 1) 
the Shang-tu party put up its own emperor, Yesiin Temiir's 
eight-year-old son and heir apparent, Aragibag.27 It made 
use of what resources it had at hand to issue its own paper 
currency and gather armies to attack Ta-tu.28 Of the provinces 
4 0 of the Yiian empire, five at one point or another declared 
^ themselves for the Shang-tu side: Liaoyang and Lingpei (i.e., 
toration Manchuria a n (J Mongolia), Shensi, Kansu, Szechwan, and 
of 1328 Yunnan.29 The loyalist armies, led by various princes, nobles, 
and provincial officials, penetrated El Temiir's defenses on 
the north and east and advanced as far as the outer walls 
of Ta-tu by late October and early November, forcing the 
insurgents to conscript the civilian inhabitants to help defend 
the city.30 
El Temiir's over-all strategy rested upon the exploitation 
of two broad advantages. One was that his initiative in seizing 
the bureaucratic and administrative center of the realm 
assured him an incalculable material advantage over Shang-
tu. The provinces that declared for Shang-tu were geographi-
cally peripheral and economically poor compared to the core 
regions of China. The province of Shensi, potentially one 
of the richer provinces, was in the throes of a ruinous famine 
in 1328 and 1329 and consequently was of less aid to the 
Shang-tu side than it might otherwise have been.31 El Temiir 
held the metropolitan province of Chung-shu, together with 
Honan, and above all the three rich Kiangnan provinces of 
Hukuang, Kiangsi, and Kiangche. To be sure, certain 
imponderable factors, such as a bandit insurrection in Kiang-
nan, or treachery on the part of the Merkid Bayan, or active 
Korean support to the Shang-tu side, might have tipped the 
scales against the restoration.32 As it turned out, however, 
the core provinces held firm, thanks partly to El Temiir's 
swift removal and execution of opposition elements in the 
provincial governments. Despite the absence of the imperial 
seal, the insurgents were able to command the provincial and 
local bureaucracies and through them impose extra duties 
of forced labor, weapons manufacture, and rations deliveries 
upon the population.33 The Shang-tu armies were at a com-
parative disadvantage. Once they entered North China, they 
had to forfeit popular sympathy and supply themselves by 
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looting the villages. El Temiir was quick to provide relief 
to the areas the Shang-tu forces disrupted, and so capitalized 
upon one major weakness of the loyalists.34 Since he control-
led the economic heart of the Yiian realm and could use the 41 
regular bureaucracy to exploit it, El Temiir forced his oppo-
nent to act the part of an invader dependent upon casual 
local plunder for supplies. Though an insurrectionist, he 0fl328 
made his own side appear the true defender of security and 
order. 
A second advantage of great importance to the restoration 
was the fact that no one single important political or military 
power group in insurgent territory proved entirely loyal to 
the Shang-tu side once El Temiir seized control in Ta-tu in 
the name of Qaishan's line. Two groups potentially capable 
of determining the outcome of the struggle were the imperial 
princes and the elite military units. The great majority of 
the princes, however, remained aloof. Only twelve fought 
actively on the Shang-tu side, some of them for obvious per-
sonal reasons.35 Not one of the elite military guards units 
at Ta-tu, which in the circumstances were remarkably free 
to bolt sides, threw all of its support to Shang-tu. Several 
of them were cleanly split, with one half fighting for Shang-tu 
and the other for the restoration.36 The palace guards and 
the elite units at Shang-tu were not entirely loyalist in sym-
pathy either; some of the commanders there defected to Ta-tu 
with their troops.37 The two great noble Mongol clans, the 
Qunggirad and the Jalair, with semi-autonomous appanages 
in eastern Mongolia and Manchuria plus large holdings in 
China, saw no special advantage in giving full support to 
either party, and in fact committed a few members to both 
sides.38 For the geographically and materially disadvantaged 
Shang-tu loyalists to succeed in their aim of regaining control 
at the center, it was of course imperative that they hold the 
allegiance of at least a few key power groups there. Even 
though El Temiir's active supporters may have been no great-
er in number than those backing Shang-tu, the very wide-
spread apathy, or calculated neutrality, on the part of many 




Temiir's favor. The young emperor Aragibagand his partisans 
at Shang-tu were fatally disadvantaged by the lack of die-hard 
enthusiasm for their cause inside China. 
The Shang-tu loyalist effort collapsed on November 14, 
1328, after two months of warfare. El Temiir's forces having 
surrounded the city, the Chancellor of the Right Daula-shah 
of 1328 came out and surrendered,'bringing with him the imperial 
seal. This he presented to Tugh Temiir at a ceremony in 
Ta-tu on November 23. On December 26 Daula-shah was 
executed and his corpse exposed in the market place. The 
Prince of Liang, Ongchan, one of the few loyalist commanders 
not killed in battle, was ordered to commit suicide.39 The 
fate of the unfortunate young emperor Aragibag is unclear; 
there is a slight possibility, however, that he survived the 
debacle.40 Not through luck, but through their initiative and 
superior strategy, exploiting popular apathy and bureaucratic 
discontent, the restoration forces triumphed. 
Not a single issue, but a complex tangle of personal and 
group interests brought together the forces that produced 
the coup d'etat of 1328. The restoration of the imperial line 
of Qaishan was the slogan which lent all the participants a 
cloak of righteousness and a degree of unity but, because 
only a handful of men with real personal ties to Qaishan actu-
ally took part in the event, its true political meaning was 
neither so simple nor so profound as it might appear. Only 
for the leaders of the coup did Qaishan serve to symbolize 
personal interests and bureaucratic identities. 
It is related that when plotters first approached El Temiir 
with a plan for a coup d'etat, he was shocked and alarmed 
at the idea.41 But as he weighed the pros and cons in his 
mind, his thoughts must have flickered briefly over the for-
tunes of his recent ancestral history. There was his great-
grandfather, who surrendered to the Mongols, fought under 
Móngke in the Caucasus and under Qubilai in China and 
Mongolia, and in reward for his exertions was put into the 
Imperial Guards (su-wei), with a girl of the imperial house 
for a wife. His Qipchaq followers were accorded the privilege 
of being made koumiss-brewers (qarachi) to the imperial 
household. There was his grandfather Tughtugha (d. 1297), 
who succeeded to the Imperial Guards position, and over 
a period of a quarter century compiled a brilliant military ^ 
record against Arigh Boke, Nayan, and Qaidu. For his efforts, 
he too was given a girl of the imperial house, and in addition T jw 
was made a member of the appanaged nobility, being Restoration 
awarded extensive grants in lands and households in North of 1328 
and South China. Nor was that all. In 1286 Qubilai set up 
a new elite military unit, the Qipchaq Guards (wei), consist-
ing of Qipchaqs, Qanglis, and other Turkish soldiers, over 
which Tughtugha was given partial control.42 Finally there 
was his father *Chong'ur (d. 1322), who ably carried on the 
tradition of this remarkable family, commanding his troops 
under Qaishan in the steppes, as was recounted in the pre-
vious chapter. After *Chong'ur's death, however, the family 
inheritance suffered serious losses, possibly through the influ-
ence of Temiider, who like his financier predecessors was 
intent upon reducing the appanages. The elite troops, the 
households, and the lands passed out of the family's control, 
and the princely fief of Chii-jung, awarded to *Chong'ur by 
Qaishan in 1309, was not reassigned to his heirs.43 Surely 
El Temiir calculated that he stood to regain all of this, and 
more, if he led a successful revolution in the name of Qaishan, 
under whom both he and his father had served, and who 
was the last to confirm and augment the family privileges. 
El Temiir first gained official position on the occasion of 
Qaishan's enthronement in 1307, and for the Merkid Bayan, 
too, Qaishan was the bridge into the bureaucracy. With the 
death of Qaishan and the accession of Ayurbarwada in 1311, 
however, both El Temiir and Bayan were obliged to relin-
quish their positions. El Temiir gave up his office in the Court 
of Imperial Cuisine and from 1312 to 1325 commanded an 
elite unit called the Left Guards.44 Bayan left court altogether 
and took up new duties in the southern provinces.45 The 
man the court at the time considered to be the leader of 
the Qaishan bureaucratic clique, the Qangli Toghto, was sent 
out to be Chancellor of the Left of Kiangche province. Once 
during Ayurbarwada's reign he was called to the capital, 
imprisoned, and interrogated about his attitude toward the 
naming of Shidebala as heir apparent. He was arrested again 
in 1322 after Shidebala became emperor; this time he was 
flogged at court, imprisoned, and sentenced to banishment.46 
4 4 When Yesiin Temiir came to the throne in 1323, however, 
^ he acted upon his policy of reconciliation and relaxed the 
toration c o n t r o^ s ^at his two imperial predecessors had imposed upon 
of 1328 ^ e Qaishan clique. He released the Qangli Toghto, reopened 
contact with Qoshila, recalled Tugh Temiir from exile in 
Hainan, gave El Temiir civil office again, and transferred 
Bayan from South China to Honan province, which was in 
the north and nearer the court.47 
Despite the emperor Yesiin Temiir's conciliatory moves, 
which served to put El Temiir, Bayan, and their imperial 
candidate Tugh Temiir into the strategic positions they 
occupied on the eve of their coup d'etat, there was no longer 
any real Qaishan clique in existence, no horde of old Qaishan 
bureaucrats eager and ready to reoccupy their lost positions 
in the central bureaucracy. With the exception of *Chong'ur's 
son El Temiir, none of the descendants of Qaishan's senior 
staff are known to have been involved in any aspect of the 
restoration, and few seem to have profited politically by it.48 
As for the leading figures in Qaishan's bureaucracy, those 
associated with his central chancellery (the Shang-shu sheng) 
were actively persecuted by Ayurbarwada upon his accession 
in 1311, and six of them were put to death.49 Others joined 
Qoshila in his abortive revolt in Shensi in 1316 and then 
followed him into the steppes, thereby removing themselves 
from Yiian politics.50 Still others either suffered persecution, 
died, or changed their political affiliations. Only for a few 
former members of Qaishan's junior staff—El Temiir, Bayan, 
and the Qangli Toghto (who died in 1327)—was the idea of 
a restoration a living and concrete symbol of their identities 
and interests. Since among the chief figures in the restoration 
were a number of men whose lives are reasonably well 
documented but who had no known official or personal con-
nection with Qaishan, other ties of common interest must 
have helped provide a basis for the mutual trust and coopera-
tion that existed inside the restoration clique. 
An examination of the family and tribal backgrounds of El 
Temür and the Qangli Toghto provides a clue to the existence 
of a wider bond, whose origins lie in the Mongol conquests 
of the previous century. The two men belonged to closely 
related Turkish tribes, the Qipchaq and the Qangli. On the 4 5 
eve of the Mongol invasions, the Qipchaqs dominated the 
Russian steppes from the Black Sea to the Caspian and Aral, T^storat. 
while their neighbors, the Qanglis, held the steppes from 0f132g " 
the Aral eastward to Lake Balkhash.51 Toghto's was a chiefly 
clan among the Qangli, which, according to the ancestral 
record, surrendered and came to Qaraqorum during the reign 
of Ogodei.52 Similarly, El Temiir's ancestors, a chiefly clan 
among the Qipchaqs, with its center of power in the area 
between the Yaik and Volga Rivers north of the Caspian, 
surrendered to the Mongol armies in approximately 1237.53 
The descendants of both these clans, uprooted from their 
own native grasslands, eventually came to settle in China 
in the service of the qaghan. By Qubilai's time, when the 
ethnic class system was established, they were designated 
as se-mu and ranked right after the Mongols themselves. As 
members of a deracinated steppe aristocracy serving in China, 
El Temiir and Toghto could reach out to a much wider circle 
of men of similar background than they could as former per-
sonal adherents of Qaishan. It was this consideration which 
must have helped to tie a number of important individuals 
to the restoration cause.54 To a degree, the restoration of 
1328 may be characterized as a seizure of power by the 
foreign, largely Turkish, elements in China officially known 
as se-mu. 55 
A third bond, which the Qangli Toghto was particularly 
active in cultivating, linked the restoration clique to the Con-
fucian movement within the bureaucracy and provided the 
necessary assurance of base support to the coup makers both 
during and after the short civil war of 1328. After his second 
release from prison, the Qangli Toghto spent the last years 
of his life at his private villa in Hsiian-te (now Hsiian-hua, 
Chahar), where with the cooperation of the court he estab-
lished a Confucian academy for the instruction of his nine 
sons and the other people in his district.56 Although he died 
in 1327 and thus took no part in the coup, his Confucian 
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interests were shared by other se-mu backers of the restora-
tion, and his Confucian studies were avidly pursued by at 
least two of his sons.57 
46 Only the Qangli Toghto was at the same time a former 
personal adherent of Qaishan, a se-mu, and a patron of Con-
fucianism. El Temiir was a Qaishan adherent and a se-mu, 
but had no Confucian sympathies. Bayan was neither a se-mu 
nor a Confucian, but simply a Qaishan adherent. The restora-
tion idea was the only common denominator among them. 
Little wonder, then, that they and their followers should raise 
the restoration slogan as a mask to cover other and potentially 
conflicting interests. 
Tugh Temiir's reign as emperor lasted from 1328 only until 
1332; although shortlived, the period was on the whole peace-
ful and stable. Some understanding of the institutional nature 
of the period may be obtained through an analysis of the 
offices held by El Temiir, whose efforts on behalf of the resto-
ration found consummation in a far-reaching domination of 
Tugh Temiir's court. 
A position in the Chief Military Commission had enabled 
El Temiir to initiate the insurgency in September, 1328. In 
October, 1328, Tugh Temiir appointed him Chancellor of the 
Right, a post which afforded him control over the central 
bureaucracy; from this eminence, El Temiir's power soon 
flowed outward into the military, censorial, and other 
branches of government and downward through the lines of 
command into the lower levels of the bureaucratic machinery. 
By a decree of December, 1328, only El Temiir and Bayan 
were permitted to hold three offices concurrently, and by 
the same decree they were designated the exclusive channels 
through which matters of state expressed in memorials might 
reach the emperor.58 El Temiir was reappointed Chancellor 
of the Right in March, 1329, and he reached an apogee of 
power and influence in March, 1330, when Bayan agreed 
to step down as Chancellor of the Left and leave him as sole 
Chancellor and sole channel between emperor and bureauc-
racy.59 An imperial edict of June 1, 1330, justified El Temiir's 
paramount position on the basis of his meritorious accom-
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plishments, listed his honors and offices, emphasized his 
power of final decision over all matters concerning orders 
and directives, punishments, official appointments, fiscal pol-
icy, and construction, and warned not only the regular 4 7 
bureaucracy but also the princes, princesses, imperial sons-
in-law, and their attendants against circumventing his 
authority.60 of 1328 
El Temiir's military powers rested upon his designation 
as Lu chiin-kuo cliung-shih, which allowed him a final word 
over the policies of the Chief Military Commission but did 
not necessarily involve him in its daily administration; and 
also upon his more direct control of the Ta-tu-tu-fu, a new 
institution which constituted a kind of special directorship 
over six of the elite guards units, one of which he also com-
manded personally.61 The Ta-tu-tu-fu, it may be noted, had 
under it the various Qipchaq guards units; El Temiir's power 
over them, thus legalized and institutionalized, was a resump-
tion and a further growth of an inheritance dating from the 
time of his grandfather; and, equally important, he had at 
his disposal a loyal force which he could deploy on short 
notice against seditious movements in the capital.62 
In contrast to his influence within two of the great organs 
of state, the Central Chancellery and the Chief Military Com-
mission, El Temiir's power over the third, the Censorate, 
appears to have been tenuous. In February, 1329, he was 
indeed appointed Censor-in-Chief, but merely for the pur-
pose, it would seem, of gaining some familiarity with its per-
sonnel and operations, since he apparently occupied the post 
for only about a month. Yet, owing undoubtedly to firm parti-
san control, the Censorate during Tugh Temiir's reign con-
fined its scope of attack and impeachment chiefly to certain 
former members of the political opposition. El Temiir and 
his close political associates were never attacked.63 
Other offices which El Temiir held may be summarized 
briefly. Already in October, 1328, he was given general 
editorship of the National History (which implied ultimate 
control over its contents); in February, 1330, he was given 
general editorship of the great institutional compendium of 
the Yiian period, the Ching-shih ta-tien; these were followed 
in March, 1332, by a charge over the K'uei-chang-ko 
Academy, a collegium of scholars of literary and artistic bent 
which Tugh Temiir set up in 1329.64 It may be assumed with 
4 8 some confidence that El Temiir's literary positions did not 
involve him in any actual literary work, and that his director-
W ship over the Academy was in part intended as an impediment Restoration r J 
of 1328 t 0 members independent access to the emperor.65 El 
Temiir was also given control over the Kung-hsiang tu-
tsung-kuan-fu, a palace office which managed an extensive 
empire of textile manufacturing bureaus and other enter-
prises such as rice farming, leatherworking, and hunting in 
North and South China.66 
If the restoration and civil war of 1328 propelled El Temiir 
into a public position suggestive of a dictatorship, it also pro-
vided him an opportunity to amass private privilege and for-
tune to a degree that far outdistanced the best efforts of his 
father and grandfather. The princely fief of Chii-jung, once 
held by his father *Chong'ur, passed to a younger brother, 
and an entirely new fief, that of T'ai-p'ing, was created for 
El Temiir himself in October, 1328. Income for the fief was 
provided by revenues from the lu of T'ai-p'ing (now Tang-t'u, 
Anhwei) on the Yangtze; by a special decree of February, 
1330, El Temiir was given the privilege of bypassing the reg-
ular bureaucracy and collecting these revenues himself.67 
And he gained yet more: 500 cliing (<ca. 8,000 acres) of govern-
ment land in the Soochow area; other confiscated tracts of 
land of unspecified dimensions on the Yangtze delta region; 
a park, pond, water mill, and fields in Lung-ch'ing chou (now 
Yen-ch'ing, Chahar); and a restored outright control of around 
1,500 households in south central China which once belonged 
to his grandfather.68 He was moreover in November, 1328, 
granted the ancient and coveted title of darqan, which carried 
with it the hereditary privileges of unrestricted access to the 
emperor, juridical immunity, and exemption from taxation.69 
In pursuance of this latter right was Tugh Temiir s order of 
September 12, 1331, to the effect that the Commercial Tax 
Bureau (Hsüan-k'o t'i-chü-ssu) was not to let its agents enter 
El Temiir's residence for the purpose of taxing the commer-
cial articles he stored there.70 Other gifts in gold, silver, cash, 
precious objects, slaves, women, residences, and lesser goods 
came one after the other from 1328 to 1332; of these gifts, 
not least perhaps was the construction at imperial command 
of a temple (sheng-tz'u) on the outskirts of Ta-tu, dedicated 4 9 
to the worship of El Temiir's spirit and genius, with an accom- ^ 
panying stone stela bearing an inscribed account of El Te- Restoration 
miir's merits, for the edification of contemporaries and the of 1328 
enlightenment of posterity.71 The emperor himself honored 
the site with occasional visits. 
But there was yet more than this to El Temiir's ascendancy: 
offices and privileges were further extended and cemented 
through the bonds of kinship. His stepmother, the princess 
*Chagir, apparently gave El Temiir significant aid and coun-
sel in the early stages of the coup.72 Of El Temiir's four sis-
ters, three married princes of the imperial house.73 El Temiir 
himself is said, no doubt with exaggeration, to have taken 
no less than forty girls of the clan of Chinggis Qan to wife.74 
The true significance of these marriages and the manner of 
their arrangement are nowhere described, but may be sur-
mised. If El Temiir had it in mind to displace the Qunggirads, 
the imperial consort clan par excellence, with his own 
Qipchaqs, then this was a policy which did come briefly to 
fruition. His daughter, married to Toghon Temiir, became 
empress in 1333.75 
Other ties of relationship operated in different spheres to 
aid and reinforce El Temiir's dynasty. An uncle, Buqa Temiir, 
who commanded an elite guard against Shang-tu in 1328, 
received as reward a confiscated residence, promotion to a 
senior post in the Chief Military Commission, and the 
princely fief of Wu-p'ing.76 El Temiir's younger brother 
Sadun and Sadun's son *Tangkish, both active in the coup, 
received their measure of booty as well as the title of darqan; 
both served at different times as directors of the Office for 
Imperial Cuisine, a sort of palace commissary. Through that 
office patronage could be dispensed, because it appointed 
its own functionaries, and political loyalties could be cul-
tivated, owing to the many recipients of its favors.77 El Te-
miir's younger brother *Darindari, who inherited the fief of 
Clni-jung, also held military office and served as a director 
of the Ta-hsi tsung-yin-yiian, which nominally managed the 
imperial cult, but which also dispensed cash and grain and 
undertook imperial construction. Access to the Ta-hsi tsung. 
50 yin-yüan meant access to a whole world of semiprivate impe-
rial finance.78 
Restoration A s s o*e Chancellor of the Right and the chief minister of 
of 1328 the realm, El Temiir's power substantially surpassed that of 
any of his predecessors. To be sure, previous chancellors had 
packed the bureaucracy with their relatives and personal sup-
porters and had concurrently controlled individual guards 
units; but none gathered so many powers and functions into 
his own hands, or combined bureaucratic leadership with 
princely status, as did El Temiir. By the same token, no 
previous emperor of the Yiian Dynasty was ever so cir-
cumscribed in his powers as Tugh Temiir. From this it would 
appear that the restoration idea served not only to unify a 
coalition of disparate insurgent elements, but also to justify 
what might be termed a temporary but radical alteration of 
the Yiian constitution. In fact, the i<»ading partisans of the 
restoration looked not upon Qubilai as their justifying found-
ing father, but upon Qaishan; and not upon Qaishan as 
emperor, but as their commander in the steppe wars. As 
emperor, Qaishan's strongly legalistic policies were neither 
revived nor invoked as precedents by the restorers of his 
line.79 As the personal symbol of the unity of a group, how-
ever, Qaishan lived on in the figure of his son Tugh Temür, 
In these circumstances, Tugh Temiir s function in the restora-
tion was not to rule as emperor in the fashion of either Qubilai 
or Qaishan, but simply to reign as a living representative 
of his father and a rallying-point for the restoration forces. 
There was little Tugh Temiir could do to alter this situation, 
for the whole composition of government rested upon the 
intensely personal relationship between himself and El 
Temiir. Neither could have achieved his position without the 
other, and both were knowing accomplices in the murder 
of Qaishan's eldest son Qoshila, the emperor from the steppes 
who invoked Qubilai and promised to institute a very different 
style of rule. 
The restoration regime led by El Temiir moved quickly 
and eagerly to satisfy a Confucian demand of long stand-
¿ng—the removal and punishment of Temiider's former 
clique. The Moslem officials were the first to suffer. One 
of the first acts of the new regime was the abolition on 
October 3 of the office of the Moslem qadi in Ta-tu.80 The 
Chief Administrator Ubaid-ullah, arrested in Ta-tu on Sep- T h e 
tember 8, was executed on October 15; the Chancellor of Restoration 
the Right Daula-shah, who surrendered Shang-tu to the of 1328 
insurgents, was put to death on December 26, as was related 
above.81 These men were highly placed protectors of Moslem 
commercial wealth in Yiian China, and powerful enough to 
exempt their co-religionists from labor service obligations.82 
Their names were given specific and pointed mention as 
traitors in Tugh Temiir's edict of enthronement of October 
16, a document intended for the widest publicity.83 No less 
pointed was the official name which El Temiir later gave to 
the coup d'etat: "The Pacification of Daula-shah."84 Since the 
officially protected commercial operations and other 
privileges of the Moslems had long provoked Confucian 
enmity, their special privileges were canceled, and imperial 
favor was henceforth bestowed upon their commercial com-
petitors, the Buddhist monasteries.85 It would appear that 
the entire recent past was being surreptitiously marked with 
the stigma of Islam. These official moves soon stimulated a 
popular wave of anti-Moslem sentiment in both North and 
South China, and the government was obliged to take steps 
to curb it.86 
During November and December, 1328, the restoration 
regime stepped up the purge, giving special attention this 
time to the Chinese and Mongols who were officials in the 
former administration. In addition to dismissals and punish-
ments, the purge involved the confiscation of families and 
family property. By a special edict of November 24, El Temür 
was appointed the sole authority for redistributing confiscated 
property, and under his direction about 125 individual prop-
erties changed hands.87 While it certainly did not oppose 
El Temiir, a clue to the already strong Confucian orientation 
of the new Central Chancellery may be seen in its repeated 
but unsuccessful attempts to halt the confiscations of wives 
and children.88 
By the time of Qoshila's murder in August, 1329, and Tugh 
Temür s reassumption of the throne, the basic work of the 
restoration was accomplished, and a major bureaucratic 
revolution had been achieved. With its opponents at last 
52 thoroughly vilified and totally crushed, the Confucian move-
^ ment stood as the only coherently organized faction remaining 
Restoration i n bureaucracy. Even so, it was not yet strong enough 
of 1328 t o f ° r c e i t s ideology upon the leadership. Until Tugh Temiir's 
death in 1332 the non-Confucian El Temiir and his personal 
Qipchaq dynasty were all-powerful. His position rested upon 
the tentative but close harmony of the men he carried with 
him to office when he acted to restore Qaishan's line, and 
upon his peculiar relationship with Tugh Temiir—to whose 
care, in ostentatious token of mutual harmony between ruler 
and minister, he entrusted his son.89 The over-all stability 
of the period is easier to assume than to demonstrate, 
although the quiescence of the Censorate, obstreperous in 
Yesiin Temiir's day, seems indicative of it. The regime was 
in any event stable enough to put down rebellions in 
Szechwan and Yunnan and, in accordance with its official pol-
icy of fiscal sobriety, to carry out a partial demobilization 
of the Imperial Guards.90 
Yet the whole structure of government was fragile and 
transitional. The leadership at the top was united only 
through Tugh Temiir, who served as a personal representa-
tive of his father. As it turned out, the death of Tugh Temiir 
in 1332 led to a split between El Temiir and Bayan. In addi-
tion, the alliance between the leadership and the Confucian 
movement in the bureaucracy was only a temporary one, for 
El Temiir and Bayan were not themselves leaders or cham-
pions of the Confucian movement. The two sides were allied 
only because in 1328 they needed each other to effect the 
purge of Temiider's faction, which was their common enemy. 
In 1335, after Bayan had annihilated El Temiir's relatives 
and supporters, he repudiated his alliance with the Confu-
cians and tried to crush them. In the face of this anti-
Confucian reaction, however, the Confucian movement was 
to show its true strength. 
Chapter III 
Bayan and the Anti-Confucian Reaction 
The relationship of the Merkid Bayan to 
the restoration of 1328 was a peculiar and ambiguous one. 
He was not a Confucian, and he formed no known friendships 
with people who were. He was not a se-mu, either, but a 
member of a Mongol tribe, the Merkids, whose unfortunate 
history resembled strongly that of the defeated and uprooted 
Turkish noble clans of Central Asia. The Merkids were not 
allies of Chinggis Qan, but one of the chief victims of his 
wars of unification in Mongolia. The leading clan of the Mer-
kids was utterly annihilated in two main battles, one in about 
1209 on the Irtysh, and the other around 1217 somewhere 
further west, possibly on the Chu River.1 Having been denied 
asylum by the Uighur kingdom of Qaraqojo, remnants of the 
routed Merkids continued to flee westward, some of them 
seeking refuge among the Qipchaqs. After the Mongol 
general Sübifiitei defeated the Qipchaqs and the Russians 
in the famous Battle of the Kalka in 1223, he formed 
chiliarchies, including a Merkid Chiliarchy, from among the 
captives he took.2 Although Bayan's ancestral connection with 
these events is not directly attested anywhere, it is possible 
that his ancestors were among the Merkids taken at that 
time.3 
Unlike El Temiir, who struggled to restore an endangered 
family inheritance, Bayan acted for himself alone, His 
forebears were undistinguished and obscure.4 His only appar-
ent relationship to El Temiir lay in the fact that they both 
served as junior staff under Qaishan in Mongolia. It was this 
former relationship that El Temiir had in mind when he 
began the coup in Ta-tu in Qaishan's name. It would have 
been disastrous for the whole undertaking had Bayan chosen 
to give strict observance to the usual administrative regula-
tions and refused to acknowledge the illegal orders issuing 
from the capital.5 The attitude of Honan province, of which 
Bayan was Chief Administrator, was crucial for at least two 
54 reasons. First of all, El Temiir's imperial candidate Tugh 
^ ^ Temiir was in residence at Chiang-ling on the middle Yangtze 
Anti-Confucian ^ ^ would have to cross Honan in order to reach the capital; 
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China and could conceivably have interdicted the flow of 
grain and other resources which only South China could pro-
vide. In these circumstances, Bayan was in a position to throw 
the province either to Ta-tu or to Shang-tu. He chose, how-
ever, to give El Temiir's agents free access to Tugh Temiir; 
and when the imperial candidate and his cortege on their 
journey north reached the Honan provincial capital of Pien-
liang (K'ai-feng), Bayan immediately assumed personal 
responsibility for the safety of the candidate for the remainder 
of his progress to the capital. Bayan's act of loyalty to the 
insurgents at Ta-tu was executed at a moment of critical 
importance to the success of the restoration movement. El 
Temiir must have been well aware of this: upon entering 
Ta-tu with Tugh Temiir on October 1, Bayan was accorded 
high honors, put in charge of the Imperial Guard, and 
appointed Censor-in-Chief. Honan was left for others to 
defend.6 
During Tugh Temiir's reign, Bayan's position in the state 
was second only to El Temiir's. While El Temiir remained 
as Chancellor of the Right, Bayan was shifted from high office 
to high office but finally settled into the headship of the Chief 
Military commission on a permanent basis. Like El Temiir, 
however, Bayan also occupied a number of concurrent posi-
tions in other areas of the government. During Tugh Temiir's 
reign he commanded an elite guards unit and a myriarchy 
of Alan troops, and held, like El Temiir, the designation of 
Lu chün-kuo chung-shih.7 Within the palace, Bayan held po-
sition in, but had no exclusive control over, the institution 
established for the guidance and support of the heir apparent; 
and he was also named one of nine chiefs of a new board 
called the Shih-cheng-fu, which managed those members of 
the Imperial Guards who served as the emperor's personal 
valets.8 Finally in November, 1331, Bayan was appointed one 
of the heads of the new Chao-kung wan-hu tu-tsung-shih-ssu, 
a palace revenue-producing agency—which seems to have 
lost much of its sources of wealth when one of its components, 5 5 
headed by El Temiir, was removed from its jurisdiction.9 _ . 
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also the recipient of property confiscated from the political Reaction 
opposition.10 He too was granted a princely fief, with income 
from the tax revenues of two counties (hsien) in Honan pro-
vince, and was given the daughter of an imperial prince in 
marriage.11 On imperial order, temples (sheng-tzu) and 
laudatory stelae were set up for him in his bailiwick of Pien-
liang and elsewhere in North China.12 Bayan's power was 
thus distributed in the same fashion as El Temiir's; they both 
held high posts in the central government, in one or more 
inner palace agencies, and both had personal command of 
elite guards troops. Bayan's position was lesser only in degree; 
and with the disappearance of El Temiir from high politics, 
it was a position which he could, and did, easily build upon. 
The death of Tugh Temiir on September 2, 1332, at the 
age of twenty-eight removed the keystone from the whole 
restoration settlement. The heir apparent Aradnadara had 
died in February, and Tugh Temiir had named no replace-
ment. In these circumstances, Tugh Temiir's widow, the 
Qunggirad Budashiri, stepped into the political foreground, 
brandished a will said to have been left by Tugh Temiir on 
his deathbed, and declared that it was the late emperor's 
intention that the throne should first go to a son of Qoshila 
rather than to his and Budashiri's second son, El Tegiis.13 
Although there is no evidence that he originally opposed the 
move, El Temiir was eventually persuaded to give his 
endorsement to the succession of Qoshila's younger son Irin-
jibal.14 Irinjibal ascended the throne in October, 1332, and 
died two months later, at the age of six. It would appear 
significant that while there was enough time during Irinjibal's 
short reign to reconfirm Bayan in most of the same positions 
he held under Tugh Temiir, El Temiir was not reconfirmed; 
in fact no chancellor at all was named.15 El Temiir, quite 
clearly, was being outmaneuvered by the Qunggirad empress 
dowager. She appointed a seven-man advisory board to dis-
cuss the "renovation of government" and aid her in rule.16 
El Temiir was excluded. She had, it might be noted, sufficient 
finances of her own to use in support of her political pur-
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tion clique was put in confusion. 
The empress dowager's determination to replace Irinjibal 
not with El Tegiis, but with Qoshila's elder son Toghon 
Temiir, was obviously aimed at preventing El Temiir from 
returning to power; and although his position was already 
severely damaged, El Temiir was able to prevent the 
enthronement for a time. For half a year, until July, 1333, 
the throne remained vacant. There is some doubt whether, 
as his biography explicitly states, El Temiir died before 
Toghon Temiir's enthronement; some evidence suggests that 
he died in the following year, 1334.18 He appears in any 
event to have withdrawn from active politics owing to illness, 
and was dead at least by July, 1334, when posthumous honors 
were accorded him.19 In the meantime, Bayan made an open 
political break with El Temiir and shifted his support to the 
empress dowager. According to an unofficial account, Bayan 
was in Honan province at the time that Toghon Temiir was 
recalled from exile in Kwangsi; and once again, as in 1328, 
he placed himself prominently in the escort as the imperial 
candidate proceeded northwards across Honan to the capital. 
Until the last possible moment, however, Bayan gave no indi-
cation of his attitude towards Toghon Temiir, thus dramatiz-
ing once again his power to permit or obstruct imperial suc-
cessions.20 
Bayan's willing collaboration with Tugh Temiir's widow, 
the empress dowager Budashiri, together with his support 
of the enthronements of Qoshila's sons Irinjibal and Toghon 
Temiir, forced him to move further and further away from 
his old colleagues of 1328. The total collapse of the restoration 
order did not come about, however, until the summer ol 
1335. In June of that year the empress dowager signaled her 
support for Bayan when she refused his request to cede the 
Chancellorship of the Right to El Temiir s son *Tangkish.21 
Then in July, suddenly and without warning, Bayan fielded 
his elite units and attacked and destroyed El Temiir's sons 
on the dubious charge that they were plotting "rebellion" 5 7 
(ni).22 Following that, he dismissed their personal adherents B( l l ( ln 
from their positions, and poisoned Toghon Temiir's empress, Anti-Con 
who was a Qipchaq and the daughter of El Temiir.23 The Reaction 
official justification for this purge was shallow; there was no 
appeal this time to former days, no rehearsal of ancestral 
glories, but simply charges of rebellious and criminal behavior 
against an old and powerful clan.24 The restoration clique 
was irreparably damaged, and the restoration myth, centered 
about Qaishan's achievements and his frustrated legacy, could 
no longer perform any cohesive function. It was hard for 
Bayan, the parvenu Merkid who climbed to the very top 
of the bureaucratic pyramid and into El Temiir's shoes on 
the ruins of these associations, to escape the imputation of 
undisguised political opportunism and selfish ambition. 
A sense of personal insecurity may have contributed to 
Bayan's incessant quest for private wealth and honor. After 
the purge, Bayan took over much of the Qipchaq inheritance 
himself.25 Also profitable, but more picturesque, were the 
40,(XX) pearl-diving households allotted to him in March, 
1337.26 There was more: several grants of land in various 
parts of the realm, and a new fief at Kao-yu on the Grand 
Canal.27 New laudatory stelae were emplaced in a triumphal 
arch north of the capital.28 
In rank, Bayan climbed notably higher than his predecessor 
El Temiir had done. In November, 1339, he was elevated 
beyond (sole) Chancellor of the Right to "Great" Chancellor 
(ta cli eng-hsiang).2* Even more, he had already held since 
1333 the first-class princely fief of Ch'in.30 Ch'in was the sec-
ond on the list of first-class fiefs, all of them traditionally 
reserved for members of the imperial clan, except for three 
further down the list which were held at various times by 
members of the Qunggirad clan.31 The princely fief of Chü-
jung awarded to *Chongur in 1309 was of the sixth, or 
lowest grade; that of T'ai-p'ing, held by El Temiir, was only 
of the second grade. Surely Bayan was going to excess. In 
a spirit of malevolent and persistent pedantry, a Chinese 
opponent wrote down in his personal notebook Bayan's thirty-
five concurrent positions and official honors, which, he trou-
5 8 bled to note, added up to 246 characters. Four other entries 
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for their patron.32 No one but Bayan was authorized to hold 
three or more concurrent positions; no one was second to 
him as he had once been to El Temiir.33 
While institutionally Bayan's position as Chancellor 
appeared to be nothing more than an improved version of 
El Temiir's, the positions of the two men actually rested upon 
entirely different political foundations. Bayan's working rela-
tionship with the monarchical institution, so different from 
El Temiir's, gives one clue to the changes that had taken 
place. From 1332 to 1340 the monarchy was under thecontrol 
of the empress dowager, ruling for her nephews, both chil-
dren whose own mothers (Qoshila's consorts) were dead or 
missing.34 In this capacity, she was entitled to the designa-
tion, "empress dowager" (huang fai-hou), but not to the title, 
"grand empress dowager" (t'ai-huang t'ai-hou)9 which she 
assumed in September, 1335, over the strenuous objections 
of both Chinese and non-Chinese in the Central Chancellery 
and in the Censorate.35 The meaning in her elevation was, 
however, clear: not one, but two imperial lines were open 
and operative. If Toghon Temiir of Qoshila's line sat on the 
throne, her own son by Tugh Temiir, El Tegiis, was alive, 
in the palace, and was designated as heir apparent and 
Toghon Temiir's successor.36 Toghon Temiir was only twelve 
years old when he assumed the throne; the precariousness 
of his tenure must have been impressed upon him by the 
widespread and officially encouraged rumor that he was not 
really Qoshila's son.37 It seems significant that Bayan made 
no attempt to define a new single line of. legitimate succes-
sion, but cooperated with the Qunggirad Grand Empress 
Dowager Budashiri and maintained a friendly attitude toward 
both Toghon Temiir and his cousin, El Tegiis. Bayan's 
indeterminate position on the monarchical issue was clearly 
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related to his difficulty in defining a political role for himself 
after the passing of El Temiir and the restoration order. 
El Temiir's restoration order was firmly and fully commit-
ted to Tugh Temiir. Bayan, however, was not in a position 
to repeat El Temiir's actions and make himself a restoration 
hero, this time in favor of another legitimate but wronged ^nt̂ Confucian 
line, that of Qoshila. On the face of it, it would appear that Reaction 
he ought to have been able to make a forthright attempt 
to champion Qoshila's line, since he was not directly involved 
in Qoshila's assassination. But the truth seems to be that 
Bayan was almost as closely identified with Tugh Temiir and 
his line as El Temiir had been; and while he was able to 
accommodate himself to the reversion of the throne to 
Qoshila's sons in 1332, he was in no position to lead a glorious 
restoration on their behalf. Bayan and El Temiir seem to 
have made efforts to avoid an overt political clash during Tugh 
Temiir's reign, and Bayan made no noticeable attempt to nur-
ture a clique of his own during that time, even though there 
was ample opportunity for him to do so.38 In 1330, for exam-
ple, there were at least two conspiratorial movements afoot 
in the capital, which according to later allegation had 
attempted to rally behind Toghon Temiir as their factional 
symbol. In both cases, Bayan stood aside while El Temiir 
executed the leaders, confiscated their families, and finally 
exiled Toghon Temiir himself to Korea.39 In January, 1331, 
a few months after the failure of these plots, Bayan was per-
sonally involved in the nomination of Tugh Temiir's eldest 
son Aradnadara as heir apparent, for it was he who was sent 
to announce the event to the gods in the suburban temple.40 
Thus by 1332, when Tugh Temiir died, the time and oppor-
tunity for the factional exploitation of monarchical cleavages 
had come and gone. Not only that; the bureaucracy was rela-
tively calm and showed no perceptible movement or desire 
to champion any particular imperial candidate as it had in 
1328. As a consequence of this, Bayan lacked any acceptable 
justification for his emergence at the expense of the restora-
tion order; he had no glorious and deserving imperial cause 
to promote, and no righteously vocal following within the 
bureaucracy. Once having achieved the highest position of 
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ministerial power, however, he then attempted to formulate 
a program and win bureaucratic supporters for it. If his pre-
cipitate advance into the supreme ministerial position did 
little more than cause raised bureaucratic eyebrows, the sub-
sequent revelation and implementation of his controversial 
Bayan and ,. . , . , , , , , 
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Reaction antagonized and eventually alienated those elements in the 
bureaucracy that had earlier supported the restoration order. 
By 1340 bureaucratic revulsion against Bayan and his policies 
grew widespread and intense enough to occasion his political 
downfall. 
Bayan's attempt to effect basic changes in the restoration 
political settlement, though inauspicious and eventually 
unsuccessful, nevertheless merits close attention. At the out-
set, his "anti-Confucianism" was a distinctly limited notion, 
more pragmatic than ideological; he rejected, for example, 
the policies of fiscal aggrandizement that earlier financiers 
had pursued, and he was even willing on occasion to accord 
official patronization to leading Confucian temples.41 Bayan 
did not at all intend to destroy Confucianism altogether, but 
rather aimed to reduce what he saw as its inordinate influence 
in the bureaucracy, to deprive it of some of the gains it had 
made in the restoration of 1328, and to reinstitute some fac-
simile of the more varied mixture of factional alignments that 
had characterized the Yiian bureaucracy in its earlier years. 
The Confucian movement, however, put a more extreme 
interpretation upon Bayan's ultimate intentions than the facts 
of the case really warranted, but in the end it succeeded 
in showing conclusively that a non-Confucian factional alter-
native could not be restored in the bureaucracy. The Confu-
cian gains of 1328 were not, as it turned out, temporary but 
permanent and preparatory to the even greater gains of 1340. 
On November 17, 1335, Bayan had the emperor decree 
the abolition of the civil service examination system as a route 
of entry into bureaucratic office.42 This was the earliest and 
most notorious of Bayan's anti-Confucian acts. There followed 
in December, 1335, almost as an afterthought, a change of 
reign-title (nien-hao)—an act which traditionally often sym-
bolized a major change in official policy.43 What was new 
and historically unprecedented in the reign-title change of 
1335 was the fact that it revived and reimposed the Chih-yiian 
title that Qubilai had used from 1264 to 1294. Although Bayan 61 
never gave an explanation of what he meant by this peculiar 
t , i . . i Bayan and act, it is certain that he was attempting to resuscitate the Anfi Qonfuciün 
figure of Qubilai, shunted aside in favor of Qaishan since Reaction 
1328, as the constitutional authority for the legitimacy of his 
policies. No civil service examinations had been held under 
Qubilai. In May, 1337, Bayan also issued regulations reserv-
ing once again the leading positions in the central, provincial, 
and local government organs to the Mongols and se-mu.44 
The aim of this move was to preserve the delicate system 
of bureaucratic control through the ethnic class system that 
Qubilai had devised. Bayan's order forbidding Chinese to 
learn the Mongol or se-mu languages must have been 
intended to deny them a popular but irregular route of official 
advancement.45 Bayan's revival of the legacy of Qubilai did 
not, however, extend much beyond matters of bureaucratic 
recruitment and appointment; in the fiscal and economic 
spheres, he laid Qubilai's acquisitive precedents entirely 
aside. Thus one finds Bayan humbly beseeching the emperor 
to cease all activities that interfered with agriculture, to stop 
all imperial construction within the empire for four years, 
to close down two government ironworks, to reduce corvee 
among certain occupational groups, to reduce the annual 
quotas in three important salt-producing areas, and to relieve 
the large numbers of famine victims in north and south.46 
Of all of Bayan's measures, the examination controversy 
aroused the most heated passions, yet few critics were so 
bold as to challenge the issue squarely. In opposition circles 
at court, responsibility for the cancellation of the examinations 
was not laid directly upon Bayan, but upon a subordinate, 
one Cherig Temiir, who as Chief Administrator first made 
the proposal. Cherig Temiir, it is said, was concerned over 
the expenses involved in arranging and holding the examina-
tions, and thought that the proceeds from the lands set aside 
for the support of Confucian students might be put to better 
use if instead they provided maintenance for the Imperial 
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Guards (keshig)47 A Confucian opponent imputed Cherig 
Temiir's dislike for the examination system to a "personal 
grudge."48 Similar in its ascription of motive is an anecdote, 
probably apocryphal, that Bayan stopped the examinations 
when he found out that his missing Chinese groom had gone 
Anti-Confucian t o kis 1uck at them: "As for the Chinese who study books," 
Reaction Bayan supposedly confessed, "they always deceive people. 
Formerly I had a groom. For some time I did not see him. 
When I asked about him, I was told that he had gone to 
take the examinations. I never realized that the examinations 
were taken by these kinds of people. . . . '49 
If Confucian dismay at the cancellation of the examinations 
is perhaps readily understandable, Bayan's purpose in can-
celing them is less so, for between the years 1315 and 1333 
only 539 chin-shih of all ethnic classes were graduated, con-
stituting a mere 2 percent of a total ranked bureaucracy of 
around 22,500 men.50 Obviously, the bureaucracy was hardly 
on the point of being taken over by the holders of the highest 
degree. This point was made forcibly in what appears to be 
an accurate report of a conversational exchange at court 
between Bayan and the Confucian Hsii Yu-jen. Since few 
transcripts of this sort survive, perhaps a direct translation 
would not be out of place here: 
Hsü: If the examination system is abolished, the talented men of 
the empire will lose all hope. 
Bayan: Many of the graduates have become corrupt, and some 
of them have assumed Mongol or foreign names. 
Hsü: Countless officials were punished for corruption before the 
examination system was reinstituted, so this involves not only 
the graduates. The graduates are not blameless, but they are 
hardly as corrupt as the others. 
Bayan: Of all the graduates, you are the only one capable of assum-
ing office. 
Hsü: Men like Chang Meng-ch'en, Ma Po-yung, and Ting Wen-
yiian are all fit for high responsibility. And who can match Ou-
yang Hsiian in composition? 
Bayan: Even though the examination system is abolished, any 
scholar who wants fine food and clothing can study on his own 
and get any high office he wants. 
i-
Hsü: The true scholar does not concern himself with fine food and 
clothing. His business is to rule the state and bring peace to 
the empire. 
Bayan: But selection for office through the examination system cuts 6 3 
off other avenues. 
Bayan and 
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of where they come from. Are not the scholars who come through Reaction 
the examination system much better than those who come from 
the ranks of the translators or seal-keepers? In the whole empire 
there are presently 3,325 translators and others, about 456 per 
year. The gatekeepers, imperial physicians, and imperial 
guardsmen all get to become regular officials, as do the local 
(lu) clerks and the sons of officials. So there are many avenues. 
This year from the fourth to the ninth month, 72 non-scholars 
were given office, yet the examinations only graduate about 30 
men per year. I ask you, does the examination system really 
block other avenues?51 
Bayan's appeal to the large but inarticulate mass of non-
Confucians of all ethnic categories within the bureauc-
racy—careerists frankly interested, as Bayan put it, in the 
pursuit of wealth and rank, or men who prided themselves 
upon technical expertise—was to a degree based upon a com-
passionate and realistic assessment of the composition and 
mood of Yiian officialdom. Among many officials known collec-
tively as li-chin, or men promoted upward from the clerkly 
ranks, there existed a good deal of smoldering resentment 
against the Confucian examination graduates, whose entry 
into the regular bureaucracy was so much easier and whose 
rates of official promotion were, or were believed to be, so 
much faster than their own.52 The li-chin were officially dis-
criminated against. During Ayurbarwada's reign, for exam-
ple, there was a regulation in effect which prohibited li-chin 
from advancing beyond the fifth grade in the civil service.53 
At the higher levels of government, Confucian officials did 
struggle to see that their own men were given preference 
over li-chin in the matter of bureaucratic appointments.54 
By canceling the examinations, Bayan was making a definite 
political overture to this large and frustrated mass of clerks 
and lower bureaucrats whose status had not been quite so 
despised and hopeless under Qubilai. 
What Bayan did not calculate was the enormous prestige, 
far greater than the statistics would indicate, that the Confu-
cian movement commanded within the ranks of the 98 per-
64 cent non-chin-shih majority of the bureaucracy There were, 
Bayan and e x a mP^e ' about 2,100 holders of the lower chü-jen degree, 
Anti-Confucian which did qualify a man for office; combined with the 539 
Reaction chin-shih, Confucian degree-holders of all kinds must have 
constituted about 11 percent of the bureaucracy.55 Even 
more, there was a strong tendency on the part of many li-chin 
to identify themselves with the Confucian movement and to 
pin their career hopes upon eventual success in the 
examinations.56 The Confucians, for their part, tended to look 
kindly upon those li-chin who professed shame for their 
clerkly origins.57 Thus for all the men who might conceivably 
have been pleased by Bayan's attack on Confucianism, there 
must have been a large number of others who were dismayed 
and disappointed. In any case, it was certainly widely felt 
that the cancellation of the examinations would have a pro-
foundly adverse effect upon the Confucian movement pre-
cisely because of the all-important role played by the state 
in channeling and regulating sociopolitical ambition. As the 
Kiangsi Confucian Chieh Hsi-ssu put it, with the prospect 
of an examination career dangled before them, men will drop 
their plows, their weapons, or their clerkly tools in order 
to follow it; but with that prospect gone, even the sons of 
the great Confucian literati will abandon Confucian study for 
other pursuits.58 
Outside immediate court circles, the Confucian reaction 
to Bayan's moves was not limited to technical points, but 
cautiously hinted consequences of a much more fundamental 
sort. Chieh Hsi-ssu indicated this in a missive to a young 
Turkish protege, a Qarluq from a family of garrison command-
ers domiciled in the provinces, who had married a Cantonese 
girl and pursued the chin-shih degree program only to find 
the door summarily shut by Bayan. The situation' is distress-
ing, urged Chieh, but not hopeless, for the Confucian Way 
in the final analysis exists independently of examinations or 
other official encouragement. One must continue to devote 
oneself to study even in the absence of career opportunity 
in so doing, for the pursuit of the chin-shih degree as a means 
of social self-advancement is not really its legitimate purpose. 
Its legitimate purpose is to nourish and build a corps of Confu-
cian talents whom the ruler may employ in leading positions 6 5 
so that Confucian ideals may be translated into concrete pol- B 
icy for the benefit of all society. This purpose, Chieh ^Zlconfu 
emphasized, has not l>een achieved in the Yiian period any- Reaction 
way, despite the examinations. Ideologues who cleave sin-
cerely to the Way have been ridiculed as pedants and hypo-
crites; eager and assertive talents who share in anxiety for 
the dynasty have been buried in inferior positions. The state 
has wrongfully contented itself with the reputation for, and 
not the real aim of, employing Worthies. Chieh ended his 
missive with a veiled threat and a note of hope. Whether 
Confucians are employed or not is a matter out of our hands, 
he confessed; the obstruction of our Way has to do with the 
movement of the cosmos and the dynastic cycle. Grieve as 
we will, there is nothing we can do about this, yet perhaps 
someone will soon come forth who, unable to bear any longer 
this cruelty and oppression {k'o-pao tsan-ko), will rectify 
matters for the dynasty.59 
Chieh's indirect warning of disastrous consequences for the 
Yiian Dynasty was seriously intended. The Confucianists' bar-
gaining point with any dynasty was their unqualified assertion 
that only they knew how to assure that ultimate guarantee 
of dynastic safety, the harmony of the social order. The vital 
point of contact at issue lay at the local level, where the 
chiao-hua (Confucian moral suasion) of the government met 
and acted upon the feng-su (prevailing customs and attitudes) 
of the common people. Feng-su was the fund of precedent 
and habit which is the very stuff of any tradition-bound society 
on the popular level. In Confucian eyes, however, the value-
content of unadjusted feng-su was at best neutral in its harm-
lessly quaint or picturesque forms, and at worst positively 
evil when it degenerated into criminality, heresy, competi-
tive strife, gross ignorance, or mindless excitability. Hence 
the purpose of chiao-hua was to improve and rectify 
—"beautify"— feng-su. Like the experienced peasant who 
cherishes the grain sprouts and roots up the weeds, the good 
local official, appointed to his post by a Confucian government 
sincerely committed to the Confucian program, must protect 
his crop of good people, feeding and clothing them, and posi-
6 6 tively encouraging their growth through the suppression of 
Bayan and heretical and violent, the guidance and enlightenment 
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Reaction and disturbed. Prohibitions are not enough to extirpate 
undesirable forms of feng-su; positive remedial measures are 
necessary. All people are ultimately transformable to the 
good, and the sources of chiao-hua which effect this derive 
not from any code of laws but from Confucian self-cultivation 
and self-restraint, which alone legitimizes the use of sanc-
tions, and which Bayan had now decided officially to discour-
age. A government dominated by li-chin, men who by their 
very nature believe that the possession of power carries with 
it the license to gouge and oppress (thus Chieh's reference 
to "cruelty and oppression"), will inevitably encourage the 
worst excesses of feng-su. That in turn will eventually bring 
about a total social cataclysm.00 Chieh warned in his missive 
that in the six decades of the Yiian period to date, chiao-hua 
had never flourished and feng-su had grown progressively 
worse. The whole Confucian argument was ancient and pow-
erful, if not logically necessary. In attempting to refute it, 
Bayan was laughing at the already weak bulwarks of chiao-hua 
which shielded the dynasty from the effects of violent and 
erratic feng-su, thus recklessly calling the Confucian bluff. 
The first tangible signs of what the Confucians did interpret 
as proof of their warnings soon began to appear. In 1337 
and 1338 a number of popular uprisings broke out in Central 
and South China. In February, 1337, rebels in Kwangtung 
set up a Great Chin "dynasty" and made common cause with 
another rebel group whose symbolic leader was claimed to 
be a reincarnation of the Dipamkara Buddha.61 In March 
a group of rebels led by one "Stick" Hu, emboldened by 
a belief in the imminent appearance of the Maitreya Buddha 
and his millennium, initiated a rising which spread into four 
cities of the Huai area.62 In May one Han Fa-shih, evidently 
a Buddhist devotee of some sort, set himself up as "king" 
of a Sung restoration state in Szechwan.63 These commotions 
were followed in the summer of 1338 by a rising in Kiangsi, 
inspired and organized by the heretic Buddhist monk, Peng 
Ying-yii. There were also troubles in Fukien.64 Bayans 
remedies for these disturbances, though negative and pro- 6 7 
hibitory, were successful. His provincial authorities put the D , 
i l i rr i Bayan and 
rebels down without much difficulty. In October, 1337, he Anti-Confucian 
set up Branch Military Secretariats in four provinces, and Reaction 
twice issued regulations forbidding the possession of weapons 
to all Northern and Southern Chinese and Koreans.65 
A Confucian by the name of Yeh Tzu-ch'i asserted that 
there was a connection between Bayan's "wrecking of the 
old norms" and the occurrence of these risings.66 Precisely 
what the connection was, if indeed there was any, cannot 
be said for certain. However, whether from paranoia or from 
well-founded suspicion, Bayan himself was certain of the 
existence of some collusion between some of his Chinese offi-
cials and the rebels. His certainty in this matter had the unfor-
tunate effect of enlarging his anti-Confucianism into a kind 
of anti-Chinese racism. On the explicit grounds that the 
rebels were all Chinese, he and his associates summoned 
the Chinese court officials and laid the evidence before them, 
hoping that "the Chinese officials would avoid answering and 
could then be accused of complicity."67 In this he was not 
successful, but another case did develop concerning the 
illegal possession of weapons, in the course of which an 
unspecified number of Chinese officials in the Central Chan-
cellery was cashiered.68 
The peculiar timing of the rebellious demonstrations, com-
ing about a year after the inauguration of his new policies, 
certainly convinced Bayan that they were not coincidental 
but were positive and menacing signs of intransigent Chinese 
opposition. When from far-off Ning-hsia came reports of a 
plot against his life, Bayan was provoked into anger and vin-
dictiveness.69 His fear of assassination became known to the 
population at large, among whom a tale was current that 
Bayan especially hated the Southern Chinese because his per-
sonal augur had predicted that he would die at the hands 
of one, and thus he prohibited weapons and forbade the Chin-
ese to retaliate if struck by a Mongol or a se-mu.70 Other 
stories had it that Bayan was prohibiting the use of iron farm 
tools in South China in order to rid the area of possible 
weapons for use in rebellion, and that he was forbidding all 
68 performances of opera and storytelling, probably in order to 
Bayan and S t o p s a t i r^ a n ¿ frustrate opportunities for clandestine 
Anti-Confucian organization.71 Another rumor spread and caused panic: the 
Reaction officials were going to seize all of the unmarried boys and 
girls in the empire.72 Wildest of all was the report that Bayan 
intended to kill everyone with the five surnames of Chang, 
Wang, Liu, Li, and Chao—a major percentage of the Chinese 
population.73 Horror was compounded with ridicule; a 
popular jinglet heard in the capital went: "He deceives the 
ruler above, and oppresses the people below, while leaning 
on the Grand Empress Dowager." Indeed, he was said to 
be visiting her secretly at night.74 Thus fear grew and rumors 
multiplied on both sides, the specter of a total conspiracy 
of the Chinese people in the mind of Bayan neatly balancing 
the vision of a monstrous and irrational official terrorism in 
the minds of the people. A Confucian might have noted that 
the soothing effects of chiao-hua were not in evidence. 
Owing in part to the structure of the Yiian Confucian move-
ment, however, the nightmarish prospect of a total Sino-
Mongol confrontation never developed into a reality; for 
Bayan's policies also landed him in serious difficulty with sec-
tions of the Mongol and se-mu population in China, among 
whom Confucianism was a flourishing and growing move-
ment. In fact, it is beyond doubt that the institution of the 
Confucian examination system had a greater impact upon the 
Mongols and se-mu than it did upon the Chinese. The 
arrangement of the examinations favored the chances of the 
non-Chinese candidates, not only because they could take 
a simpler test, but also because while Mongols and se-mu 
combined constituted only about 3 percent of all registered 
households in China, they occupied 30 percent of the posi-
tions in the regular bureaucracy.75 If it is assumed that the 
Northern and Southern Chinese easily filled their total quota 
of fifty chin-shih at each triennial examination, one can then 
perceive a steadily increasing number of successful non-
Chinese candidates from 1315 to 1333, for the combined totals 
run as follows: 56 (1315), 50 (1318), 64 (1321), 86 (1324), 86 
(1327), 97 (1330), and 100 (1333).76 This process would seem 
to have produced by 1333 a total of around 189 Mongol and 
se-mu holders of the chin-shih degree. 6 9 
This alternative career program fell short of Confucianizing B n a n d 
the non-Chinese bureaucracy as a whole. In about the year Anti-Confucian 
1300, there were 6,782 non-Chinese in the Yuan bureauc- Reaction 
racy.77 Assuming that this number remained constant, chin-
shih degree holders would by 1333 have constituted about 
3 percent of the total, and degree holders of all kinds about 
18 percent. No non-Chinese degree holder is known to have 
held an important position at court in Bayan's time.78 At 
stake, however, was more than a small, albeit growing, body 
of actual Confucian degree holders among the Mongols and 
the se-mu. By all indications, there was a large number of 
non-Chinese, particularly those domiciled in the provinces, 
who were attracted to the program and placed their career 
hopes in it.79 Involved too was the patronage of Confucian 
studies by a number of Mongol and se-mu clans of high status 
which did not actually have degree holders among their own 
members.80 It was consequently inevitable that Bayans anti-
Confucianism would provoke powerful opposition form within 
the ranks of the Mongols and se-mu, as well as the Chinese. 
The Mongol and se-mu opposition to Bayan in fact stemmed 
from two separate but closely related issues. The Confucian 
issue was intimately bound up with widespread bitterness 
and resentment against Bayan's destruction of the restoration 
order of 1328, a program which began in July, 1335, with 
the liquidation of the Qipchaqs and which was still in progress 
at the time the examinations were abolished. One by one, 
Bayan and his agents ferreted out and purged the Mongol 
and se-mu supporters of the restoration order, both Confucian 
and non-Confucian. 
A relatively mild case concerned the Jalair viceroy Dorji, 
born in the famous Southern Chinese city of Hang-chou. 
Dorji, it is said, "served his mother with extreme filial piety; 
he liked reading books, but rather than waste his time with 
textual pedantry, he devoted his mind to the study of how 
in antiquity rulers and ministers carried out affairs, how loy-
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alty was given the ruler and solicitude bestowed upon the 
people."81 He was admired by a number of Chinese Confu-
cians, and succeeded to the viceregal title in 1329. In 1338, 
however, Bayan divested him of the title and gave it to 
^ Naimantai, a distant cousin of Dorji's, whose career had 
AntíConfucian begun under Qaishan in the steppe wars and whose sub-
Reaction s e Q u e n t experiences had not brought him into any close con-
tact with Chinese or Confucians.82 
More serious was the abrupt and unexplained disappear-
ance of the Uighur Arigh Qaya, prominent on Tugh Temiirs 
side in 1328, who "favored the classics" and was pleased to 
endow a Confucian temple school attached to a guards unit 
which he commanded.83 An obstreperous opponent of 
Bayan's, the Tangut Irinjinbal, was sent into exile and his 
son executed.84 Treason charges were pressed against mem-
bers of the family of the Prince of Chia Qonqor Temür, a 
descendant of Qubilai's elder brother Mongke (r. 1251-59). 
Qongqor Temür himself, accused of having been the imperial 
candidate of the Qipchaqs, had committed suicide at the time 
of the Qipchaq defeat in 1335.85 
Yang Yü tells us that the people of the capital were much 
aggrieved at the executions of the Prince of Tan Chechegtii 
and the ex-iduq-qut and Prince of Kao-ch'ang Temür Buqa.86 
Temür Buqa, whose own kingdom of Qaraqojo had passed 
out of existence, made his career in China and was one of 
the most prominent of Tugh Temür's partisans in 1328. He 
was also a patron of aspiring Confucians.87 The case of 
Chechegtü, also a descendant of Mongke, is difficult to fathom 
because the prince had collaborated closely with Bayan in 
the destruction of the Qipchaqs, and as late as April, 1337, 
was the recipient of a grant of land in the Yangtze delta. 
An unofficial source has it that Bayan was originally a "family 
slave" of the prince, an embarrassment now that he was prime 
minister, and that Bayan executed him and several of his 
sons in 1337 on the grounds of treason.** Later allegation 
relates that when Chechegtü was executed, his family and 
property were confiscated, and in the course of the prosecu-
tion against him "countless numbers of El Temür's clan clique 
(tsung-tang) were killed."89 The true facts of the case seem 
to be buried in mystery. 
At the time of Bayan's downfall in early 1340, he was in 
the midst of carrying out three more prosecutions. Two con-
cerned the Prince of Wei-shun Kóncheg Buqa and his 
brother, the Prince of Hsiian-jang Temiir Buqa, grandsons 71 
of Qubilai through his eleventh son Toghon. Twice, appar-
ently, in 1336 and again in 1339, Bayan summoned the two ^ulcon 
princes from their residences in Central China. Both had Reaction 
been closely associated with Tugh Temiir since before his 
enthronement in 1328, but their supposed crimes were 
unstated, the charges against them unpublished.90 The third 
case, the Fan Meng incident, was more clear-cut and more 
dangerous, not only because of the possibilities of bureau-
cratic mutiny which it revealed, but also because of the reck-
less way in which the case was handled. An extant account 
describing this incident appears to be closely based upon 
documentary evidence. Briefly, what occurred was a sudden 
takeover of the Honan provincial capital of Pien-liang by a 
low-ranking Chinese clerk named Fan Meng. While he was 
on duty in provincial government headquarters, Fan had an 
accomplice act as an imperial messenger bearing an imperial 
edict. One by one, nine of the chief Mongol and se-mu provin-
cial officials were summoned from the banquet table to hear 
the edict, only to be slaughtered by attack from behind with 
an iron club as they came out. Appointed "Commander-
in-Chief of Honan" by the spurious edict, Fan then called 
up troops to await orders, took over the whole city, and for 
a length of time which is not precisely known he was able 
to seal off one of the main lines of communication between 
North and South. The danger in this incident lay first of all 
in its brazenness—Pien-liang was, after all, Bayan's old 
bailiwick—but even more in its demonstration of the ease 
with which the Chinese could shift their loyalties away from 
the dynasty to the first practitioner of strongarm methods who 
came along. A retired Yiian official and a private citizen who 
had earlier refused a high Yuan appointment were two promi-
nent Chinese who were made to obey Fan Meng and to serve 
him in an official capacity. Kuei Chang, a chin-shih of 1330 
and a native of Pien-liang, gained fame and renown as the 
only such official or potential official who refused to join in. 
At length another Chinese clerk, discovering that the edict 
72 
was false and Fan Meng an imposter, insinuated himself into 
his confidence and then murdered him.91 
Bayan and his men reacted savagely to the incident, and 
apparently tried to implicate as many men as they could. 
^ ^ Rumored estimates of the number of guilty Chinese officials 
Anti Confucian ^nvo^ve(l differed widely: thirty men according to one source, 
Reaction three hundred according to another, and "hundreds and 
thousands" according to a third.92 The Jalair Dorji, Chancel-
lor of the Left of Honan province, eager to restrict the scope 
of the prosecutions to the few ringleaders, was openly accused 
by Bayan's chief prosecutor Narin of ̂ favoring the Chinese."93 
Bayan made the same accusation against his nephew Toghto, 
who was Censor-in-Chief.94 
By now, matters had gone too far. Bayan's last-ditch 
attempt to save himself by turning the ethnic groups against 
each other could not succeed. The young emperor was furious 
at the prosecutions going on against the two princes, and 
too many highly placed Mongols and se-mu were repelled 
and frightened by Bayan's increasingly murderous activities. 
Bayan's position within the ruling class was unstable, and 
he was as a result forced into the unenviable position of having 
to persecute his opposition without the help of any widely 
acceptable ideological justification in so doing. His badly 
articulated appeal to Qubilai in the end fell on deaf ears. 
His attack upon Confucianism obliged him to persecute the 
Mongols and se-mu who for the sake of self-advancement had 
come to some understanding with that doctrine and who 
resented on conservative grounds both his naked rise to 
power and the brutal means he used to defend himself. 
In 1328 it happened that both the non-Confucian leader-
ship of the restoration and the Confucian movement in the 
bureaucracy had something to gain by the coup d'etat that 
took place. Indeed, so generally content were the Confucians 
with the liquidation of their enemies that they ignored the 
assassination of Qoshila and never sought to make a cause 
of it.95 A secure dictatorship such as that of El Temiir could 
control the Confucians. It could establish an academy such 
as the K'uei-chang-ko, appoint to it scholars of conflicting 
ideological tendencies, and thus confuse its goals. It could 
keep the literati occupied with literary projects, such as com-
piling the huge Ching-shih ta-tien encyclopedia, or writing 
inscriptions and epitaphs in honor of the leading restoration 
figures. It could isolate important Confucian leaders such as /3 
Yii Chi in high-ranking but meaningless positions. Bayan's B ¡ 
dictatorship, however, was not a secure one. While there ^^"co^/cmri 
had been no Confucian drive to block Bayan's takeover of Reaction 
government, his position was vulnerable in that his bloody 
rise to power had profited the Confucians nothing. This awk-
ward state of affairs Bayan surely sensed correctly, and rather 
than passively await the inevitable development of Confucian 
intransigeance and counter-activity, he decided to act first 
and deliver a crippling blow to the apparently monolithic 
prestige the Confucians enjoyed within the bureaucracy—a 
prestige which had been built up for the most part after the 
death of Qubilai. The tragedy was that the basic insecurity 
of Bayan's position grew rather than diminished; each de-
fensive act demanded another that was more defensive, more 
repulsive, more murderous. 
Bayan's removal was authorized by the emperor Toghon 
Temür and engineered by his own nephew, Toghto. On 
March 14, 1340, as Bayan was returning from a hunt with 
El Tegiis, he found the capital gates locked against him. 
Toghto read aloud the edict of dismissal, and Bayan's imperial 
guards, bribed beforehand, deserted him without incident. 
Bayan was first exiled to Honan province, then soon after-
wards he was banished to the far south. In April, 1340, he 
died on the way there.96 
Toghto had earlier sensed the impending political doom 
of his uncle, and realized that unless something were done 
his uncle's fall would also mean the elimination or destruction 
of the entire Merkid clan. To a certain degree, Toghto was 
in the same political position as his uncle, for he had partici-
pated in Bayan's bloody overthrow of the Qipchaqs. But 
Toghto had certain important connections that Bayan lacked. 
When Toghto was a young boy, his father Majartai had hired 
a southern Chinese by the name of Wu Chih-fang to tutor 
him in Confucian learning. Through Wu Chih-fang, Toghto 
was later put in contact with a number of other men, who 
as Confucians were opposed to Bayan and his policies. By 
1340, when he was a Censor-in-Chief, Toghto not only had 
74 high political standing within Bayan's administration and 
entree to the emperor; he also enjoyed a somewhat covert 
Bayan and relationship with the Confucian opposition. On Wu Chih-
Antl COReacüon s ur§inS> he decided to put himself at the head of all 
the opposition forces and strike down his uncle in the name 
of Confucian righteousness. 
Bayan's attack on Confucianism proved to be ideologically 
unjustifiable and in the end self-defeating. Toghto's attack 
on Bayan was ideologically supportable, but only on Confu-
cian grounds. There was no other way to rally and unify sup-
port from the bureaucracy. There was no other cause, no 
alternative principle, no competing movement that could 
serve to bind the ethnic classes together and permit the Yiian 
bureaucracy to function normally once again. 
The failure of Bayan's attack on Confucianism was the best 
proof of its strength and resiliency. As the leading movement 
within the bureaucracy, it could neither be ignored nor 
eliminated, except at the price of dynastic collapse. The Con-
fucian movement threatened to demand as the price of its 
suppression both racial war within the bureaucracy and mass 
popular rebellion against the state itself. With the removal 
of Bayan, the way was finally prepared for the triumph of 
Confucian politics at the highest levels of power. 
Chapter IV 
The Triumph of Confucian Politics 
Toghto's timely action spared the Merkid 
clan the fate of the Qipchaqs. Not only did Toghto contrive 
the overthrow of his uncle, but he went on to sponsor a major 
shift in the political direction of the Yiian state. The pending 
prosecutions were called off and the examination system was 
at once restored. Bayan's mainstay, the grand empress dowa-
ger Budashiri, was exiled; the heir apparent El Tegiis was 
quietly murdered; and Tugh Temiir was posthumously vil-
ified and his tablet removed from the imperial ancestral tem-
ple. The imperial succession was again confined to one 
legitimate line, that of Qoshila. The seventh year of Chih-
yiian was changed to the first year of Chih-cheng (1341), and 
with that the Bayan era was officially closed and a new period 
begun.1 
Confucian parlance designated the dismissal and exile of 
Bayan and the cancellation of his policies as keng-hua—a shift 
(keng) in the direction of Confucian suasion, or transformation 
(hua).2 The signs of Toghto's keng-hua in government can 
be seen in a number of areas, one of which was the matter 
of official appointments. Hsü Yu-jen, chin-shih of 1315, 
several times humiliated by Bayan, returned to court in 1340 
at the invitation of Toghto and his group and later resumed 
his former chancellery position of Assistant Administrator.3 
Hsü arrived with three other Chinese who had held promi-
nent chancellery positions under El Temür and who were 
now offered gifts in token of their political sufferings under 
Bayan.4 The list of Toghto's appointees to the Central Chan-
cellery in 1341 shows a definite Confucian bias, at least insofar 
as the identities of the men can be traced. In 1341 Toghto 
himself was Chancellor of the Right; his Chancellor of the 
Left was one Temür Buqa, a descendant of Chinggis Qan's 
half-brother Belgütei, about whom little is known.5 The Chief 
Administrators were Berke Buqa, an Eljigid Mongol, admirer 
of Chinese literature, and a former Imperial University stu-
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dent, of whom more will be heard; Toghon, a Jalair Mongol, 
The Triumph Confucian sympathies; Toghto's younger brother Esen 
of Confucian Temür; and the Qangli Temiir Tash, son of the Qangli Toghto, 
Politics and an avid Confucian.6 As Vice Administrator of the Right 
there was Arugh, possibly the same Arugh who as an intimate 
of the emperor's had worked closely in the plot against 
Bayan.7 Hsü Yu-jen was promoted to Vice Administrator of 
the Left; and as Assistant Administrators there were Ting-
chu, a former ally of Bayan's, a Qangli with no known Confu-
cian connections, and a certain Wu Qudu Buqa, who is 
unidentified.8 Back to the Han-lin Academy came the great 
Confucian leaders of the era: Chieh Hsi-ssu of Kiangsi, who 
under Bayan had left court on the excuse of illness; Huang 
Chin of Kiangche, also in the provinces during Bayan's ascend-
ancy; back too came Ou-yang Hsüan of Kiangsi, and Chang 
Ch'i-yen of North China, all of them chin-shih of 1315.9 
There were other signs of keng-hua. The Ching-yen, or 
"Classics Mat," suspended by Bayan, was reopened as an 
avenue of Confucian approach to the emperor. The Classics 
Mat was a kind of imperial seminar, a highly contrived and 
formalized meeting held at periodic intervals at which Con-
fucianists expounded doctrine directly to the emperor; its 
ideological justification lay in the ancient and familiar proposi-
tion that the correct ordering of the empire must begin with 
the rectification of the ruler. As Chancellor, Toghto took over 
the ex-officio chairmanship of the sessions, but he left other 
arrangements, such as the procurement of Confucian lec-
turers and interpreters, to the Han-lin Academy.10 The 
institution constituted an important link between the court 
and Confucian circles in the provinces, particularly in South 
China.11 
Southern Chinese political activists of an obscure sort had 
taken a prominent part in staging the anti-Bayan coup and 
in advising Toghto on the proper means of winning Confucian 
support for his cause.12 Throughout the planning and execu-
tion of the coup, Toghto was in frequent consultation with 
his mentor Wu Chih-fang, a Southern Chinese, concerning 
problems of both strategy and ideology. Wu Chili-fang's skill 
in Confucian casuistry helped to transform Toghto's removal 
of his own uncle from an act of gross impiety to an undertaking 
of supreme righteousness.13 When Toghto cast out his uncle The Triumph 
in March, 1340, it was probably Wu who advised him not 0f Confucian 
to assume the position of Chancellor of the Right immediately, Politics 
but for the time being filially to cede the position to his father. 
This Toghto did. As a patron of aspiring Chinese Confucian 
officials, Toghto's father Majartai was well known, and as a 
Chancellor eager for favorable Confucian opinion, his actions 
were conspicuous and unconcealed.14 Thus in a gesture 
unthinkable for either El Temiir or Bayan, in May, 1340, 
Majartai openly declined the designation of darqan and 
enfeoffment as prince of the first class. So well received was 
this refusal and so indicative was it of a new mood of modesty 
in government that the Censorate urged the emperor to issue 
an announcement about it to the empire "in order to encour-
age probity and deference."15 A struggle of long standing 
among the various ethnic groups in Yiian China concerning 
the right officially to impose the marriage, mourning, and 
burial customs of one group upon another was resolved at 
least temporarily by Majartai in favor of the Chinese Confu-
cians and their allies when he forbade the se-mu from marry-
ing their maternal aunts.16 
There appears to have been little doubt in any quarter 
that Toghto was the real power behind the change in govern-
ment and Majartai merely a front put up in obedience to 
the Confucian principle of filial respect. On November 12, 
1340, Majartai resigned as Chancellor of the Right on the 
excuse of illness, and Toghto, up to this time serving as head 
of the Chief Military Commission, stepped into his place.17 
An unofficial source has it that Majartai had taken advantage 
of his position to invest heavily in wine and grain shops and 
in salt distribution, and that Toghto considered his father's 
evident greed a sufficient reason to approach the emperor 
and ask him to allow Majartai to resign if he so requested.18 
There are grounds for suspecting that Majartai's resignation 





response to this action, Confucian opinion appears to have 
been sharply divided.19 
Toghto's assumption of the highest ministerial post in the 
realm as a champion of keng-hua did not signify any qualita-
tive change in the power or perquisites of the chancellorship 
itself. Although Majartai had abolished certain revenue-
producing agencies that his brother Bayan had controlled, 
Toghto managed to acquire his own sources of wealth.20 He 
derived his income from salt wells in Szechwan as well as 
from a number of landed estates in Huai-an and Sung-
chiang.21 Like El Temiir and Bayan, he held concurrent posi-
tions of command over several elite guards units.22 He con-
trolled the inner palace agency known as the Chao-kung wan-
hu-fu; and he extended his own power through the use of 
close relatives. As Bayan had once used him, he used his 
younger brother Esen Temiir in the vitally important post 
of Censor-in-Chief.23 In securing offices and private 
revenues, Toghto was more restrained than El Temiir or 
Bayan had been, and less inclined to flaunt his personal 
wealth and power, yet the nature of his position was much 
the same. One can detect a strong institutional continuity 
in the highest ministerial position, even though Toghto did 
not formally seek to do away with the Chancellorship of the 
Left as El Temiir and Bayan had done. After 1349, he simply 
left the position unfilled. 
It is above all Toghto's new direction in public policy that 
stands out as the hallmark of his first incumbency. Since 1328 
the dynasty had really done little in a positive way. Except 
for El Temiir's sponsorship of the compilation of the Ching-
shih ta-tien encyclopedia, suggestions for radical new official 
schemes went unheeded.24 Under Bayan's administration, it 
appears that governmental activity was actually lessened in 
scale. Toghto was, by contrast, receptive to ideas for official 
involvement in various sorts of projects. The compilation of 
the Liao, Chin, and Sung dynastic histories, which had lapsed 
for some time partly owing to a lack of funds, was taken up 
again in 1343 with Toghto himself as honorary general editor. 
The clerks and secretaries in the Central Chancellery and 
in the Han-lin Academy showed him that funds could be 
made available by borrowing from the cash and grain stored 
in South China and ordinarily used to defray expenses 
involved in operating the examination system.25 Participation 
in the final editing of the three official histories was a signifi-
cant and prestigious item in the career records of the officials 
involved. It was also a means of indulging the desire of the 
great Confucian scholars to impose their judgments upon the 
accomplishments of governments and the talents and moral 
worth of men.26 
The construction of the forty-mile-long Chin-k'ou canal, 
which Toghto began in 1342, was another such postponed 
project. Earlier in the Yiian period, and also during the pre-
ceding Chin Dynasty (1115-1234), attempts had been made 
to tap the Yung-ting River flowing eastward out of the Shensi 
highlands and join it by a canal through the capital with the 
Pei-ho at T'ung-chou, about thirteen miles to the east, in 
order that the annual maritime grain shipments from the 
Yangtze delta might reach Ta-tu directly by an all-water 
route. As it was, the grain boats were obliged to unload at 
T'ung-chou, from which point the grain was hauled by carters 
at some difficulty and expense the remainder of the distance 
to the capital. It was also surmised that such a canal might 
make it possible to ship Shensi coal by water directly into 
the capital, and put an end to the city's need for its swarms 
of fagot-sellers.27 
The launching of the canal project, however, exposed a 
side of Toghto which many of his Confucian admirers had 
not fully anticipated. His restoration of the examinations, his 
relaxation of prohibitions, lowering of the salt quotas, and 
cancellation of back taxes, and his commitment of the 
emperor to a full program of imperial sacrifices were all 
policies that won Confucian support—so much so that, as 
the Yiian shih historiographers put it, "those inside and out-
side the government hailed him as a 'worthy minister.' " 2 8 
But with the initiation of the canal project, many Confucians 
were discovering to their dismay that Toghto's keng-hna was 
not a pure substance, but an alloy compounded with kung-li9 
the "merit and profit" of the ancient Legalist Shang Yang 
and the controversial Sung Confucian Wang An-shih. Against 
the project it was forcefully argued, especially by the Confu-









River would put the capital in danger of inundation during 
the summer and fall rains if it were diverted and brought 
right into the city itself, while even under normal conditions 
the high silt content of the water sitting behind the locks 
would soon impede navigation in any case. "Since this discus-
sion has been going on," said Hsii, "news about it has leaked 
outside. Opinions are unanimous that the project cannot be 
carried out. If it is carried out simply as a means of gaining 
personal achievement, and if people s opinions are not con-
sulted and their advice is ignored, then we are back to Shang 
Yang and Wang An-shih and their methods. This is not the 
kind of discussion we ought to have now."29 
Toghto brushed aside all such objections and went ahead 
with his plans. In four months, he had the new waterway 
dug. But as soon as the canal was opened, he was obliged 
to close it down owing to a storm of protest. It was asserted 
that the flow was too rapid, mud and silt clogged the canal, 
people's homes and graves were wrecked during the digging, 
hordes of laborers had been killed or wounded, the expenses 
were incalculable, and no accomplishment was gained from 
it after all. Toghto himself was verbally criticized for the 
fiasco. The censors impeached two men whom they found 
responsible for submitting the original proposal, and Toghto 
signaled his renunciation of the project by allowing them to 
be executed.30 
Two years after the abortive canal affair, in June, 1344, 
Toghto resigned his position as Chancellor of the Right, a 
move which seems to have been prompted by a number of 
other events of ill omen. During 1341 and 1342 risings broke 
out on the far southern fringes of the Yiian empire; there 
were tribal troubles on the Yunnan frontier, in Kwangsi, as 
well as in the southern part of present-day Hunan province, 
where the rebels rallied behind a "King Who Obeys 
Heaven."31 These were followed in 1343 by more frontier 
disturbances: in March a tribal uprising in upper Manchuria, 
and during the summer new troubles along the Szechwan-
Tibet frontier and among the Moslems in southwestern Shan-
32 In the interior of China, the annals report widespread si. 
banditry in Shantung and Hopei; in August, 1343, bandits 
managed to plunder and burn the Shantung city of Yen-
chou.33 
There was also important political opposition from within 
the Central Chancellery. The Eljigid Mongol Berke Buqa, 
who had risen to the Chancellorship of the Left, was 
indirectly attacking Toghto through denunciations of his 
father Majartai.34 Bowing to Heaven's warnings and submit-
ting to the demands of filial respect, Toghto stepped down. 
In so doing, he left the impression that his political behavior 
was under the ultimate control of Confucian norms. 
Toghto remained out of government for five years. He 
lived, however, in the capital where he could exert influence 
behind the scenes until the summer of 1347 when he accom-
panied his father into exile. In 1344 he named as his replace-
ment the Arulad Mongol Arughtu, a man of impeccable 
lineage, being a descendant of Boghorchu, a childhood friend 
of Chinggis Qan, and one of his "Four Heroes."35 Arughtu 
was, however, a compromise choice and a political nonentity 
who lacked previous administrative experience. As Chancel-
lor, he suffered excruciating loss of face before the emperor. 
On the occasion of the completion of the Liao, Chin, and 
Sung dynastic histories and their presentation to the throne 
in 1345, he confessed that he could not read them and did 
not know what their purpose was; whereupon the emperor, 
in a curious reversal of roles, delivered a short Confucian 
lecture to him on the value of history as a mirror for present 
action.36 
Berke Buqa, who had been instrumental in bringing about 
the resignation of Toghto, maneuvered to force his way 
against Arughtu. Upon failing to enlist Arughtu's support 
against Toghto, Berke Buqa had a censor denounce him on 
the grounds of incompetence, and in February of 1347 he 
resigned.37 Arughtu was succeeded as Chancellor of the Right 
by Berke Buqa himself. 
Berke Buqas term in the dynasty's highest ministerial posi-
tion was a short one, lasting only from February, 1347, until 
his dismissal in July, but it was really he who controlled policy 








He was strongly opposed to Toghto, a point which he made 
clear when, after taking office, he exiled Majartai from the 
capital to the far west and impeached Toghto's old mentor, 
Wu Chih-fang.38 
Under Berke Buqa's protection, some of Bayan's old adher-
ents and their relatives returned to positions at court.39 Yet 
Politics there was no question of Berke Buqa's reviving Bayan's 
policies and leading an anti-Confucian movement against 
Toghto. The events of 1340 had ensured that all future politics 
could henceforth he conducted only in Confucian terms. The 
important political split that developed between Toghto and 
Berke Buqa was one in which, for the first time in Yiian 
history, Confucian ideology predominated on both sides. By 
1347, it can definitely be stated, Confucian political ideology 
had at last become a controlling force in Yiian government. 
Since Berke Buqa could not oppose Toghto by falling back 
upon anti-Confucian policies, he opposed him by appealing 
to a more "conservative" Confucianism than that represented 
by Toghto. The conservative variety of Confucianism which 
Berke Buqa championed tended to value individual morality 
over public policy, and voluntary consensus over political or 
factional organization. According to this brand of Confucian 
ideology, good government was ultimately a matter of good 
local government, with good and upright men using moral 
suasion (chiao-hua) to control and soothe the population. 
Unlike Toghto, Berke Buqa had had first-hand experience 
in the problems of regional and local administration, not only 
in China proper, but also in the western and southern frontier 
regions. His biography tells us that he enjoyed extraordinary 
success in his endeavors in these fields, and that his sym-
pathetic and compassionate measures invariably won public 
gratitude.39 Since he was, moreover, a Mongol, his leadership 
of the conservative Confucian opposition to Toghto was on 
all counts an appropriate one. 
As an official in the Central Chancellery, Berke Buqas 
primary political concerns had all along reflected his conserva-
tive Confucian approach. He had been sufficiently alarmed 
by the increase over the last several years in the incidence 
of floods, famines, plague, and banditry in the center as well 
as on the frontiers of the empire to turn his attention almost 
exclusively to problems of local government. It was probably 
Berke Buqa—certainly it was not Arughtu—who had con-
ceived the idea of an empire-wide investigating commission 
in November, 1345, for the express purpose of rectifying ^ Triumph 
abuses in the provincial and local administrations. Berke Buqa 0j Confucian 
was Chancellor of the Left at the time. For the investigating Politics 
commission, he formed two-man teams, each consisting of 
one Mongol or se-mu and one Chinese, and dispatched them 
to each of the twelve censorial circuits in the realm. They 
were authorized to examine into the people's distress, dismiss 
corrupt officials and promote those who deserved it, and 
relieve onerous tax and corvee burdens. They were permitted 
to do anything they saw fit to correct local injustices.40 
The dispatch of the commission was followed by other 
measures which showed much the same general concern. The 
a urugh, or camps for the dependents of the Mongol military, 
which Hsii Yu-jen had vigorously denounced for oppressing 
local peasants, were ordered abolished in the fall of 1345.41 
In August, 1346, men were directed to be specially picked 
from the imperial guards to serve as darughachi, i.e. non-
Chinese representatives of the imperial authority, at levels 
of local administration, replacing the old and corrupt incum-
bents with men personally known to the emperor.42 In April, 
1347, students in the Imperial University were examined and 
chosen for positions as directors of Confucian studies in the 
local governments and in the elite guards units.43 Even the 
clerks attached to the Central Chancellery were ordered to 
study the classics and histories in the afternoons.44 As part 
of the new emphasis upon improving local government, it 
was proposed by a censor that rather than have the Board 
of Civil Office at the capital select the magistrates of the low-
est grade counties, it would be easier to get better men 
appointed if the provinces themselves handled the matter.45 
The government's new concern with local administration 
derived from its discovery of the importance of chiao-hua 
to the security of the dynasty. Yet despite this concern, social 
disorder showed definite signs of increase throughout the 





its course in the summer of 1344. The investigating commis-
sion sent out in 1345 met with indifferent success in its effort 
to rectify matters. It was welcomed with enthusiasm in some 
quarters, but in the North China area it began to carry out 
its work so thoroughly that the entrenched bureaucracy, 
threatened with mass impeachment, had to apply pressure 
upon the central government and have the leading inves-
tigator dismissed.46 In the Kiangsi-Fukien circuit, the local 
population, utterly cynical, watched the commission come 
and go.47 In the southern part of Hukuang province, a long-
simmering tribal disturbance achieved a degree of organiza-
tion and by 1346 was causing widespread destruction.48 Mem-
bers of the scholar gentry, noting this, grew increasingly 
apprehensive about the likelihood of popular rebellion in 
Central and South China.49 On July 2, 1347, the emperor 
called attention to the lack of official harmony and the fre-
quent observation of adverse portents and on those grounds 
dismissed Berke Buqa from the Chancellorship of the Right.50 
Though dismissed, Berke* Buqa remained in the capital 
with the honorary designation of Grand Guardian (t'ai-pao), 
a title which afforded him access to the emperor and allowed 
him to operate behind the scenes as a kind of defacto prime 
minister. His administrative machine in the Central Chancel-
lery remained essentially intact. For six months the office 
of Chancellor of the Right remained vacant; the Qangli Confu-
cian Temür Tash, however, continued in his position as Chan-
cellor of the Left until his death in October, 1347.51 Temiir 
Tash made further refinements upon Berke Buqa s policies. 
Among other measures, he set up a system whereby officials 
might be rotated on a regular basis between court and provin-
cial positions, and he brought the emperor more intimately 
into the appointive process by requiring all court officials 
assigned to outside posts to pay their respects to the throne 
upon their departure in order that the emperor might person-
ally exhort them to achieve good results in local adminis-
tration.52 After Temiir Tash's death, the Jalair Dorji, an 
equally avid Confucian, was appointed to replace him. Dorji, 
however, insisted that he could not serve without his friend 
Ho Wei-i as a close colleague. In conformity with his wishes, 
the emperor made Dorji Chancellor of the Right in January, 
1348, with Ho Wei-i to assist him as Chancellor of the Left.53 
Berke Buqa remained as Grand Guardian, in ultimate control 
of policy. 
That Ho Wei-i, a Northern Chinese, should occupy so high 
a position as Chancellor of the Left was of course extraordi-
nary. For anything like an equivalent case, one must go back 
to the formative years of the dynasty, before 1262, when 
Qubilai began phasing the Chinese out of the higher positions 
in the bureaucracy.54 As the ethnic class system of rule so-
lidified through the years, it became customary for the Central 
Chancellery to bar Southern Chinese altogether, and to 
restrict the Northern Chinese to the positions of Chief 
Administrator or below. Since the restoration of 1328 the 
Northern Chinese were generally further restricted to the 
position of Vice Administrator of the Left or below, until 
under Toghto's aegis Ho Wei-i became Chief Administrator 
in 1344.55 
For four generations, however, the Ho family, whose 
origins were military, had been in the good graces of the 
Mongol rulers. Around 1253, when Qubilai as prince was 
undertaking his invasion of Szechwan and Yunnan, Ho Wei-i's 
great-grandfather visited his camp and presented the con-
queror with 5,000 ounces of white gold. Since then the sons 
of the Ho family had entree to the Imperial Guards, heredi-
tary command of an elite guards unit, and hereditary control 
of the office of commandant (liu-shou) in the imperial summer 
capital of Shang-tu. Since 1320, when Ho Wei-i's father was 
executed by the financier Temiider, the Ho family was also 
highly regarded by the Confucian movement.56 Ho Wei-i 
profited politically from what was widely considered to be 
the righteous martyrdom of his father. From his inherited 
position, Ho worked his way up through the bureaucracy, 
holding various positions in the capital and outside. As a cen-
sorial official, he resigned in protest early in Bayan's adminis-
tration and did not return to office until Toghto brought him 
back in 1342. In October, 1345, while Arughtu was Chancel-
lor of the Right, Ho was elevated to the position of Censor-





for this unprecedented occasion, the emperor had conferred 
upon him the Mongol name of Tai-p'ing, and thus symboli-
cally adopted him into the Mongol nation.57 
86 The government of Dorji and Ho Wei-i lasted from 
, _ 7 January, 1348, until the Merkid Toghto's return to power 
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of Confucian i n August, I 3 4 9 - During that time the conservative Confucian 
Politics administrative program was brought to something of a peak 
of fulfillment, both in the capital and in the provinces. As 
Chancellor of the Right, the Confucianist Dorji chose to place 
himself above politics as symbol of the over-all Confucian 
tone of the administration. He devoted his attentions to the 
ta-t'i—the over-all polity, the immanent order of things, as 
contrasted to the more practical aspects of administration 
(y ting) that Ho Wei-i handled. As his biography tells us, Dorji 
examined the ritual canons and revived some of the ancient 
practices for use at court. He asked that, as a means of honor-
ing Confucianism, the participants in the Classics Mat be 
permitted to seat themselves in the imperial presence. He 
had renowned and upright officials study the classical prece-
dents and propose appropriate methods for achieving good 
rule and order. He defrocked supernumerary Buddhist 
clerics, and recommended neglected Confucian worthies to 
the court.58 
On a more practical level, the government continued to 
act upon its basic commitment to the improvement of local 
administration. In January, 1348, it selected sixteen well-
known officials from the Censorate and the literary academies 
of the capital and placed them in local government positions, 
with the right to memorialize the throne directly on problems 
of popular affairs.59 Special efforts were made to honor and 
reward outstanding local functionaries.60 The government 
also tried to revitalize the she system of local control.61 On 
two occasions high-ranking officials were ordered yearly to 
recommend men of their acquaintance for local positions, and 
care was taken to appoint only experienced and qualified 
Mongols or se-mu to local darughachi positions. Once more 
it was vowed that assignments to these positions would not 
be used as a convenient means for providing relief to needy 
guards troops.62 
Despite its well-meaning gestures, the conservative Con-
fucianist government of Berke Buqa, Dorji, and Ho Wei-i 
found itself in serious political trouble. Popular distress and 
07 
social disorder, stemming from deep-rooted causes over 
which the government really had no control, continued to ^ ^ . 
make their presence felt. In the north, the Yellow River was 0fConfucU 
still causing damage. In June and July of 1344, swollen by Politics 
heavy rains, it had gone on one of its rampages, bursting 
its dykes in two places east of Pien-liang, and flooding an 
area of about 6, (X)0 square miles in the lowland triangle west 
of the Shantung massif. Seventeen walled cities were inun-
dated.63 The flood set off a migration of refugees, and an 
upsurge in bandit activity in the area immediately surround-
ing the scene of the disaster.64 Since Toghto retired from 
office just as the Yellow River was beginning to get out of 
hand, it was left to Berke Buqa to devise some remedy for 
the catastrophe. But Berke Buqa did not have a ready-made 
programmatic approach which he could apply to a problem 
of such magnitude, and what remedies he did devise were 
minimal. A court discussion of the Yellow River problem held 
in December, 1344, resulted in a decision simply to make 
dyke repairs here and there, and to set up water control 
bureaus along the lower course of the river to inspect and 
make suggestions.65 These measures were clearly insufficient. 
The Yellow River breached its dykes at least three more times 
and, what was worse, it began to shift its course.66 It had 
hitherto flowed eastward as far as Pien-liang, where it veered 
toward the southeast and added its water to the tributaries 
of the Huai River system.67 After the 1344 flood, however, 
the Yellow River began gradually to shift its course north-
ward. Part of it began flowing along the north side of the 
Shantung peninsula and into the sea. Another part began 
to pour into the Grand Canal and up the North China plain 
toward Ho-chien, where it threatened to wreck one of the 
government salt works. As a result, the Grand Canal was 
put out of commission, and the government was in danger 
of losing the million ingots of cash that the Ho-chien works 
provided yearly.68 This loss it could scarcely afford.69 
At sea there were more difficulties. The annual maritime 
grain shipments from the Yangtze delta region to the capital 
had peaked at 3,340,306 piculs in 1329. Owing to piracy, 
official corruption, and acts of nature the shipments fell by 
8 8 almost 25 percent to 2,800,000 piculs in 1341 and 2,600,000 
The Triumph i n 1 3 4 2 - 7 ° During the year 1348, moreover, piracy along the 
of Confucian Kiangche coast began to assume serious proportions and put 
Politics e yen this reduced movement of grain in jeopardy. It was 
usually the responsibility of the local officials to deal with 
this maritime banditry, which was common enough along the 
coast in the 1340s.71 The local authorities, however, were 
in many cases hesitant to take to sea, preferring instead to 
purchase protection for the government grain boats by paying 
subsidies to the pirates. This policy made piracy a rather 
rewarding occupation, and had the effect of encouraging some 
of the coastal people, who might otherwise have been "useful 
in suppressing the trouble, to put to sea themselves and join 
the number of pirates already there. It was in these circum-
stances that a certain Fang Kuo-chen from Huang-yen rose 
to prominence in 1348, when he seized a government grain 
boat together with the chiliarch who was in charge of it. The 
act was brazen enough to engage the attention of the 
Kiangche provincial authorities; the Administration Vice 
Commissioner of the province set out with a fleet of boats 
in pursuit of Fang, but instead of arresting him, he miscalcu-
lated his chances and fell into the pirate's hands. Fang then 
pressured him into submitting to the court a demand for hon-
orary titles for himself and his brothers.72 
After receiving the Administration Vice Commissioner, 
together with Fangs personal envoy, the Berke Buqa court 
decided, after some argument, not to punish the luckless offi-
cial. It was pointed out that, since his troops were northern 
infantry and cavalry and untrained in naval warfare, punish-
ment would be meaningless. The court also permitted Fang 
to "surrender" in return for official recognition, even though 
Fang surrendered from a position of strength and was in fact 
bullying the court. The court was, in the words of a policy 
opponent, "interested in expedients."73 Since, moreover, the 
court in its concern for the problems of local government 
tended to emphasize conciliation and moral suasion rather 
than coercion, it dismissed a proposal to set up a naval com-
mandery at Ch'ing-yiian (Ning-po) when it was reported that 
the local elders were opposed to the idea.74 Thus by 1348 
the security of the maritime grain shipments was mortgaged 
to the pirate Fang Kuo-chen; and the Grand Canal, the only 
alternative grain transport route, was out of service because 
of the Yellow River floods.75 
These manifold difficulties which troubled the Yiian realm 
in the late 1340s demanded some sort of radical action for 
solution. The Berke» Buqa government, confined by its philos-
ophy to the uttering of soft Confucian noises, could offer no 
adequate solutions and consequently suffered an increasing 
loss of confidence. The ex-Chancellor Toghto, eager to seize 
an opportunity to return to power, began to attack the incum-
bent administration from the sidelines. The incumbents, as 
a regime with pretensions to Confucian rectitude, were 
poorly equipped to hold themselves together against such 
a partisan attack; although Berke Buqa needed at this point 
a closely knit faction to defend himself, conservative Confu-
cian theory condemned the idea of faction out of hand. 
Conservative theory held that bureaucrats should never 
organize themselves into cliques based upon the principle 
of common material interest, but should instead form random 
associations based upon moral and ideological likeminded-
ness. The conservative persuasion desired to achieve for Con-
fucianism a permanent dominance in government, and would 
appear to have calculated that the greater the atomization 
of its individual members, the greater the chances for the 
survival of the movement as a whole. Cliques were all too 
fragile and vulnerable in the long run. Nevertheless, Berke 
Buqa's government, at a loss to give adequate answer to 
Toghto's attacks, unable to deflate or repudiate his charges, 
made a desperate but unavailing effort to organize factionally 
to save itself. Under pressure of attack from Toghto, Berke 
Buqa tried to use personal persuasion to secure support from 
such figures as Arughtu and the Tangut Irinjinbal, but they 
refused his advances. He eventually went so far as to swear 





Ho Wei-i and the Tangut Han-chia -nu.76 In the end 
nevertheless, he was unable to insist upon an unthinking par-
tisan devotion among the higher figures in his administration. 
9 0 The struggle between Toghto and Berke Buqa for the con-
trol of government was fought out, not with weapons in the 
, r . field, but with words in the Censorate, couched in Confucian 
onjucian au 
Politics t e r m s - With troubles mounting within the empire, the Shensi 
Branch Censorate initiated the first attack in December, 
1347, impeaching the Grand Guardian Berke Buqa for being 
the son of a "rebellious minister."77 In order to quell this 
outburst, Berke Buqas sworn brother Ilan-chia-nu was dis-
patched to act as Censor-in-Chief of the Shensi Branch Cen-
sorate.78 
The struggle, however, continued. It happened that 
Toghto's father Majartai, living in exile in Kansu since the 
summer of 1347, died there in December. Ho Wei-i, oblivi-
ous of the interests of faction, argued that Toghto must be 
permitted to return to the capital in order to arrange for 
his father's burial there. Ho argued that, since Toghto had 
shown loyalty to the imperial house, it would be remiss now 
to prevent him from exercising his duties as a filial son. Ho's 
argument carried. The regime conscious of its Confucian com-
mitments could not easily afford the imputation of obstructing 
the way of filial piety, and Toghto was permitted to return 
from exile. In the spring of 1348 the emperor conferred upon 
him the title of Grand Tutor (t'ai-fu), a degree higher than 
Berke Buqa s title of Grand Guardian. With Toghto nearby, 
the attack against Berke Buqa then shifted from the Shensi 
Branch Censorate to the Censorate proper.79 
In 1348 the Censorate denounced Berke Buqa for the in-
ability of his regime to deal effectively with the rising prob-
lems of banditry and piracy, and for his protection of former 
Bayan partisans.80 The first charge was sound enough, but 
the second was less so. The paths of Berke Buqa and Toghto 
appear to have crossed for the first time in 1339, when both 
served as concurrent Censors-in-Chief under Bayan. In the 
wake of the Fan Meng incident, Bayan ordered the Censorate 
to draft a demand that all Chinese be removed from the lead-
ing positions in the provincial Surveillance Offices.81 Berke 
Buqa, who was fearful of Bayan's increasing recklessness, did 
not at all want to send this demand up to the emperor. 
Toghto, instead of joining him in a common stand against 
Bayan, left it to him to take the demand up while he 
approached the emperor indirectly and persuaded him to 
reject it.82 As a result of Toghto's sly maneuvering, Bayan 
was thwarted and Berke Buqa placed in a politically damaging 
position. The affair not only turned Berke Buqa against 
Toghto, l)ut it also made him the natural protector of a 
number of smaller bureaucrats whom Toghto threw out of 
office for purely partisan reasons after Bayan's ouster.83 Urged 
on by Toghto, the Censorate now tried to use this fact to 
pin the Bayan label upon Berke Buqa, and impugn the 
genuineness of his Confucianism. 
The attack was unscrupulous, and Berke Buqa tried to 
persuade the Censor-in-Chief Irinjinbal not to forward the 
impeachment to the emperor. Irinjinbal, whose son had been 
executed by Bayan, would not be dissuaded, and sent the 
statement up. The emperor was faced with the choice 
between endorsing the impeachment and dismissing the 
regime and rejecting it and provoking an uproar in the Cen-
sorate. He decided to reject it. He removed Irinjinbal from 
his position and sent him off to the provinces. The emperor's 
action was an expression of no confidence in the Censorate. 
The Censorate, an increasingly restless institution since the 
death of Tugh Temiir, was a rather special organ of govern-
ment. It demanded strong institutional loyalty from its mem-
bership, and it insisted upon its right to speak out freely 
at any time. It was an organ in which Confucianism was firmly 
established. Unless it was ruled over by a strong partisan 
hand, it tended to become obstreperous and unruly. The 
emperor's rejection of its impeachment of Berke Buqa caused 
it a damaging loss of institutional prestige. It had to attack 
back, and since it could not attack the emperor directly, it 
did so indirectly. The Jalair Dorjibal, a distant cousin of the 
Chancellor of the Right Dorji, and as avid a Confucian as 
he, resubmitted the impeachment to the emperor, threaten-
ing the total collapse of the Censorate as an institution if 









for the first rejection upon the inner palace functionary Ko 
Yong-bok, whom he impeached for presuming upon favor, 
impeding government, usurping authority, and conniving 
with the chief ministers of the Central Chancellery. Since 
the departure of Irinjinbal left as sole Censor-in-Chief the 
Tangut Narin, a man associated with Bayan and Berke Buqa, 
Li Chi further demanded that the censors be allowed to 
memorialize the throne directly, without the prior approval 
of the Censor-in-Chief. The emperor accepted the impeach-
ment of Ko Yong-bok, and sent him back to his native Korea, 
but he rejected the other demands of the Censorate. There-
upon Dorjibal and a number of other censors resigned en 
bloc from the Censorate, and the attack against Berke Buqa 
was once again taken up by the outside censorial organs.85 
At the height of the struggle, Berke Buqa made the mistake 
of ridiculing the Censorate, a faux pas which aroused Confu-
cian resentment and only helped to damage his cause.86 The 
Censor-in-Chief Narin, apparently sensing Berke Buqas 
hopeless impasse, attempted an attack upon a member of 
the Central Chancellery, but he was himself impeached by 
a censor and dismissed in March, 1348.87 Berke Buqa's sworn 
brother Han-chia-nu, who replaced Narin as Censor-in-Chief, 
organized a retaliatory attack upon presumed Toghto parti-
sans in the inner palace and succeeded in getting the emperor 
to dismiss and exile them in July, 1349.88 
The enhanced power of the monarchy, evident throughout 
these censorial convulsions, was a conspicuous result of recent 
political change. Toghto's strategy for the overthrow of Bayan 
had centered about the participation of the emperor not as 
a symbol, but as a free political agent. After the eradication 
of the rival imperial line of Tugh Temiir, the imperial institu-
tion remained relatively free of outside manipulation. Toghon 
Temiir's principal empress, the Qunggirad Bayan Qudu, was 
quiet and self-effacing.89 She was upstaged by Toghon Te-
miir's second empress Oljei Qudu, nee Ki, a Korean. Bayan 
had prevented the emperor from elevating Oljei Qudu to 
the rank of empress on the grounds of her nationality; but 
after Bayan's overthrow, Toghon Temiir got his way and 
finally obtained a consort who had no clan behind her power-
ful enough to interfere in imperial affairs. After 1340 Toghon 
Temiir carefully exploited the opportunities for improving the 
monarchical position which events and circumstances had 
placed before him. While he was no statesman after the pat-
tern of Qubilai, he enjoyed his role as the sponsor of keng-
hua, and he used cautiously and consistently in the monarchi-
cal interest his power as final arbiter over the struggle going 
on in the leading organs of government. On August 16, 1349, 
he finally decided that the Berke Buqa government had had 





That Yiian politics had become Confucianized is evident 
from the fact that after 1340 political division at the highest 
levels of power in the state had come to express itself in 
terms of the conservative and reformist tendencies within 
Neo-Confucian ideology. As political leaders at court, both 
Toghto and Berke Buqa were obliged to couch their differ-
ences, justify their political activities, and formulate their 
ideas for the use of power in Confucian language. Each 
attacked the other by questioning the validity and honesty 
of his opponent's Confucianism. Toghto was attacked as a 
Legalist, Berke Buqa as a protector of Bayan men. 
Toghto emerged at the top of the political hierarchy in 
1340 as a Confucian hero, a sponsor of keng-hua, savior of 
the emperor, restorer of the examination system, and much 
else. In 1344 he capped this reputation by gracefully retiring 
from political life, a Confucian act and an untypical one for 
Yiian chancellors. Such previous chancellors as Bayan, El 
Temiir, and Daula-shah had been removed only by death 
or violence. 
Toghto proved to have a special affinity for the reform vari-
ety of Confucianism, an ideological tendency specially notable 
among certain Southern Chinese from Kiangsi, the old home 
province of the Sung reformer Wang An-shih, An idea origi-
nally conceived by Yii Chi of Kiangsi (d. 1348) to eliminate 
the maritime grain shipments by large-scale agricultural 
development in North China was in fact carried out by Toghto 
in 1352. The Kiangsi Confucians Chieh Hsi-ssu (d. 1344) and 
Ou-yang Hsiian (d. 1358) were friendly with Toghto and may 
have served as the original source for some of his government-
al ideas. Certainly the new institutional use of the Han-lin 
^ Academy as a kind of training base for prospective Confucian 
appointees to the Central Chancellery was strongly urged 
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of Confucian When Toghto returned to office in 1349, conservative Con-
Politics fucianism had proved ineffective as a means of assuaging the 
troubled conditions of the time. China's feng-su was not 
responding to Berke Buqa's increased applications of chiao-
hua. In these circumstances, Toghto's reformist Confucian 
approach held promise. Reform Confucianism was less hostile 
to the idea of clique, and Toghto needed a tightly knit per-
sonal machine to carry out the large-scale projects he had 
in mind. 
The reform Confucian approach was often called the doc-
trine of "merit and profit" (kung-li) by its critics. Used with 
li, meaning opportunism or profiteering, kung implies un-
bridled activism and reputation-seeking by individuals or 
bureaucratic administrations. In what his opponents would 
term the pursuit of "merit and profit," Toghto would emerge 
as financial reformer, rechanneler of the Yellow River, and 
conqueror of the Red Turban rebels. He would come very 
near to settling the worst of the empire's problems and estab-
lishing the Yiian Dynasty on an entirely new basis. 
Chapter V 
In Pursuit of "Merit and Profit" 
In August, 1349, Toghto and his men returned 
to power in a spirit of partisan vengeance. The Chancellor 
of the Right Dorji resumed his viceroyship and returned to 
his home in Manchuria. The Censorate attacked Ho Wei-i 
for his administrative deficiencies and his son Ho Chiin for 
having married a girl of the imperial house, and both departed 
in exile to Shensi. An adherent suggested to Ho Wei-i that 
he dramatize through suicide the injustice that was being 
done him. Ho dismissed the suggestion and decided instead 
to pass his days studiously absorbed in the histories and clas-
sics. Toghto succeeded Dorji as Chancellor of the Right; the 
post of Chancellor of the Left remained unfilled throughout 
Toghto's second ministry (1349-55), a reversal in fact if not 
entirely in name to the sole chancellorships of El Temiir and 
Bayan. Han-chia-nu and Tiimender, both sworn brothers of 
Berke Ruqa, were impeached on various charges of crime 
and corruption. The former was deported to the mouth of 
the Amur River, where he died; and the latter was murdered 
en route to a post in the provinces. Berke Buqa himself was 
removed to Shantung, and he died there in 1350.1 
Toghto's overthrow of the opposition was difficult to justify 
on Confucian moral grounds. He was careful to leave the 
visible performance of the more unpleasant aspects of the 
task to the lower-level personal operatives he assigned to 
advisory positions in the Central Chancellery.2 Toghto's 
removal of the Berke Buqa leadership was unlike El Temiir's 
removal twenty year before, of Daula-shah—minion of the 
usurper Yesiin Temiir, and a Moslem, to whom any real or 
fancied criminality could be believably imputed. Toghto was 
aware of the difference, and refrained from posthumously vil-
ifying his victims. His coup against his uncle Bayan in 1340, 
his revival of the examination system, and his timely retire-
ment in 1344 were apparently still sufficient to secure his 
own Confucian credentials, or at least to make widely accept-
or able his reentry into government. At any rate he had gained 
In Pursuit of s uPPo r t Censorate by posing as the champion of 
"Merit i t s institutional integrity, and that was most important. 
and Profit" In comparing the staff of Toghto's new Central Chancellery 
with his appointees of 1341, however, one notices above all 
the absence of any Mongols or se-mu with known Confucian 
leanings. The Qangli Temiir Tash was dead, and several other 
Confucianist Mongols and se-mu who served in the Chancel-
lery between 1343 and 1346 were now branded as members 
of the opposition and removed from office. The Qunggirad 
Tai Buqa and the Qangli Ting-chu, both non-Confucians, con-
veniently switched sides and joined Toghto; they retained 
their Chief Administrator positions.3 The other Chief 
Administrators were the Kashmiri Bayan and the Kereid 
Mongol Chosgem.4 The Qangli Uch Qurtuqa came in as Vice 
Administrator of the Right, and Han Yiian-shan, a graduate 
of the Imperial University, as Vice Administrator of the Left.5 
Han Yung (no relation), a chin-shih of 1318, was made an 
Administration Vice Commissioner.6 
During his first ministry of 1340-44, Toghto had given an 
indication of his activist political tendencies. His canal project 
encountered vociferous opposition, however, and had to be 
scuttled. This time, Toghto succeeded in discrediting 
beforehand the main sources of conservative Confucian op-
position to the activist approach by his timely and successful 
attack on the Berke Buqa administration. In addition, the 
Central Chancellery was now more fully under his own per-
sonal control than it had been earlier. The Censorate was 
in his debt. On all sides, the way was open for a new thrust 
of policy, a vigorous and imaginative response to the grave 
problems that were threatening the existence of the dynasty. 
Writing unofficially, the chroncler Ch'iian Heng ascribed this 
vision to Toghto: "He was of a mind to inititate policies, for 
he believed that nothing would be remembered of the former 
prime ministers because they were indifferent to ceremony, 
to literary celebration, and to institutional measures. He 
wanted actively to display his power and brilliance to the 
empire, surpass the old norms of the ancestors, and make 
his name immortal in the historical records."7 
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As a step preparatory to his further plans, Toghto needed ' 1 
to offer some compensation to the conservative Confucians _ „ In Pursuit c 
for their loss of a controlling voice in the inner councils of "Merit 
government. In November, 1349, he accordingly established and Profit" 
the Tuan-pen-t'ang, a palace school of Confucian learning, 
for the education of the heir presumptive Ayushiridara. Son 
of Toghon Temiir by his Korean consort, Ayushiridara was 
now about eleven years of age. Since it was likely that he 
would be named heir apparent, and one day become 
emperor, the conservatives' pedagogical instinct was aroused, 
and their concerns in part transferred from the immediate 
present to the future.8 
Although it would appear that Toghto already had some 
idea of the kinds of projects he wanted to carry out, he prefer-
red that ideas and suggestions should come up from below. 
The government announced that it would welcome project 
proposals, and in October, 1349, it set up a special staff to 
sift through the responses and report the more practical ones 
to the Central Chancellery.9 Since it was anticipated that 
the new projects would demand large sums of money, the 
first major proposal to be taken up was one submitted in 
May, 1350, by Wu Ch'i, a minor official in the Board of 
Revenue, urging that the government expand the money sup-
ply and increase its rate of circulation.10 It had evidently 
been the policy of the Bayan and Berke Buqa administrations 
to cut governmental expenditures and to restrict the issuance 
of paper currency. In 1348, however, there was some court 
sentiment favoring an immediate issue of 5,000,000 ingots 
in paper cash in order to rectify the tight money situation. 
It was to be put into circulation through the merchants, who 
would obtain it by surrendering silver bullion to the govern-
ment. The idea was opposed by the chin-shih Kuei Ch'ang 
on the grounds that such a policy would enrich the merchants 
but not benefit the people.11 The court then apparently 
dropped the idea, for by 1349 there was still a severe money 
shortage, compensated for in part by the continued circula-
tion of worn notes and an increase in counterfeiting. In 
November, 1350, the Uighur Hsieh Che-tu, a chin-shih and 
President of the Board of Civil Office, further proposed a 
currency reform along the lines laid down by Wu Ch'i, adding 
i Pursuit of s u g§ e s t i o n ^at the government also mint and circulate 
"Merit subsidiary copper coins.12 
and Profit" A general court conference was then called by Toghto to 
discuss and make a decision upon the matter of revitalizing 
the monetary system. Despite conservative objections, 
Toghto decided to mint copper coins and to print and issue 
a new variety of paper currency to circulate alongside the 
old and at twice its face value. On December 17, 1350, the 
emperor announced the new currency system to the empire, 
and by October, 1351, twelve issuing offices were established 
in various parts of the realm.13 During 1351 the government 
issued a total of 2,000,000 ingots in new paper currency.14 
The government, however, wanted to do more than simply 
increase the amount of money in circulation. Had that been 
its main purpose in reforming the currency, it would probably 
have issued the new notes through the merchants as was 
proposed in 1348; and it would probably have taken care 
that the new note issue be to some extent backed by precious 
metal reserves.15 But the new issue was not so backed, and 
it was put into circulation through government payments for 
materials and labor. It was Toghto's real but unstated aim 
to use the new issue of currency to pay for the larger official 
projects that lay in the offing.16 
By 1350 there was probably no way to raise funds other 
than through currency manipulation. It was out of the ques-
tion to raise the household land tax rates, or even to collect 
the full amounts due under the regular rates; that had been 
tried before with disastrous results, for the landlord gentry 
had made it clear that they would rebel rather than pay.17 
Nor was it any longer feasible to raise the salt production 
quotas and sell more salt, or to force increased salt prices 
upon the population. During the late Yiian period, the profits 
received from the production and sale of monopoly salt pro-
vided the government with about 7,661,000 ingots of paper 
currency annually, or 82 percent of the income necessary 
to meet official expenses.18 Prices and production quotas in 
the Yiian period had been revised steadily and drastically 
upward through the reigns of Qaishan and Ayurbarwada; they 
remained relatively stable from then until 1335, when Bayan ^ 
found it necessary to revise the production quotas downward. ^ pursujt c 
After 1335 the salt production quotas continued to be revised "Merit 
downward, owing to a decline in the salt-producing house- and Profit" 
holds, increasing impoverishment on the part of the popula-
tion, and mounting backlogs of unsellable government salt.19 
Since the population could no longer afford to purchase larger 
quantities of government salt at the artificially high prices 
that were charged, Toghto could not attempt to derive extra 
income for his projects from this otherwise lucrative source. 
With the question of finance settled by currency expansion, 
Toghto went ahead to act upon the more attractive of the 
other project proposals that were being submitted to the gov-
ernment. In 1351 the government spent "several myriad" 
ingots of paper money to recruit 10,000 laborers and clear 
the silt out of the Chih-ku River southeast of Ta-tu.20 This 
project, however, was hardly one of great moment. There 
was another problem for which proposals were solicited: one 
which, if solved, would indeed credit the Yiian Dynasty and 
the Toghto administration with the historically significant 
accomplishment it was looking for. This problem was the Yel-
low River. 
As was discussed in the previous chapter, the Yellow River 
as a governmental responsibility was politically and economi-
cally related to the rise of piracy along the China coast. Since 
in 1348 the government's maritime grain transport system 
had fallen under the protection of the pirate Fang Kuo-chen, 
it could not regain control of the grain shipments until it 
either put down Fang Kuo-chen, or else outflanked him by 
opening the alternative Grand Canal transport route. Until 
the Yellow River was somehow put back under control, the 
Grand Canal would remain inoperative. 
Toghto made an attempt to suppress Fang Kuo-chen. 
When Toghto came to power in the summer of 1349, it was 
of course axiomatic that whatever agreements had been struck 
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between Fang and the Berke Buqa leadership would have 
to be renegotiated. It was therefore incumbent upon Fang 
to make a new demonstration of his power for the enlighten-
ment of Toghto's government. In the spring of 1350 he there-
fore made a raid at T'ai-ts'ang, one of the major ports of 
"Merit embarkation for the maritime grain boats.21 Early in 1351 
and Profit" he a l s o attacked Wen-chou and other coastal cities south of 
the Yangtze delta.22 
Toghto responded cautiously to these provocations, one 
reason being that the local gentry were clearly of two minds 
about Fang Kuo-chen. Some hated the pirate for personal 
reasons, and some ambitious local men were eager to pounce 
upon Fang and thus make their mark in Yiian service. In 
this they had the full backing of local Confucian opinion, 
which was quick to point out that the prestige and integrity 
of the empire were at stake in this matter, and that immediate 
retaliatory measures against Fang were necessary. But other 
local notables felt that there was little likelihood of reward 
for their cooperation against Fang, and that Fang was really 
the government's problem, not theirs.23 In the winter of 
1350-51, however, Toghto had the Qangli Dash Temiir set 
up a naval commandery in the Yangtze delta and recruit local 
men who were accustomed to seafaring to protect the grain 
shipments.24 At the same time he sent out the Baya'ud Mon-
gol chin-shih Tai Buqa to head a naval expedition from Wen-
chou against Fang. But Fang captured Tai Buqa's chief aide, 
and in repetition of the earlier incident, the captured aide 
had to memorialize the court on Fang's behalf. As a result, 
the court decided once again to raise the ranks of Fang and 
his brothers and to cancel the expedition.25 
Toghto had earlier attacked the Berke Buqa regime for 
pursuing the very same policy of appeasement toward Fang. 
Toghto had, however, an alternative plan. He knew that he 
lacked the immediate naval capability to ensure victory, and 
so he withdrew his expedition as soon as it appeared that 
it might be humiliatingly defeated. He hoped to confine Fang 
Kuo-chen to the coast south of the Yangtze delta, and eventu-
ally, perhaps, slough him off as a purely local problem. Most 
important in the present connection, however, is the fact 
that because of Fang Kuo-chen the regulation of the Yellow 
River and the restoration of the Grand Canal became matters 
of pressing need, since it was clear enough that the Yiian 
government no longer had control of the sea. And rather 
than go to war at sea, Toghto preferred to bypass the dangers 
inherent in that choice by the more peaceful, more profitable, 
and more traditional plan of restoring the inland water trans-
port system. 
Shortly after the 1344 flood of the Yellow River, the 
emperor, personally distressed by the catastrophe, had offi-
cials inspect the scene and recommend plans for repairing 
the damage. His personal appointee as chief of the Branch 
Directorate of Water Control (Using tu-shui-chien), a non-
Confucian Chinese by the name of Chia Lu, was sent to make 
a tour of the lower course of the Yellow River.26 He mapped 
the topography, and suggested two alternative plans for reg-
ulating the river. The simpler plan proposed leaving the river 
in its new northern bed, and dyking it along its north bank. 
The more ambitious plan called for the digging of another 
bed south of the Shantung peninsula and the diversion of 
the Yellow River into it. When Toghto returned to power 
in 1349, he was apparently convinced that the more ambitious 
proposal was the best one, and he pressed for its adoption. 
With the approval of the emperor, Toghto called together 
a court conference for a discussion of the matter. "The 
emperor is just now worrying about the common people," 
insisted Toghto "We who fill the high offices ought to share 
his concern. The matter is hard to manage, and perhaps it 
will be impossible to repair it, since from ancient times Yellow 
River problems have been extremely difficult to deal with. 
But he definitely wants us to go ahead and clear up the trou-
ble."27 
But the court was reluctant to rubber-stamp Toghto's pro-
posal. Some officials were strongly of the opinion that the 
simpler and less expensive plan would suffice. In the spring 
of 1351 this group secured imperial permission to send out 
a team of its own, headed by the chin-shih and President 
of the Board of Works Ch eng Tsun together with the Grand 
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Minister of Agriculture (Ta ssu-nung) Tughlugh, to inves-
tigate the Yellow River for itself. After carrying out an 
engineering survey, checking into the historical records, and 
soliciting the opinions of outsiders, the team concluded that 
the river could not be rechanneled as Toghto proposed.28 
By the time the team returned, however, Toghto had already 
and Profit" obtained the emperor's approval for the rechanneling project 
and was determined to move ahead with it. Ch eng Tsun 
and his colleague brought Toghto face to face with the conser-
vative Confucian objection to large programmatic schemes: 
their inherent tendency to produce popular disorder. "The 
area in question has had successive years of famine and the 
people cannot survive," they argued. "If you gather 200,000 
men here, there will be an even worse disaster than the 
flood." Toghto, reportedly, continued the argument for his 
detractors. "Are you saying that the people will rebel?" he 
retorted.29 
The possibility of popular disorder was not out of the ques-
tion. Banditry continued to disturb Shantung. In Honan prov-
ince the situation was not too different. Famine there in 1344 
and plague in the following year caused widespread death. 
The court's plea to the richer households to contribute cash 
and grain to relieve the destitute received a good response, 
but when the harvest improved a little the year following, 
relief measures were stopped, leaving the basic problem of 
overgrown fields and shortages in oxen and farm tools un-
solved.30 Bandits troubled the Honan city of Nan-yang; more 
bandits raided merchant boats on the Huai section of the 
Grand Canal.31 The western Huai area was overtaxed and 
impoverished.32 Throughout the 1340s famines were recur-
rent in North China. In December, 1347, the Board of 
Revenue reported a widespread harvest failure due to 
drought; and in January, 1348, it was noted that the succes-
sive droughts had driven many people out of farming.33 The 
Berka Buqa administration had been concerned enough with 
these conditions to begin setting up temporary military 
agencies in an effort to control the gangs of refugees and 
bandits.34 Toghto carried this program further. In November, 
1350, he established four Foot and Horse Commanderies 
(Ping-ma chih-hui-ssu), each with a full supporting staff of 
officials and clerks, in the general area of west Shantung. 
This was in response not only to banditry, but also to what 
the government called the 4 prophetic miasma" (yao-ch'i), by 1 0 3 
which it presumably meant secret society activities.35 In the 
spring of 1351 the government set up two commanderies on * 
the Shantung coast to check piracy, and it opened a military- and Profit" 
agricultural colony on the Grand Canal south of Shantung.36 
It was apparently in Shantung that the government antici-
pated trouble, for most of its new military agencies were con-
centrated there. Toghto did not provide special protection 
for the Huai region, where Chinese sectarian rioting broke 
out in May. 
The Yellow River project was officially announced on April 
29, 1351, with the engineer Chia Lu in immediate charge. 
Local men of standing were given official titles and quantities 
of paper currency, and were sent out to the towns and cities 
to assemble laborers and purchase supplies.37 Altogether 
150,000 commoners from nearby towns and 20,000 troops 
from the Huai region were called up to supply the labor.38 
Work began on May 17, and continued throughout the sum-
mer and fall until its completion in December.39 A sum of 
1,845,636 ingots in new currency was spent on official 
salaries, food and clothing for the troops and commoners, 
wages (kung-ch'ien), medicines, sacrifices, relief, horses and 
post stations, together with payments (yung-tzu) to the 
lumber carriers, boatmen, pile-drivers, and workers in stone, 
iron, wood, and rope, and compensations to families whose 
properties were condemned by the project.40 Toghto's desire 
to accomplish something of genuine historical significance was 
realized. The rerouting of the Yellow River was one of the 
greatest hydraulic projects ever undertaken in China in pre-
modern times.41 
Trouble, however, darkened the luster of success. As 
Toghto's conservative opposition had warned, popular rebel-
lion did break out. On May 28, barely a week after the 
laborers were assembled for work, a small disturbance broke 
out, not in Shantung, as anticipated, but in the Huai city 
of Ying-chou (Fou-yang, Anhwei), which lay about 100 miles 
south of the Yellow River. The rebels, incited by the White 
Lotus Society and its messianic propaganda, were still only 
clandestinely organizing when local officials learned of their 
104 activities and arrested the White Lotus leader. The other 
_ „ „ rebels then decided that they either had to act at once or In Pursuit of . . . . , , 1 
"Merit e c a P t u r e ^ themselves, whereupon they moved in and 
and Profit" openly seized the city of Ying-chou.42 This was the first action 
in a rebellion soon to involve almost all of China. During 
the summer and fall of 1351 the rebels, known as Red Tur-
bans, captured a large bloc of territory lying generally west 
of Ying-chou along the upper reaches of the Huai and its 
tributaries, comprising some half-dozen cities and about 
50,000 square miles of land. In August and September 
another group of rebels seized the city of Hsii-chou on the 
Grand Canal near the eastern terminus of the rechanneling 
project. Beginning late in the year 1351, another group of 
Red Turbans from the mid-Yangtze initiated a series of riots 
which by 1353 affected some 200,000 square miles of South 
China from the modern province of Hunan east to the sea. 
Early in 1353 a former salt-smuggler by the name of Chang 
Shih-ch'eng took the city of Kao-yu, about 150 miles southeast 
of Hsii-chou, and thus cut off the Grand Canal entirely.43 
In the face of conservative opposition, Toghto had launched 
the immense Yellow River project and had succeeded with 
it. But as the conservatives predicted, popular insurrections 
had broken out. Sectarian rioters, bandits, and rebels of vari-
ous sorts were in temporary occupation of enormous stretches 
of territory in Central and South China. Local government 
was overwhelmed and in many places had ceased to function. 
The Grand Canal, under rebel control at Hsii-chou and Kao-
yu, was still unusable as an alternative grain transport route. 
Popular opinion tended to affix the blame for all the disorders 
upon Toghto and his innovative programs.44 For a brief 
moment, Toghto allowed himself to fall victim, as Bayan had 
done, to the undiscriminating fear that the entire Chinese 
population was rising up against him.45 When, however, it 
turned out that the rebels were only a minority of the Chinese 
population, and that they were in rebellion not only against 
the local officials of the dynasty but against the Chinese land-
lord gentry as well, Toghto recovered his composure. He 
decided that the suppression of the disorders, far from com-
pelling him to alter drastically his programmatic kung-li 
approach to the problems of the realm, could in fact best 
be handled through intensified bureaucratic and program- ln pursuif ( 
matic means. Rather than conclude that his search for "merit "Merit 
and profit" had itself helped to incite the rebellions, and was and Profit" 
therefore discredited, Toghto eventually came to the view 
that his previous methods alone afforded the best means for 
putting down the rebels. His response indicated that he came 
to see the rebellions as a problem requiring organized gov-
ernmental action on a scale similar to that necessitated by 
the Yellow River project. 
The unexpected rising at Ying-chou caught the court unpre-
pared. Since the emperor was then vacationing at Shang-tu, 
and could not be reached rapidly to authorize the movement 
of troops, some of the officials at Ta-tu hesitantly decided 
on their own authority to send out a force of 500 Imperial 
Guards.46 Not until June 18, almost three weeks after the 
onset of the rebellion, did the emperor finally authorize the 
dispatch of more forces.47 These were still not enough, for 
the rebel movement continued to spread through the upper 
Huai region during the summer and fall of 1351. 
Toghto's first recourse was to the regularly constituted 
military forces of the dynasty. These troops campaigned in 
the Huai region of central and western Honan, the main 
center of rebel activity in 1351 and 1352, and suffered some 
unfortunate reverses there. According to the unofficial 
chronicler Ch'üan Heng, the Red Turban rebels put to rout 
the mixed Chinese and Alan forces led by Tughchi, Vice Com-
missioner in Chief of the Chief Military Commission, whom 
the court had sent out on June 18. In Ch'üan Heng's view, 
this happened not because the "green-eyed Christian Alans" 
were timid or unskilled, but because they were undisciplined, 
disease-ridden, unused to the watery topography of the Huai 
area, and were, moreover, mobbed by a great horde of Red 
Turbans. The story of their rout became a much-repeated 
joke in the Huai region.48 ChYian Heng also has it that the 
Chief Administrator *Gongbubal, who commanded the main 
forces in Honan after Tughchis reverse, was kidnaped and 
butchered by Red Turbans while his army of 10,000 nomad 
tribesmen and Chinese was drunk and asleep.49 
Late in October, 1351. in the wake of these setbacks, 
In Pursuit of Toghto Put younger brother Esen Temiir, and Koncheg, 
"Merit w ' 1 0 w a s Prince of Wei and a head of the Chief Military Com-
and Profit" mission, in over-all command of the pacification effort in 
Honan. Their troops, said to have numbered 100,000 men, 
seem to have consisted largely of elite guards.50 These forces 
campaigned from the fall of 135! through the spring of 1352. 
They registered a few triumphs. In November a commander 
who was an imperial prince was rewarded for his recapture 
of two county seats southeast of Hsii-chou.51 In January, 1352, 
Esen Temiir was credited with the recovery of a county seat 
and the capture of several rebel leaders,52 Following this vic-
tory, however, Esen Temür withdrew his forces and made 
camp on the banks of the Sha River. One night during the 
spring of 1352 the enemy stole into his camp and by some 
means succeeded in striking terror among his entire army. 
Esen Temiir then made a frantic retreat north towards the 
city of Pien-liang, abandoning his weapons and supplies to 
the rebels as he went.53 
Serious as these three successive routs were, they proved 
to be less than catastrophic in their effects. Elsewhere in 
North China, the imperial forces did better against the rebels; 
the Qunggirad Tai Buqa, for example, rapidly retook a half-
dozen cities of the western Huai region.54 What the Red 
Turbans gained from their daring and provocative actions was 
an important but momentary psychological victory. They bol-
stered their morale, and gained perhaps an undue reputation 
for invincibility among the populace. There is no doubt that 
their example directly encouraged the spread of rebel activity 
to other parts. But their essentially psychological victories 
were no real test of the fighting capacities of the Yiian 
Dynasty. 
Toghto protected the commanders whom the Red Turbans 
had initially discredited.55 He was able to save his younger 
brother Essen Temür from impeachment. The Shensi Branch 
Censorate, led by the Jalair Dorjibal, submitted to the central 
government a formal impeachment of Esen Temiir for "losing 
the army and shaming the state." The impeachment was, 
however, only a gesture; the branch censors knew well 1 0 i 
enough beforehand that they would only be demoted and 
transferred for their temerity. As he had anticipated, Dorjibal «"j^6"1 ' ^ 
was shifted to a non-censorial position in Hukuang province.56 anc¡ j>rof[f 
The Tangut Irinjinbal, now one of the heads of the Chief 
Military Commission, met with Toghto informally and tried 
to urge upon him the necessity of punishing those responsible 
for the defeats. In response to this unsolicited and unwelcome 
advice, apparently, Toghto transferred Irinjinbal to Kiangsi 
province.57 If the conservative opposition was trying to break 
Toghto's power by pressuring him into dismissing his unsuc-
cessful military commanders, their efforts were in vain. 
In other parts of China the anti-rebel effort of 1351-52 
showed signs of succeeding. Before his transfer in May or 
June, 1352, the Shensi Branch Censor-in-Chief Dorjibal pro-
vided for the defense of the far west by enlisting into Yiian 
service the famous local militia outfit known as the "Hairy 
Gourds."58 The Honan provincial capital of Pien-liang was 
successfully defended against rebel attack.59 Tung T'uan-
hsiao, chief official in Tsi-ning (Shantung), organized a 
military-agricultural colony and a militia group and helped 
his superior, the Kiangche Chief Administrator Chiao-hua, 
recover the Huai city of An-feng.60 In the upper Han River 
area, the Saljfud Mongol Dash Radulugh, recalled with 3,000 
of his tamachi troops from the Yiinnan frontier, aided the 
Szechwan Chief Administrator Yao-chu in the recovery of the 
important town of Hsiang-yang in January, 1353.61 In South 
China, too, the rebel onslaught was turned back and the 
poorly organized and poorly trained rebel movements 
crushed. The provincial authorities in Lung-hsing (Nan-
chang), the Kiangsi provincial capital, were unprepared for 
a rebel attack, but they rallied sufficiently to save the city 
itself from being overrun.62 The Kiangche provincial capital 
of Hang-chou,seized by Red Turbans during 1352, was 
retaken in January, 1353, by Chiao-hua and TungTuan-hsiao, 
who had moved their forces down from the Huai region.63 
Numerous other southern administrative centers were recov-
ered from the rebels during 1353-54. 
I()S In order that the preponderance of military power might 
. r be kept in its own hands, and not be transferred by default i Pursuit of * _ / 
"Merit t o Provincial or other outside agencies, the central govern-
e d Profit" nient itself led the largest military contingents and directly 
carried out the annihilation of the more ominous rebel con-
centrations. Especially important in the view of the court 
was the eastern Huai city of Hsii-chou, situated where the 
Grand Canal intersected the recently rechanneled Yellow 
River, and occupied by rebels since August, 1351. It had 
to be retaken, and Toghto decided to lead the expedition 
against it in person. During the first half of 1352 Toghto 
busied himself amassing the necessary military forces. Aside 
from one contingent of elite guards, the bulk of the forces 
came to consist of newly recruited Chinese. Early in 1352 
Toghto sent the Huai-nan Pacification Commissioner Lu Lu-
tseng to the eastern Huai area to assemble and lead 5,000 
Chinese salt workers for the Hsii-chou expedition, on the 
grounds that the regular government troops were unac-
customed to the climate. Eventually, these ad hoc recruits-
salt workers, river project laborers, and various market place 
youth—came to number 20,000 men. They were generally 
styled the "Yellow Army" after the color of their uniforms.64 
On February 29 the rebels in and around Hsii-chou were 
issued an ultimatum giving them twenty days in which to 
disperse and return to their homes. On August 28, the 
ultimatum having gone unheeded, Toghto received the 
emperors permission to command the expedition against the 
city. On October 5 he departed Ta-tu; marching about 22 
miles per day he reached Hsii-chou on October 23. Six days 
later the city was in his hands. This was a major victory for 
the government side.65 The rest of the Huai area, with the 
exception of the single town of Po-chou (Po-hsien, Anhwei), 
was soon after recovered from the rebels. 
By 1354 the mass outbreaks known as the Red Turban 
rebellions were finished. In both North and South China, 
the chief administrative centers had either been successfully 
defended against the rebels, or were recovered after a brief 
period of rebel occupation. The Huai-area Red Turbans lost 
all of their previous conquests and were thrown back upon 
Po-chou, their last redoubt. The Red Turbans of South China 1 0 9 
were pushed out of the cities, the river valleys, and the main 
population centers, and into the wooded hill country between " ¿ 
the provinces of Kiangsi and Hukuang. Yiian forces overran and Profit" 
the southern Red Turban rebel center in 1353 and captured 
four hundred men there.66 By 1354 the Yiian authorities in 
South China were undertaking the work of peaceful recon-
struction—canceling summer and fall taxes, resettling 
refugees, and giving work relief to the impoverished.67 There 
remained, by 1354, only Fang Kuo-chen and Chang Shih-
ch'eng still in open defiance of the Yuan government. Fang 
had not been able to take advantage of the mass rebellions 
of 1351-52 to establish himself on land, and was still confined 
to the sea. The former salt-smuggler Chang Shih-ch'eng, who 
had seized the Grand Canal city of Kao-yu, and occupied 
an arc of territory around the Huainan provincial capital of 
Yang-chou, was the last remaining land-based rebel of any 
importance. Toghto decided to lead personally the campaign 
against him, hoping thus to bring the suppression effort to 
a glorious and emphatic conclusion. 
It is a measure of Toghto's ability as a statesman that he 
was able to put down the rebellions. Even more remarkable, 
however, was his success in maintaining central control of 
the entire pacification effort. That pacification, nearly com-
plete by 1354, had of course been a major new undertaking 
for the Yiian state. It had never before been obliged to handle 
mass insurrection on so immense a scale. The task was accom-
plished only by effecting major changes in bureaucratic and 
administrative routine, changes which had important implica-
tions for the distribution of political power within the Yiian 
state. 
Rebel pacification did not, however, lead to any immediate 
change in the balance of power between state and society, 
even though the early ineffectiveness of the regular armies 
perhaps pointed to the likelihood of such a change, with real 
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power and initiative descending into the hands of gentry-led 
militia. However, between the years 1351 and 1354, a shift 
indeed took place in the composition of the Yuan military 
forces. For the first time in recent Yiian history, the bulk 
T „ . . of the troops used to suppress the rebels was made un of In Pursuit of . 1 _ _ V . . * 
"Merit ^ " i n e s e recruits. The shift seems clearest m the case of the 
and Profit" ma*n body of central forces: as the leadership of these passed 
from Tughchi to *Gongbubal to Esen Temiir to Toghto, Chin-
ese troops became more and more prominent. Toghto used 
the largely Chinese "Yellow Army" to deliver the first really 
crushing blow against the rebels at Hsii-chou. In other parts 
of China, Chinese militia troops appear to have predominated 
in the Yiian forces from the very beginning. There were, 
to be sure, a few exceptions. The commander "Abd ar-Rahman 
led the Lung-chen Guards, an elite unit of Alans and 
Qipchaqs, with some measure of success in Hukuang in 1352. 
Miao tribal forces, commanded by the Hukuang provincial 
official Alqui in 1353, saw service also.67 The 3,000 tamachi 
troops led by the Salji'ud Dash Badulugh at Hsiang-yang 
could have been partly Chinese in composition; in any event, 
the 20,000 extra men he used in taking the city were locally 
recruited Chinese militia.68 Yet the fact that the Yiian had 
come to depend largely upon Chinese troops in suppressing 
the rebellions was a simple product of the expansion of rebel 
activity beyond what the regular forces could handle. Much 
the same sort of process had occurred when the Mongols 
undertook their vast world conquests of the previous century; 
the Mongols wrere accustomed to the use of conquered 
peoples as troops, especially in those days. In itself, the mere 
process of recruiting Chinese troops could not lead to any 
immediate drift of power and initiative away from the state 
as long as Mongols and se-mu continued as they did to 
monopolize military command. The Chinese landlord gentry, 
often instrumental in recruiting militia forces, especially in 
the South, were on the whole content enough to cooperate 
with the Yuan government and not to demand independent 
military power for themselves. Only through such coopera-
tion could their common enemy, the Red Turbans, be put 
down. In the circumstances, it was unnecessary for the state 
to deliver the Yiian armies to outside Chinese control. 
The massive recruitment, supply, and command of troops 
that had to be undertaken, however, did force changes on 
a different level of power. The need to supply the forces 
in the field, to concentrate anti-rebel efforts, and to provide 1 1 1 
the official machinery necessary to deal with stricken or vul-
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central administrative structure. In view of the geography (1nd Profit" 
of the rebellions—the fact that they were almost empire-wide 
in extent and spread rapidly from one region to another—the 
central government could not hope to direct every aspect 
of the pacification from a supreme command located in the 
capital. Authority had to be delegated to lower echelons, and 
certain regional officials had to be allowed to 'act at conveni-
ence" (pien-i hsing-shih) and make the command decisions 
they judged necessary without seeking the prior approval of 
the central government. Yet, while the central government 
was obliged to surrender some of its decision-making powers 
to regional authorities, it did so wit'i great caution. Through 
1354 it was able to pit imperial princes, provincial officials, 
and censorial personnel against each other in such a way as 
to inhibit the creation of any unitary regional force strong 
enough to constitute a power challenge to the capital. 
The problem of military supply, for example, was met in 
a number of ways, although the same care was always taken 
that supply and command were never handled by the same 
men. In the metropolitan (Chung-shxi) province of North 
China, administrations "detached" from the Central Chancel-
lery (Chung-shu fen-sheng) were set up in Tsi-ning and in 
Chang-te in 1351 and 1352. Their purpose was to interdict 
the upward flow of grain taxes and divert the proceeds 
directly to the armies in the field.69 In view of the heavy 
demand for military rations in 1352, the government further 
issued special orders to the local officials in Honan and 
Shensi, urging them to ensure that the peasants cultivated 
all available land to the fullest extent, and that the military 
commanders kept their armies from trampling and destroying 
the grain fields.70 Extra efforts were also made to extract 
the maximum in tax revenues. In 1351, in spite of all dif-
ficulties, the salt tax was collected on schedule.71 In 1352 
Chinese Confucian officials were sent out to various parts 
of North China to plead with the local elders and urge the 
necessity of prompt tax payments.72 The government, how-
112 ever, rejected a proposal to carry out a complete resurvey 
of the fields of North China.73 
In Pursuit of In South China supply was the primary responsibility of 
"Merit the provincial governments. Rations procurement often 
and Profit involved the cooperation of two or more provinces, a situation 
which may have served as a check upon too much provincial 
independence. As Chief Administrator of Hukuang province, 
the Jalair Dorjibal amassed grain supplies by purchasing them 
in the neighboring provinces of Szechwan and Honan, and 
by awarding official positions to local people who contributed 
grain voluntarily.74 Ch'eng Tsun, magistrate in the Hukuang 
provincial capital of Wu-ch'ang, purchased grain in Honan 
and Kiangche provinces.75 Kiangsi province obtained salt and 
grain from Kiangche.76 
Food was also needed in the capital. The Grand Canal 
was blocked at Kao-yu by Chang Shih-ch'eng, and the pirate 
Fang Kuo-chen still remained at liberty on the sea. The Yiian 
government made still further attempts both to coax Fang 
into submission and to attack him outright—all to no avail. 
In June, 1352, the government decided temporarily to sus-
pend all maritime grain shipments from the Yangtze delta 
to the capital, and in consequence no grain at all arrived 
by the sea route in 1352.77 The food situation was serious. 
The government purchased 500,000 piculs of grain and beans 
in Liaoyang in November, but that was not enough.78 Late 
in 1352, Toghto conceived the grand idea of solving the prob-
lem by opening state farms on a broad scale in North China 
near the capital. An area of about 150,000 square miles, 
bounded by the Great Wall in the north, Shan-hai-kuan in 
the east, Pao-ting and Ho-chien in the south, and the Western 
Hills in the west was thrown open to government-sponsored 
colonization. Peasants were brought in from the Shantung 
area to augment the indigenous population. It was decided 
to emphasize the cultivation of rice, since an earlier experi-
ment had shown that sufficient water was available and that 
rice could in fact be grown in the area. Since the northern 
peasants were ignorant of the techniques of rice cultivation, 
Toghto arranged to import from the Yangtze delta region two 
thousand experienced rice farmers to serve a year's term as 
agricultural teachers. The project was costly; 5,000,000 ingots 1 1 3 
were allotted to cover all expenses. Yet it appears doubtful 
whether Toghto actually got the million-picul harvests that In Pursuit of 
he anticipated.79 The Grand Ministry of Agriculture, which "Merit 
had over-all charge of the operation, was headed by two men, a n d Pwf lt 
both of whom held concurrent positions in the Central Chan-
cellery. In view of Toghto s general desire to inhibit the con-
centration of power in single hands, the arrangement seems 
typical. 
Besides keeping rations procurement out of the hands of 
the commanders, Toghto went further in his efforts to prevent 
successful generals and provincial officials from developing 
into warlords or regional satraps. In almost all the major anti-
rebel campaigns the Yiian carried out, special exertions were 
made to keep military commands divided. In the Hsiang-yang 
campaign of 1352-53, for example, the commanders Dash 
Badulugh and Yao-chu both held high positions in the 
Szechwan provincial government, although the major battles 
they engaged in took place not there, but in Honan province. 
Nor were they left free to monopolize the direction of military 
operations. The government sent out one force under the 
control of the local Pacification Commissioner, and another, 
consisting of Uighur troops, led by the son of the iduq qat.80 
To these were added yet other men commanded by the 
Prince of Hsi-ning Yaghan-shah.81 Despite these precautions, 
Dash Badulugh managed, during the course of the long cam-
paign in the Hsiang-yang region, to appoint his own local 
civilian magistrates in an effort to gather more food supplies. 
At the conclusion of the campaigns in the early summer of 
1354, however, Dash Badulugh was replaced and was trans-
ferred together with his army to the upper Huai region.82 
Clearly the court was eager to remove Dash Badulugh from 
the local power base that he had begun to build. 
Roughly the same pattern of divided commands can be 
seen in the Yiian government's Yangtze River campaigns 
against the main center of southern Red Turban power. In 
1352, over-all control of the suppression effort in the three 
southern provinces of Kiangche, Kiangsi, and Hukuang was 
given to the Censor-in-Chief of the Kiangnan Censorate, the 
Tangut Narin, whose headquarters were in Nanking.83 It is 
not clear, however, what degree of control he exercised over 
i Pursuit of campaign against the rebel center, especially in view of 
"Merit f a c t that he was closely concerned with military operations 
and Profit" in the immediate vicinity of Nanking itself at the time. In 
any event, the suppression of the rebel center was at length 
accomplished by the joint action of several commanders, 
including Manzi Qaya, who as Vice Censor-in-Chief of the 
Kiangnan Censorate was an immediate subordinate of 
Narin's. The other major commanders included the Kiangsi 
Chief Administrator Shinggi—until his death in November, 
1352; the Hukuang Chief Administrator Esen Temiir; the 
Hukuang Vice Administrator of the Left Bayan Buqa; the 
Szechwan Assistant Administrator Qarimtu; the Prince of Hsi-
ning Yaghan-shah; the Prince of Wei-shun Koncheg Buqa; 
and above all the Kiangche Chief Administrator Buyan Te-
miir, known familiarly as "the Chief Administrator with the 
piebald horse." Buyan Temiir, apparently a popular figure, 
was the real driving spirit behind the success of the campaign. 
As soon as their joint forces overran the rebel capital, how-
ever, Toghto broke up the coalition and assigned new stations 
to the various commanders.84 This dismemberment was the 
more easily carried out precisely because the commanders 
were assembled from a half-dozen separate administrative 
agencies and princely establishments, and had not been per-
mitted to integrate themselves and their men into a single 
organization. 
In the Huai region north of the Yangtze, the Yiian govern-
ment made a major administrative change in May, 1352, 
when it detached from Honan province the whole area 
between the Yangtze and the Huai Rivers and created from 
it the new province of Huainan, with its capital at Yang-
chou.85 Huainan was a sort of "war-zone" province, embrac-
ing all the territory in Honan where the rebels were especially 
active. Its establishment facilitated the coordination of the 
anti-rebel effort, inasmuch as the Honan provincial capital 
of Pien-liang in the north was too far removed from the scene 
to provide sufficiently close supervision. But Huainan prov-
ince with its official staff of twenty-five men was obliged to 
tolerate the existence of a parallel agency in Yang-chou—the 
princely establishment of the Prince of Chen-nan Bolod Buqa, 
which had its own Pacification Office, and which conducted [n punuit c 
its own military campaigns.86 Nor was that all; the writ of "Merit 
the Kiangnan Branch Censorate extended into the Yangtze and Profit" 
River, where it constituted yet a third authority. Under these 
circumstances, we find the commander Nasr ad-Din obeying 
all three authorities during 1352. First, the princely Pacifica-
tion Office ordered him to build defense works, then the 
Huainan provincial authorities had him patrol the Yangtze, 
and finally the Kiangnan Censorate had him come to the aid 
of the town of Wu-hu on the south shore of the Yangtze.87 
Of the Huainan provincial officials, the Chief Administrator 
Qonqor Buqa, previously a member of the Han-lin Academy, 
was also given a concurrent position within the Prince of 
Chen-nan's establishment.88 Tills device probably provided 
some coordination between the two agencies, at the same 
time that it discouraged either from becoming too independ-
ent. The sources name, besides Qonqor Buqa, five other 
men appointed to the top provincial positions in Huainan, 
two of them Chinese and three non-Chinese. Of the five, 
three had previously held censorial positions elsewhere, one 
had held provincial position in Hukuang, and one was 
appointed from the military hierarchy. From this, two things 
seem clear: first, that the mixed official backgrounds of the 
new appointees would inhibit their forming a tight clique; 
and second, that Honan province was afforded no means of 
control over its former Huainan territory. 
The above evidence should suffice to cast doubt upon the 
widespread impression that the Yiian Dynasty collapsed 
because its armies had grown too decadent and soft to give 
effective opposition to the Red Turban rebels.89 It would 
appear that, far from collapsing outright, the Yiian Dynasty 
rallied in short order through the copious use of mixed aux-
iliary forces—Chinese, Miao, and Mongols and se-mu. The 
dynasty not only halted the rebel advance, but almost de-
stroyed the whole rebel movement. Whatever inadequacies 
the Yiian military arm may have shown in 1351 and 1352, 
it proved more than equal to the challenge by 1353 and 1354. 
In effecting this suppression, the Chancellor of the Right 
1 1 6 Toghto saw to it that no semi-independent regional machine 
. , should arise to challenge the powers of the central govern-
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"Merit ment, and that the chief military and civilian positions should 
and Profit remain, as always, in the hands of Mongols and se-mu. De-
spite the new and massive military and bureaucratic effort 
which the suppression of the rebellions demanded, the 
central government proved capable of exercising a significant 
degree of control over the entire operation. Large military 
concentrations were generally composed of mutually inde-
pendent units which the central government could easily split 
apart after the completion of a campaign. Rations procure-
ment and the command of troops were kept as separate and 
distinct functions. The civilian jurisdictions which oversaw 
local operations overlapped and conflicted. So much for the 
atomization of power in the provinces. 
At court, an opposite tendency can be detected. The 
singular and stark concentration of power there stood in com-
plete and perhaps invidious contrast with the situation at the 
provincial level. It would appear that the Chancellor of the 
Right Toghto alone saw his personal power and prestige grow 
in proportion to the enormous increase in new governmental 
activity which the rebellions, and his new programs, occa-
sioned. 
Far from suffering the rebellions as a political defeat, as 
his court opponents might have expected, the Chancellor of 
the Right was actually profiting from them. The pacification 
of the rebels turned out to be simply one more program of 
merit and profit for Toghto and his administration. Exactly 
as in the case of some of the other projects, the pacification 
program demanded that the government recruit, supply, and 
direct large numbers of men, and this the government was 
competent and eager to do. The career of the engineer Chia 
Lu would appear to illustrate the fundamental equivalence 
of river rechanneling and rebel pacification in the eyes of 
the government. Like his master Toghto, Chia Lu easily 
shifted from manager of hydraulic operations to commander 
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of troops in the field.90 Even though the earlier warning of the 
court opposition that the Yellow River project might bring 
on popular rebellion had come true, the Toghto administra-
tion proved its competence to handle both, and remained 
in power, stronger than ever. 
As Toghto's various operations each came to a successful 
conclusion, his personal wealth and honors increased. When anc¡ projit» 
the Yellow River project ended late in 1351, a censor dis-
regarded the Red Turban rebellion which was by then raging 
in the Huai region and proposed "extraordinary rewards" for 
Toghto's successful sponsorship of the project. In response 
to this, the emperor awarded Toghto the hereditary title of 
darqan, granted him an income fief (shih-i) in Huai-an, per-
mitted him to appoint personally the local officials in that 
place, and commissioned the erection of a commemorative 
stela whereon a detailed account of the Yellow River project 
was inscribed.91 In June, 1352, an office (tsung-kuan-fu) was 
established for Toghto at his Huai-an estates for the purpose 
of managing the hunter, falconer, artisan, and other revenue-
producing households allotted to him.92 Toghto's proposed 
campaign on Hsii-chou in 1352 elicited a joint and friendly 
protest from the presidents of the Six Boards; the govern-
ment, they said, could not possibly function without his pres-
ence.93 Toghto went anyway. On October 17, twelve days 
after Toghto had left for Hsii-chou, a concerted effort on the 
part of the court censors and various military and censorial 
officials in Honan and Shensi succeeded in clearing the name 
of the Censor-in-Chief Esen Temiir, and securing a reward 
for him besides.94 On top of Toghto's victory at Hsii-chou 
came another spate of honors and rewards. In November, 
1352, Toghto was elevated from Grand Tutor (t'ai-fu) to 
Grand Preceptor (fai-shih).95 In December the Central 
Chancellery received imperial authorization to erect a stela 
in commemoration of Toghto's victory; even more, the grant 
of a princely fief was requested for Toghto. This honor Toghto 
apparently declined.96 In March, 1353, the elders of Hsii-
chou received imperial permission to erect another stela in 
Toghto's honor, and to build a temple (shen-tzu) for him 
as well.97 
One can only speculate what further honors and rewards 
Toghto's elimination of Chang Shih-ch'eng at Kao-yu might 
have brought him. The emperor, perhaps, asked himself the 
1 1 8 same question. Had Toghto succeeded in his campaign 
against Chang Shih-ch'eng, as was entirely likely, the pacifica-
ra Pursuit of p r 0 g r a m w o u l d have been completed and his position 
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and Profit" a s Chancellor of the Right strengthened yet more. The one 
power relationship that Toghto's pursuit of "merit and profit" 
(kiing-li) affected above all others was that between himself 
and the emperor. As the power of the Chancellor grew, that 
of the monarchy had to decline. Perhaps the emperor, who 
owed his political emancipation to Toghto and the events of 
1340, pendered that matter as his Chancellor of the Right 
prepared for the Kao-yu campaign. 
Chapter VI 
The Growth of Yiian Regionalism 
It was not Toghto*s original plan to or-
ganize a campaign against Kao-yu, or to lead such a campaign 
personally. Before he decided to use force against the former 
salt smuggler Chang Shih-ch'eng, Toghto made four fruitless 
attempts to urge him to surrender peacefully in return for 
an official appointment.1 When it became clear that Chang 
would not negotiate, Toghto decided to use force. In 1353 
or 1354 he ordered the chin-shih Shih P'u, a Chinese subor-
dinate official in the Chief Military Commission, to recruit 
10,000 militiamen in Shantung and to command these men 
"at convenience" (pien-i hsing-shih) against Kao-yu. While 
Shih P'u was marching toward Kao-yu with his army, how-
ever, one of Toghto's aides rescinded the earlier order allow-
ing Shih P'u to act at convenience. Shih P'u was instead 
placed under the administrative jurisdiction of Huainan prov-
ince, and half his troops were taken away from him. In these 
reduced circumstances Shih P'u continued his expedition. 
When he arrived at Kao-yu, he let a Mongol cavalry unit 
attack first in order to let it have the merit of breaching the 
city defenses. But Chang's men beat off the attack, and routed 
Shih P'u's forces.2 It would appear that at the last minute 
Toghto decided, or was persuaded, that Kao-yu was too 
choice a rebel target to let fall to anyone but himself. The 
expedition, led by a Chinese, was apparently deliberately 
sabotaged. 
During 1354 the Yiian government laid long and careful 
plans for Toghto's coming attack on Kao-yu. Arrangements 
were made for supplies of clothing, weapons, rations, and 
fuel to be shipped from the southern province of Kiangche 
by both land and water routes to the staging area of the attack. 
During June and July, 1354, an agreement was made with 
Korea for the procurement of troops and weapons, for which 
purpose 60,000 ingots in paper cash was paid to the Korean 
Government. The date of August 28 was fixed for the Korean 
1 2 0 expeditionary force of around 23,000 men to assemble at the 
The Growth caPital- The Yiian government also assembled "Hairy 
of Yiian Gourd" militiamen from Shensi, troops from Central Asia and 
Regionalism Tibet, in addition to provincial regulars and men under the 
command of various Mongol princes. A formal edict of Sep-
tember 19 put Toghto in supreme command of all forces with 
the authority to give rewards and promotions at will. The 
provincial governments, censorates, and the Chief Military 
Commission were allowed to select officials to accompany the 
expedition. Toghto probably left Ta-tu, the Yiian capital, late 
in October. On the way south, he sent envoys to offer sac-
rifices to Confucius and Mencius at their respective shrines.3 
After Toghto's expedition arrived at Kao-yu, it skirmished 
with Chang Shih-ch'eng's men outside the city walls for about 
two weeks, from November 28 to December 12. Various 
military units jockeyed among themselves for the honor of 
leading the assault on the city walls. After December 12 fight-
ing appears to have ceased. One source says that Toghto 
wanted to rest his troops before the final onslaught.4 Kao-yu, 
however, was completely surrounded and its destruction a 
matter of certainty on any clay that Toghto might care to 
select. It is possible that he decided to starve the city into 
surrender rather than take it by storm.5 
Whatever the reasons for it, Toghto's delay at Kao-yu was 
a fatal political mistake, for it provided the emperor with 
a convenient pretext for ordering Toghto's dismissal. Tradi-
tional historiography places the blame for Toghto's fall upon 
a certain Qama, an intrigue-loving courtier of Qangli origin, 
and ostensibly a member of Toghto's own political clique. 
The sources have it that sometime between February, 1353, 
and September, 1354, Qama was temporarily removed from 
his position as Chief Administrator, owing to a complaint 
made against him by Ju Chung-po, one of Toghto's close 
aides. Although Qama had returned to his position by the 
time Toghto departed the capital for Kao-yu, he remained 
under suspicion. While Toghto was out on campaign, his 
younger brother, the Censor-in-Chief Esen Temiir, fell sick 
and absented himself from court. Qama took advantage of 
this opportunity to avenge himself upon the Merkid brothers. 
He made contact with a censor who agreed to submit directly 121 
to the emperor a memorial of impeachment against Toghto ^ Growth 
and Esen Temiir. The memorial imputed various derelictions yiian 
to Esen Temiir, and accused Toghto of the crime of deliber- Regionalism 
ately delaying his advance on Kao-yu and wasting the state's 
resources in the process. It went on to add, gratuitously, 
that half of the court officials were personal followers of 
Toghto. The emperor accepted the impeachment upon its 
third submission to him. He ordered the dismissal of Esen 
Temiir on December 23, 1354, and of Toghto himself on the 
following day.6 
Qama had taken care to forewarn many of the officials par-
ticipating in the Kao-yu campaign about Toghto's coming dis-
missal, and to threaten them with the extirpation of them-
selves and their clans if they attempted to rally behind 
Toghto. By the time he received the letter of edict, on the 
night of January 7, 1355, Toghto was aware of what it con-
tained. Some of his followers urged him to conquer Kao-yu 
first and open the edict afterwards. Others proposed that he 
back the Prince of Chen-nan Bolod Buqa and set up an oppos-
ition southern dynasty. Toghto's own reported response was 
fully Confucian, yet vengeful. According to his biography, 
Toghto spoke as follows: If the emperor orders me and I 
do not obey, that would be to oppose the emperor. Where 
then would be the righteousness between sovereign and 
minister?" Then he bowed his head, and continued: "Stupid 
as I am, I received the emperor's favor. He entrusted me 
with the great military responsibilities of state. Day and night 
I trembled, unable to bear them. Now he has relieved me 
of this great burden. Great indeed is the mercy of the 
emperor."7 
An official stepped forward. In dramatic but vain protest 
against Toghto's decision to obey the emperor, he pulled out 
his sword and committed suicide on the spot. 
The emperor divided Toghto's forces up among three com-
manders. Various units, however, mutinied and turned out-
law, and the attack on Kao-yu was in fact never pressed 
further. Toghto's agricultural program in North China was 
abolished, and the bureaus issuing the new currency closed 
down. The Merkid family properties were confiscated; Esen 
Temiir's property went to Qama. Esen Temiir was banished 
to Szechwan, where he apparently died. Toghto's two sons 
were exiled to Kansu. Toghto himself was first exiled to his 
estates in Huai-an; later he was removed to Etsin-gol, and 
finally he was transported to the Yunnan frontier, where on 
January 10, 1356, he was poisoned by Qama's agents. He 
was forty-two years of age at the time.8 
The dismissal of Toghto had utterly disastrous political con-
sequences for the future of the Yiian as a dynasty ruling in 
China. What these consequences were will be discussed 
below. It is necessary to try to answer a deceptively simple 
question first: why it was that the emperor dismissed Toghto. 
A number of possible reasons suggest themselves, but no 
single explanation is completely satisfactory. The answer 
rather lies in a combination of factors. 
Five years of Toghto and his managerial bureaucratic pro-
grams, his monopolization of power, and the supremacy of 
reform ideology had produced astounding and beneficial 
results within the Yiian empire. The Yellow River had been 
tamed in one of the greatest hydraulic enterprises ever 
organized; North China agriculture had been revolutionized; 
the Red Turban rebellions had been crushed. But five years 
of Toghto had also produced a feeling of suffocation and a 
mood of restlessness in the bureaucracy. The Censorate and 
the provincial administrations were beginning to chafe and 
grow rebellious under the continuing need to toe the political 
line. The conservative Confucians were growing impatient 
with the administration's constant refusal to listen to them, 
especially now that Toghto's programs seemed to be drawing 
to a close. Within the monarchy, there was apprehension 
as to what Toghto might attempt to do next. 
By making himself appear as the true defender of the cen-
sorial prerogatives, Toghto had been able to compel Berke 





In the six years since then, however, the Censorate had been 
under the firm partisan control of Toghto's younger brother 
Esen Temür. In 1352, nevertheless, Toghto had been obliged 
to quell an incipient revolt in the Censorate. It was apparently 
on the verge of joining the Shensi Branch Censorate in its 
impeachment of Esen Temiir until Toghto revised the ethnic 
qualifications for office-holding, appointed three Southern 
Chinese as censors, and used them to lead the counterattack 
against Esen Temiir's Shensi detractors.9 In 1354 Qama 
seems to have made common cause with the lower censorial 
opposition when he leagued with a censor by the name of 
Yiian Sain Buqa, of whom practically nothing is known, in 
order to arrange the impeachment of the two Merkid 
brothers. It would appear that by 1354 many lower censors 
felt they had been docile long enough, and were eager to 
speak out once again against those in power. 
There are also indications that Toghto had enemies among 
the provincial officials who were succeeding so well in putting 
down the Red Turban disturbances. It is not unlikely that 
many of them were impatient with the Chancellor's determi-
nation to restrict their fields of operation and frustrate their 
creation of personal power bases. What lends credence to 
such a supposition is that sometime after 1352, and before 
Toghto's dismissal, one Wang Ssu-ch'eng, Expositor-in-
Waiting in the Chi-hsien Academy and concurrent Rector of 
the Imperial University, presented a seven-point memorial 
to the emperor. His very first point was a plea to reactivate 
the positions of Chancellor of the Right and Chancellor of 
the Left in the provincial governments, and to permit the 
holders of such offices to take exclusive charge of all matters 
within their respective jurisdictions.10 Toghto ordinarily 
assigned no provincial posts higher than that of Chief 
Administrator, since it was precisely the growth of this kind 
of concentrated provincial power that he always tried to 
inhibit. The fact that the provincial chancellorships were 
revived immediately after Toghto's ouster makes it seem cer-
tain that Wang Ssu-ch'eng was under strong pressure earlier 
to make such a plea to the emperor. 





is evident, but difficult to prove. The conservatives declined 
on ideological grounds to consider themselves a faction, and 
^ they did not behave as a faction either before or after the 
dismissal. There is no evidence that they organized a move-
The Growth m e n t against Toghto, and no evidence that they made a con-
of Yiian eerted grab for the spoils of office after Toghto was gone. 
Regionalism Some of the old conservatives were dead. Berke Buqa died 
in 1350. The former Chancellor of the Right, the Jalair Dorji, 
commanded troops and voluntarily participated in Toghto's 
campaign on Kao-yu. He died in his army at Yang-chou in 
1355.11 The former Chancellor of the Left Ho Wei-i was re-
called from retirement in 1355, but was made Chancellor 
of the Right of Huainan province. In 1357, however, he did 
resume his old position in the Central Chancellery.12 Hsü 
Yu-jen, an old policy opponent of Toghto's (it was he who 
put the kung-li label on Toghto's enterprises), had served 
under Toghto since 1353 as Vice Administrator of the Left 
for Honan province. In 1355 he too was recalled to the capital 
for position there.13 Though some conservatives certainly 
benefited politically from Toghto's overthrow, they had no 
visible machine and no real leader. 
The ideological justification for Toghto's dismissal had, 
however, a definitely conservative ring. Conservative 
ideology tended to support the censorial right to speak out 
against anyone in power. Against Toghto's political centraliza-
tion, it stressed the necessity of some regional autonomy. 
Good local officials should be able to feed the starving, supply 
the troops, and attack rebels and bandits without constant 
interference and politically imposed restriction from above. 
Even more, the premium the conservatives placed upon 
selecting morally good men for office seems especially to have 
disposed them to the opposite task of rooting out the bad 
and the ineffectual, a matter which called for the full exercise 
of the powers of the Censorate. A case in point, of course, 
was the Shensi Branch Censorate's attempted impeachment 
of Esen Temiir for allowing his army to be terrorized and 
dispersed by Red Turbans in 1352. In addition, it was no 
doubt his awareness, perhaps even his support, of conserva-
tive opinion that led the Tan gut Irinjinbal to urge Toghto 
to punish his unsuccessful military commanders, a measure 
which Toghto refused to take. When Toghto was dismissed, 
the charge laid against him was deliberate delay and military ^ 
failure.14 After Toghto's dismissal, the conservatives could 
continue to demand, and obtain, exemplary punishments of Tfie Growtjx 
unsuccessful Yiian commanders.15 of Yiian 
There is, finally, the question of Toghto's relationship to Regionalism 
the monarchy, and the possibility that as the all-powerful 
Chancellor of the Right he constituted some sort of danger 
to the imperial house. Certainly Qama tried to point to the 
existence of such a danger. He had earlier approached Toghon 
Temiir's Korean empress and laid before her the charge that 
the Merkid brothers were responsible for delaying the formal 
investiture of her son Ayushiridara as heir apparent. Although 
it would not appear that Toghto was in any way opposed 
to Ayushiridara, there were some irregularities in 
Ayushiridara's position that proved troublesome to Toghto. 
His mother was Korean, and there was sentiment against 
her on these grounds. She was, in addition, only a second-
ranking empress. The principal empress was Bayan Qudu, 
whose Qunggirad clan enjoyed traditional marriage ties to 
the imperial house. Sometime around 1353 Bayan Qudu gave 
birth to a son. Under these circumstances, when Qama first 
approached Toghto with a view to conferring the patent of 
investiture upon Ayushiridara as heir apparent, Toghto pro-
crastinated.16 He apparently did so not because he opposed 
Ayushiridara, but rather because the birth of this new baby 
seriously complicated the question of the imperial succes-
sion.17 The matter required careful deliberation. 
Toghto's hesitancy on the succession question understand-
ably prejudiced his relationships with Ayushiridara and his 
ambitious mother. By his very silence, Toghto was casting 
doubt upon Ayushiridara's legitimacy. Ayushiridara was about 
sixteen years of age at the time of Toghto's dismissal. The 
indications are that unlike his father he possessed consider-
able if undeveloped executive talent, and that he was eager 
to take an active part in the administration of the realm.18 
We have it that he strongly disapproved of his father's passiv-
ity, his pleasurable diversions, and his coterie of palace 
playmates.19 It was likely that sooner or later Ayushiridara 
would come to an open confrontation with Toghto. 
^ T h r o u g h intermediaries such as Qama the restlessness and 
frustration of the bureaucracy and its desire for Toghto's 
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of Yiian Korean empress and his son Ayushiridara were interpreting 
Regionalism Toghto's evasiveness on the succession question as a sign of 
his opposition, the emperor was under pressure from within 
the monarchical establishment to remove the Chancellor of 
the Right. The emperor also had possible personal reasons 
for resenting Toghto. Under the conservative administration 
of Berke Buqa, his visible presence had been demanded by 
the bureaucracy. He was permitted a hortatory role; he par-
ticipated in the making of official appointments; and his sol-
icitude for the people was prominently advertised through 
such devices as sending special delegations to honor and 
reward popular local officials. This role the emperor seemed 
to enjoy. Under Toghto, however, there was nothing for him 
to do but pass his time in idle diversions in the palace and 
let Toghto run everything. For this his own son was beginning 
to criticize him. 
Although it was not one but probably all of these factors 
that influenced the emperor's decision to remove Toghto, 
the pressure was no doubt strongest within the monarchy 
itself. One simply could not tell what Toghto planned to do 
with the monarchy. Through his machine, Toghto completely 
controlled the state. There were no higher positions to pro-
mote him to, no honors and rewards that he did not possess 
already. What possible leverage did the* imperial house still 
retain over Toghto? Early in the previous century the Mer-
kids had been rivals to Chinggis Qan. Chinggis, in his vindic-
tive fury, pronounced anathemas upon the Merkids and all 
but destroyed them. What were Toghto's feelings on this mat-
ter? Was it by accident that he bore the same name as the 
last great leader of the Merkids, whom Chinggis killed in 
1208?20 How loyal, ultimately, was Toghto to the house of 
Chinggis Qan? What concrete facts could not prove, imagina-
tion could easily invent. There can be no doubt that the 
imperial house felt itself to be in danger from Toghto, a dan-
ger that it could not quite define. There were too many ques-
tions about him that begged an answer. 
Hence the emperor's edict of December 24, 1354, dismiss-
ing Toghto. The rebel Chang Shih-ch'eng, trapped inside the 
walls of Kao-yu, must have watched in disbelief as Toghto's 
forces, so near to annihilating him, suddenly and unaccount-
ably fell to pieces. 
As for Toghto's immediate and complete act of obedience 
to the emperor's edict, one may perhaps interpret it as the 
most extreme form of revenge he could possibly have chosen. 
One can imagine that to prove the point that the integrity 
of the dynasty rested upon him and upon him alone, he 
decided simply to scuttle it then and there, and let whoever 
pleased pick up the pieces. He would permit his entire 
machine to collapse at once, and abandon his men, his offi-
cials, and his generals to the mercies of the opposition.21 
The restless censors, the provincial autonomists, and the frus-
trated conservatives could inherit the empire, or what was 
left of it. Whatever they did would make no difference, for 
the inheritance of Chinggis Qan and Qubilai in China was 
at an end; the Yiian Dynasty was, in all essential respects, 
finished. 
The dismissal of Toghto constitutes a major turning point 
in late Yiian history. It marks the end of Yiian territorial and 
administrative centralization and the rise of regionalism in 
both North and South China. In North China and along the 
China coast the regionalists were nominally loyal to the Yiian. 
In the interior of South China grew the movements that 
would culminate in the founding of the Ming Dynasty in 1368. 
Along the South China coast, regional warlords came into 
power not long after Toghto's dismissal. A clear case in point 
is that of Chang Shih-ch'eng, Toghto's intended victim at Kao-
yu. Having given unmistakable sign that it was afraid of its 
own apparatus of pacification, the Yiian court then proceeded 
to rearrange its priorities and place conciliation ahead of sup-
pression. It is true that Toghto himself had attempted to 
negotiate with Chang before leading the campaign against 
him, but Toghto at the time negotiated from a position of 





when the former salt-smuggler refused to surrender peace-
fully. After Toghto's downfall, the Yiian court turned once 
again to negotiation and sent envoys to Kao-yu to persuade 
1 2 8 Chang to surrender voluntarily in return for an official posi-
_ 7 tion. This time, however, the court held no serious military The Growth 9 . . y 
of Yiian * o r c e i n reserve and was obliged to let Chang impose his 
Regionalism o w n terms.22 The court could not prevent Chang's migration 
south from the Huai area in 1356 and his forcible seizure 
and occupation of the Yangtze delta region, the chief rice-
growing and salt-producing part of the empire.23 It stood by 
helplessly while Chang proceeded to create his own system 
of central and local government with its capital at P'ing-chiang 
(Soochow).24 Having thus consolidated his position, with 
direct and complete administrative control over his own ter-
ritory, Chang Shih-ch'eng considered himself secure and 
under these circumstances opened negotiations with the Yiian 
court. In 1357 he agreed to abolish the Great Chou, i.e., 
the outward trappings of independence, and accept from the 
Yiian court the title of Grand Commandant (t'ai-wei). The 
Great Chou dynasty was renamed the Kiangtung Branch 
Province (fen-sheng;); Chang's adherents all accepted posi-
tions as Yiian officials, and from 1359 Chang began to send 
token amounts of tribute grain to the Yiian capital.25 
Chang's surrender was only nominal and the voluntary 
incorporation of his regime into the Yiian Dynasty a fiction. 
He stayed complete master in his own house, maintained 
personal diplomatic relations with Korea, and in 1363, when 
the situation seemed to warrant it, he threw off the Yiian 
cloak and declared his independence once again. 
The court's policy toward Chang Shih-ch'eng was paralleled 
by similar arrangements with other regionalists along the 
China coast. The pirate Fang Kuo-chen, whose emergence 
in 1348 seemed to set the trend for the future, remained 
at liberty on the sea. From 1352 to 1354 Toghto had wavered 
between conciliation and warfare in his policy toward the 
pirate, but Toghto's negotiating terms were harsh; he would 
allow Fang to surrender only in return for an official appoint-
ment somewhere away from the coast where his power lay, 
and that only on the condition that Fang first turn in his 
boats and disperse his followers.26 At the time of Toghto's 
dismissal, the official policy toward Fang Kuo-chen was one 
of hostility. This situation changed radically in 1356, for by 
this time Fang had moved ashore and seized the coastal cities 
of T'ai-chou, Ch'ing-yiian (Ning-po), Yii-yao, and Wen-chou. 
In 1356 Fang was approached by Yiian officials who hoped 
to enlist his aid against Chang Shih-ch'eng.27 In return for 
a sea attack upon Chang, which Fang undertook, though with-
out enthusiasm and without success, the Yiian court appoint-
ed him myriarch in charge of maritime grain shipments and 
at the same time myriarch in charge of the protection of the 
shipments.28 These were substantive appointments; Fang's 
power base at sea was legitimized and recognized. The court 
went yet further in 1357, when it also appointed him Assistant 
Administrator of Kiangche province, and thus recognized his 
territorial power as well.29 Like Chang Shih-ch'eng, Fang 
controlled his own regional administration. He was able to 
obtain successively higher provincial posts for himself and 
his adherents down to the end of the dynasty.30 
The autonomous coastal warlords for the most part prefer-
red to act as Yiian loyalists, but their loyalty was purely volun-
tary, and was intended in part as a means of gaming legitimacy 
in the eyes of the local landlord gentry, who had learned 
from the Red Turban troubles to associate anti-dynastic 
rebellion with the massacre of their own kind. In the interior 
of South China the situation was rather different. The leader-
ship that emerged there after Toghto's downfall consisted of 
rebels who had formerly been involved in the messianic Red 
Turban movements of 1351 and after, and who on the whole 
continued to maintain an attitude of hostility toward the Yiian 
Dynasty. While the warlords on the China coast were largely 
content to exercise authority on a purely regional basis, and 
to mask their actual independence by submitting nominally 
to the Yiian government, the rebels of the interior, although 
regionally based at the initial stages, very early made clear 
their claim to the Mandate of Heaven and their desire eventu-
ally to rule not simply a province or an area, but all of China.31 
The strategic realities favored such a development. In 





were subsequently crushed, emerged again in 1355 and estab-
lished a "Sung" dynasty with a central government in the 
northern Huai town of Po-chou. In their earlier religious 
phase, the rebels had attempted nothing of this sort. This 
The Growth their messianic propaganda was muted and their dynas-
of Yiian t i c pretensions more serious. From 1355 to 1360 the Sung 
Regionalism regime acted the part of a traditional government, imposing 
a system of taxation and instituting its own coinage. At the 
same time it made alliances with remnant rebel groups in 
various parts of Central and North China, and sent these 
reconstituted forces out on campaign against the Yiian 
Dynasty in various directions at once. In 1358 the Sung 
regime moved its capital northwest to Pien-liang (K'ai-feng). 
Lacking sufficient food supplies, and occupying an undefend-
able plains region, the rebel dynasty made a heroic but unsuc-
cessful effort to seize the grain-growing valleys of Shensi and 
Shansi, and even to storm the Yiian capital itself. By 1360 
the Sung forces were spent. Yet the historical role of the 
rebel Sung regime was a crucial one. It forced the Yiian 
Dynasty to permit the creation of an outside military machine 
under the loyalist Chaghan Temiir in order to put it down. 
This matter will de dealt with more fully below. In addition, 
the existence of the Sung movement in the north effectively 
prevented the Yiian court from interfering in any direct way 
in the situation in South China.32 
Between North China and South China lay the Huai 
region, earlier the seedbed of the Red Turban risings, but 
increasingly after 1355 a no man's land, exhausted and rav-
aged, and unable to support either provincial loyalists or 
rebels with dynastic ambitions. The Huai area was gradually 
evacuated, its major occupiers either migrating northwest like 
the Sung regime, or south across the Yangtze like Chang 
Shih-ch'eng. The Huai region thus came to constitute a kind of 
buffer zone which, together with the Sung movement raging 
north of it, effectively sealed off the interior of South China 
from any landward interference on the part of the Yiian. Until 
Chaghan Temiir's partial reunification of North China in 1361 
the Yiian court could confront the developing rebel regimes 
of Ch'en Yu-liang and the future Ming founder Chu Yiian-
chang only through the cooperation of the loyalist coastal 
warlords, who were not eager to undertake major campaigns 
inland. Consequently, rebels such as Ch'en and Chu could 
build their incipient imperial regimes relatively unhindered. 
In these circumstances, it is not surprising that Yuan pro-
vincial and local authority south of the Yangtze should have 
begun disintegrating after 1355. Many of the high-ranking 
bureaucrats who had performed so successfully under 
Toghto's direction in putting down the Red Turbans in 1352 
and 1353 were gone. One of the earliest to die was the Tangut 
Shinggi, Chief Administrator of Kiangche, who was captured 
and killed in November, 1352.33 The Tangut Buyan Temiir, 
the commander who led the successful attack on the southern 
Red Turban capital in 1353, died in November or December, 
1356, in the Yangtze city of Ch'ih-chou (Kuei-ch'ih, 
Anhwei).34 The Jalair Dorjibal, Chief Administrator of 
Hukuang, died in the former rebel-held city of Huang-chou 
at some undetermined date.35 The Dórben (Mongol) Oriig 
Temiir, Chief Administrator of Kiangche, died of illness in 
his army at Hui-chou (She-hsien, Anhwei) in the late summer 
of 1352.36 The Tangut Irinjinbal, Chancellor of the Left of 
Kiangsi, died in office there in the late summer of 1354.37 
These men were important figures; they had enjoyed the con-
fidence of the administration above and the allegiance of the 
local gentry and their militias below, and although they were 
by training civilian bureaucrats, they had commanded per-
sonally the pacification effort at the highest provincial levels. 
A few veterans of the earlier pacification campaigns were 
still alive and serving in office after 1355, but they were 
unable to cope with the new rebel power that emerged after 
Toghto's removal. This second rebel advance was militarily 
better organized than the first. In addition, the rebels were 
employing an entirely new strategy: instead of fomenting 
popular riots against the landlord gentry as they had done 
earlier, they began making an overt bid for landlord gentry 
support. By so doing, they split the phalanx of gentry-led 
militia that had rallied to the Yiian officials earlier, and left 
the Yiian officials with little of their former role as champions 





regimes of Ch'en Yu-liang and Chu Yiian-chang had grown 
to such an extent, thanks to gentry support, that the remain-
ing loyalist gentry could only submit to one or the other. 
Between them, Ch'en and Chu overpowered the isolated 
The Growth walled cities one by one, and brought a complete 
of Yiian en<^ t o Yiian rule in the interior regions of the South. Some 
Regionalism of the Yiian local officials perished along with the fall of their 
cities, as Confucian duty required. For this, they were post-
humously honored by Ch'en and Chu.38 After 1355 Southern 
Chinese history is no longer really Yiian history, but fits more 
properly into the history of Chu Yiian-chang's foundation of 
the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644). 
More pertinent to the history of the dying Yiian Dynasty 
was the slow and intricate process which led to the formation 
of semi-independent regional machines in North China, and 
the concomitant reduction in the scope of Yiian central 
authority to little more than the capital city itself. It was 
the rise of the rebel Sung regime in North China after 
Toghto's dismissal that provoked and justified the growth of 
semi-independent loyalist power. The Yiian court either had 
to allow its growth, or be overrun by the Sung rebels. 
The chief architect of this new regional organization was 
Chaghan Temiir. He was the great-grandson of one Kókótei, 
who as a tamachi, or non-Mongol soldier under Mongol com-
mand, participated in the conquest of Honan province during 
the reign of the qaghan Ogodei (r. 1229-41). Kokotei was 
a Naiman Turk, whose home was in Pei-t'ing (Beshbaliq) in 
Uighur territory.39 His son Naimantai and grandson Arghun, 
however, settled in Honan province as landowners, register-
ing their family in the county of Shen-ch'iu. Arghun did not 
hold office and evidently had no powerful connections at the 
Yiian court. If he had, one might expect that so robust and 
capable a young man as his son Chaghan Temiir would have 
gained entry into the Imperial Guards. Instead, like many 
other provincial Mongols and se-mu, Chaghan Temiir pre-
pared himself for the official examinations, which he passed 
at the chü-jen level sometime before the Red Turban rebel-




and is sometimes referred to, more sínico, as Li Ch'a-han. 
He apparently had no sons of his own. His sister was married 
to a Chinese named Wang, and Chaghan Temiir adopted a 
son of theirs named Wang Pao-pao, later known as Koko 
Temiir.40 
Although he may have been "earnest in study," as his biog-
raphy in the Yiian shih flatteringly asserts, he was widely Regionalism 
known in his part of Honan for rather different qualities. 
These one may infer from the accounts written about some 
of his friends and adherents. The epitaph of one such adher-
ent, named Kuan-kuan, describes not a literary or Confucian 
type, but a muscular bravo. "In his youth," begins the 
epitaph, "he was fierce, talented, and brave. He was fond 
of hunting and was practiced in riding and shooting. He lived 
in Shen-ch'iu, and in his travels . . . he became familiar 
with the locally powerful people (hao-chieh). He was at one 
with them in his temperament and in his ideas."41 Like 
Chaghan Temiir, Kuan-kuan had a Chinese polite name, or 
tzu. From this it may be presumed that like Chaghan he 
had a Chinese teacher and had studied for the examinations 
also. Kuan-kuan\s ethnic origin is unknown. However, he was 
clearly not Chinese, since he lacked a surname (hsing). 
Another friend of Chaghan Temiir's was an equally unlikely 
companion for an earnest Confucian. He was Li Ssu-ch'i, a 
Chinese police chief and tax clerk (tien-shih) in his home 
county of Lo-shan further south. Li had no pretensions what-
ever to Confucian learning.42 Over Kuan-kuan and Li and 
others like them, Chaghan Temiir appears to have assumed 
a kind of leadership, or exerted some sort of informal domi-
nance. Chaghan Temiir's biography portrays his personality 
simply by noting that he had bushy eyebrows and three hairs 
on his left cheek which stuck out straight when he was 
angry.43 
The county of Shen-ch'iu, located in the upper Huai region, 
lay about thirty miles west of Ying-chou where the Red Tur-
ban rebellion first broke out in 1351. The uprising was a 
matter which closely concerned Chaghan Temiir as a member 
of a landowning family, for some of the rebels were attacking 
and threatening landlords in addition to burning the cities 
and killing the local officials. In 1352 Chaghan raised a militia 
(•i-ping) of "several hundred" men from among the sons and 
younger brothers of Shen-ch'iu. With these troops he 
defended his home area, and later aided Li Ssu-ch'i in 
The Growth r e c o v e r i n g the city of Lo-shan, which had come under Red 
of Yiian Turban occupation. In this he was aided by Kuan-kuan, who 
Regionalism recruited a number of militia braves (i-yung) and came to 
join him.44 
The anti-rebel merits of Chaghan and his allies were made 
known to the imperial authorities at Ta-tu, and generous 
rewards were forthcoming. Chaghan was made darughachi 
and Li Ssu-ch'i magistrate of the prefecture of Ju-ning, and 
Kuan-kuan received the military post of centurion.45 These 
positions, however, appear to have been purely honorary. 
Chaghan and Li actually remained with their troops at Shen-
ch'iu, and from time to time engaged in local skirmishes 
against the Red Turbans, apparently on higher orders.46 
Nothing further is heard of Chaghan and the militia of 
Shen-ch'iu until 1355, when Toghto was dismissed, and as 
Chaghan's biography puts it, "the bandit forces spread." In 
1355 aboriginal Miao forces, originally sent north as loyalists 
to protect the city of Pien-liang, mutinied and went on ram-
page, seizing four county seats to the south and west. Appar-
ently on higher orders, Chaghan moved his forces northwest 
and annihilated the mutineers on the north bank of the Yellow 
River, where the armies of the Szechwan Chief Administrator 
Dash Badulugh and the Honan Chancellor of the Left Tai 
Buqa had driven them. For his merit in this, the court pro-
moted Chaghan to the honorary position of Vice Minister 
in the Board of Punishments.47 
During the same year Chaghan had another and better 
opportunity to prove himself. After his victory over the Miao 
mutineers, he moved his forces to Chung-mou, about twenty-
five miles west of Pien-liang, and there pitched camp along-
side the army of the Salji'ud Dash Badulugh. In July Dash 
Badulugh received a new appointment as Chief Administrator 
of Honan, and was put in charge of the bulk of the Honan 
forces, which included the troops of the Mongol princes and 
fresh levies of Miao from the south. He had court permission 
to "act at convenience." The Qunggirad Tai Buqa had been 
impeached by the censors and removed from his position 
in June for failing to move rapidly against the rebel forces 
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and for oppressing the people. As punishment, he and his 
troops were also put under Dash Badulugh's command. ^ Growth 
Chaghan Temiir too must have been under the command 0f Yiian 
of Dash Badulugh, although th ere is no direct evidence of Regionalism 
this.48 
In July and August, 1355, the rebel Sung forces marched 
westward in strength and resoundingly defeated Dash 
Badulugh at Ch'ang-ko, about thirty miles south of Chung-
mou. Dash Badulugh's defeat was a little surprising; he had 
been eminently successful against the Red Turbans in 1352-
53, and thus received the rapid promotions which led to his 
present high position in Honan. The rebels he had defeated 
earlier, however, were a loosely organized mob. Evidently 
he was not prepared for the better organized Sung armies. 
He was no better prepared in October and November, when 
the Sung forces directly attacked his camp at Chung-mou 
and plundered his stores. Chaghan Temiir, however, took 
advantage of a sandstorm to lead an attack on the main section 
of the enemy forces, and he succeeded in driving them back. 
For this, he was promoted honorarily to President of the 
Board of War.49 
Early in 1356 the loyalist forces rallied further and put 
the Sung temporarily on the defensive. The court had mean-
time sent an official from the Chief Military Commission 
down to Dash Badulugh's camp in order to oversee opera-
tions. Whether his visit was responsible for the greater effec-
tiveness of the loyalist army is unknown. In any event, Dash 
Badulugh finally managed in January, 1356, to crush the Sung 
army near T'ai-k'ang, about sixty-five miles southeast of 
Chung-mou. After that, he continued eastward and besieged 
the rebel capital of Po-chou, and forced the Sung court to 
evacuate and reestablish itself further south.50 For this 
endeavor, Dash Badulugh was promoted to Chancellor of the 
Left of Honan. He retained his previous concurrent position 
as head of the Branch Military Commission. His sons Hsi-





and Szechwan provinces, although they were actually fighting 
in Honan.51 
Chaghan Temiir, meanwhile, was busy elsewhere. Dash 
Badulugh had sent him and Li Ssu-ch'i westward to stop the 
Sung forces at Han-ku Pass and prevent their invading Shensi 
and Shansi. This Chaghan failed to do, but he found some 
of the rebel forces occupying the walled city of Ling-pao just 
south of the Yellow River, and with the aid of a smoke screen 
produced by burning horse dung he was able to drive them 
out. Some of the enemy then crossed the Yellow River for 
plunder. Chaghan eventually followed them and after a con-
frontation lasting several months he was able to stop them, 
partly by using heavy iron-clad cavalry. For this, the court 
promoted Chaghan to a post in the Branch Military Commis-
sion. Kuan-kuan participated in this campaign, too, and was 
promoted to myriarch. The disgraced Qunggirad Tai Buqa, 
since restored to his former position as Chancellor of the 
Left of Honan, contributed to the total pacification effort by 
bringing the Nan-yang area in western Honan under control. 
The emperor was sufficiently heartened by the loyalist suc-
cesses in Honan in 1356 to issue a special edict of amnesty 
in celebration.52 
It may be noticed at this point that even though the Sung 
thrust had been blunted, temporarily so as it turned out, 
provincial autonomy in Honan was as yet only weakly 
developed. The court, dominated by conservative Confucian 
ideology after Toghto's overthrow, was still able to maintain 
some leverage over the forces in the field. Certain typical 
patterns had, nevertheless, already begun to emerge. There 
were two kinds of military forces operating in Honan. There 
were semi-independent forces controlled by Dash Badulugh 
and Chaghan Temiir; and there were government forces 
under the command of Tai Buqa. The central government 
treated each quite differently. For the semi-autonomous 
forces, led by men who had no stake at court and no reputa-
tion to preserve there, the government employed an exceed-
ingly complex system of promotions through official ranks 
which to a surprising extent were not even remotely con-
nected with the operations the commanders were engaged 
in. On the other hand, there was no system of punishments 
for them. No attempt was made to impeach Dash Badulugh 
for his early reverses at the hands of the rebels. For Tai 
Buqa, however, who wanted court position, and who was 
not at all happy commanding troops in the field, the system 
was different. Tai Buqa was fair game for censorial attack 
as an unsuccessful general. This pattern held generally true 
in the coming years. While the censors lacerated the various 
central government commanders, absolutely no attack was 
made upon those men whose personal interests were tied 
toa growth in regional power.53 
Although regionalism was still weak, the beginnings were 
in evidence by 1356. Dash Badulugh had begun to 
accumulate those powers which Toghto always attempted to 
keep in separate hands. In June, 1355, after Tai Buqa's 
impeachment, he came to exert over-all military power in 
the province for the first time. In July he was shifted from 
Chief Administrator of Szechwan to Chief Administrator of 
Honan, and thus for the first time came to hold office in 
the province in which his own troops were campaigning. 
Although he became Chancellor of the Left of Honan after 
his defeat of the rebels in 1356, the Qunggirad Tai Buqa 
also held this position at the same time; moreover, Dash 
Badulugh was shifted back to Szechwan in May, 1357, again 
as Chancellor of the Left. Even though he remained in 
Honan, his official position there was not entirely secure.54 
There was danger, however, in the fact that Dash Badulugh 
arranged for his own supplies.55 Yet, despite his possessing 
the rudiments of an independent power base, Dash Badulugh 
was not overwhelmingly successful in his battles with the 
rebels. Probably for this reason, the court was able to keep 
a certain amount of leverage over him. It was, for example, 
able to compel him to relocate his camp so that better protec-






The revival of the Sung rebel movement after 1356 was 
directly responsible for the further development of regional 
autonomy under Chaghan Temür. The great Sung expedi-
tions of 1357-58 took them through Honan into Shensi and 
Shansi; they took Pien-liang and made it their capital, and 
nearly succeeded in storming Ta-tu itself.57 
138 It was in Shensi that Chaghan Temiir took advantage of 
The Growth ^rust to lay the foundations of his independence. 
of Yiian Early i n 1357 the rebels regrouped themselves in the moun-
Regionalism tains southeast of the Shensi provincial capital of Feng-yiian 
(Sian), and put the province in danger of imminent invasion.58 
Since the Red Turban disorders of 1352 the Shensi bureauc-
racy had ceased observing the regulations, which in the inter-
est of dynastic security, had imposed a policy of mutual non-
fraternization and noncooperation between the provincial 
administration and the Shensi Branch Censorate.59 In emer-
gency situations, both bodies now met in the presence of 
Aradnashiri, the Prince of Yii.60 This new arrangement the 
court on several occasions pointedly authorized.61 It was at 
such a meeting in the spring of 1357 that the Secretarial Cen-
sor Wang Ssu-ch'eng, a conservative, successfully argued in 
favor of inviting Chaghan Temiir and his army into Shensi 
to bolster the defenses, even though the local government 
commanders feared they would be overwhelmed, and even 
though it was actually illegal for any but the court itself to 
permit the passage of troops across provincial boundaries.62 
As it turned out, the decision had grave consequences for 
the integrity of the central administration. Upon receiving 
the joint request of the Shensi authorities for aid, Chaghan 
and Li Ssu-ch'i at once set out with 5,000 light-armed troops 
from their camp near the Shensi border. They succeeded 
in driving back the rebels, who had begun to invade the 
Wei River valley.63 Chaghan's superiors in Honan, greatly 
concerned over this irregular and unauthorized venture, 
made a complaint about it to the court. At the time, however, 
the court was devoting all of its attention to a rapidly 
deteriorating situation in east China. Rather than discipline 
Chaghan and the Shensi authorities, it decided to recognize 
a fait accompli. It appointed Chaghan Vice Administrator of 
the Left for Shensi, and Li Ssu-ch'i to the same position in 
Szechwan.64 
The presence of Chaghan Temiir and his armies led to 
civil war in Shensi. The Prince of Yii and the regular Shensi 
officials campaigned against the rebels for the last time in 
January, 1358; in that action the rebels were defeated, but 
for that the main credit went to Chaghan and Li, for the 139 
preponderance of military power in Shensi lay definitely with ^ Growtji 
the imported Honan armies.65 The Yiian court was aware 0 jyü a n 
of what was happening and apparently tried to lend support Regionalism 
to the regular provincial authorities. In March, 1358, the 
court ordered Chaghan and Li to separate their armies. In 
order to allow the regular provincial administration to 
increase its power, the court ordered it to begin printing 
its own paper money to facilitate the purchase of military 
supplies.66 The court also authorized the establishment of 
bureaus for military organization, control, and agriculture in 
Feng-yuan, Yen-an, and Kung-ch'ang.67 
In retaliation against the attempt of the Shensi officials to 
strengthen themselves, Chaghan and Li began appointing 
their own local officials in order to assure the delivery of 
supplies. In the summer of 1358, immediately after defeating 
the rebels, Li Ssu-ch'i moved against two pro-government 
commanders, eliminated them, and incorporated their troops 
into his own army.68 In 1359 the conflict grew sharper. By 
this time, the officials who had invited Li and Chaghan into 
Shensi had been transferred; the Prince of Yii, for reasons 
unknown, was removed, possibly exiled, from the province 
in November, 1358.69 In September, 1359, the court 
appointed one Teri Temiir Chancellor of the Left of Shensi, 
with permission to "act at convenience."70 Teri Temiir was 
determined to make war upon the armies of Chaghan and 
Li in spite of strong opposition from the Branch Censorate. 
The censors argued that Chaghan and Li already had enough 
power to seize the provincial capital; all they needed was 
a good excuse upon which to act. Teri Temiir, however, 
ignored the censorial counsel and lost Feng-yiian to Chaghan 
and Li sometime during the winter of 1359-60.71 
By 1360, however, the power of Chaghan had already 
spread far beyond Shensi. Li Ssu-ch'i settled in western 
Shensi as a warlord and ally of Chaghan; although Chaghan 
kept a contingent of troops in that province, he was seldom 
there himself. Late in 1357 the rebels made an initial attempt 
to seize the Fen River valley of Shansi to the northeast. 
Chaghan's men beat off the attack, and were appointed to 
1 4 0 positions in the local Pacification Office.72 In 1358, however, 
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of Yiian Again Chaghan's men proved effective. They put con-
Regionalism tinual pressure upon the invading forces and prevented them 
from permanently occupying any part of Shansi. One rebel 
contingent was obliged to leave the valley at its north end.73 
Other defeated remnants straggled back south through the 
valley and attempted an exit at the lower end, but Chaghan 
was waiting for them there and crushed them as they came 
out.74 As a result of these actions, Chaghan Temiir's power 
grew to include Shansi as well as Shensi and Honan. By the 
end of 1358 he was Vice Commissioner of the Honan Branch 
Military Commission, Chief Administrator and Secretarial 
Censor in Shensi, with orders to hold and defend Shansi and 
act at convenience there.75 His generals occupied key dis-
tricts in Shansi, and the chief magistrate in the important 
city of Ki-ning (T'ai-yiian) was his appointee, not the court's.76 
The rebels had tried to seize the agriculturally important 
river valleys of Shensi and Shansi because Honan province 
was ravaged. Honan suffered a general famine in 1357, and 
it is clear from official reports that the cumulative effects of 
six years of riot and war had seriously affected its agricultural 
capacity and hence its power to sustain a rebel regime.77 
But when the rebels failed in their attempts to take Shansi 
and Shensi, they in effect delivered these areas and their 
grain-growing capacities into the hands of Chaghan Temiir. 
The Yiian court could do little to prohibit or impede this 
development, since it was more directly concerned in 1358 
with a rebel attack upon Ta-tu itself.78 By the time it had 
thrown back this attack, Chaghan's position in the west was 
secure. 
After the events of 1358 it remained for Chaghan Temiir 
to move his armies eastward and annihilate the faltering rebel 
regime. While preparing his forces, he took care to secure 
court permission to arrange for the holding of provincial-level 
examinations in Honan in the fall of 1359. The examination 
stalls were to be set up in Shan-chou, a city under his 
occupation; refugee scholars from outside the province were 
to be admitted under the regular Honan quota for the chü-jen 
degree.79 The measure was in a way a counterchallenge to 141 
the legitimist values inherent in the rebel Sung restoration ^ 
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movement, which ltseli, however, made no known attempt Yiian 
to institute the Confucian examination system. More impor- Regionalism 
tant, arranging the examinations allowed Chaghan to serve 
as an intermediary between the aspiring provincial elite and 
the Yiian government. Chaghan's intercession was highly 
irregular and outside the normal bureaucratic channels for 
arranging examinations. It was a good sign that the Honan 
provincial bureaucracy was no longer functioning.80 In the 
circumstances, Chaghan must have controlled all those parts 
of Honan not occupied by the rebels. 
The annihilation of the Sung regime was therefore a matter 
of personal concern to Chaghan Temiir, who could reasonably 
expect to gain complete control of Honan province at the 
same time that he eliminated an implacable enemy of the 
Yiian Dynasty. His first thrust was not slow in coming. In 
May and June of 1359 he moved his Shensi and Shansi forces 
and Miao auxiliaries eastward and surrounded the Sung capi-
tal, formerly the Honan provincial capital of Pien-liang.81 By 
September the defenders were out of food, and Chaghan's 
men forced their way into the city on the tenth of that month. 
The Sung "emperor" fled through the east gate with his close 
officials and several hundred cavalry and retreated, once 
again, to the Huai town of An-feng. To Chaghan Temiir fell 
the rebel empress, 5,000 rebel officials with their wives and 
children, together with all of the imperial treasury and official 
paraphernalia. The 200,000 inhabitants of the city were 
spared; once inside the city, Chaghan's troops were careful 
to cause only a minimum of disorder. The court immediately 
awarded Chaghan a suit of imperial clothes and a seven-jewel 
belt, and appointed him Chief Administrator of Honan prov-
ince, chief of the Honan Branch Military Commission, and 
Vice Censor-in-Chief of the Shensi Branch Censorate, with 
permission to act at convenience.82 
Immediately after Chaghan's crushing victory over the 
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rebel Sung regime, however, the Yiian court began to take 
steps to contain him. It cannot have been accidental that 
Teri Temiir was made Chancellor of the Left in Shensi just 
two weeks after Chaghan's victory at Pien-liang. It must be 
assumed that Teri Temiir's anti-Chaghan policy had court 
endorsement. The court was also determined to curtail 
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Regionalism Chaghan's power in Shansi, which in the Yiian period was 
part of the metropolitan (Chung-shu) province. Significantly, 
the court was obliged to bypass the regular bureaucratic 
machinery entirely in its effort to contain Chaghan there. 
It made no attempt to punish Chaghan by having the Cen-
sorate impeach him. Rather, it chose to support against 
Chaghan Temiir in Shansi another aspiring regionalist. This 
other regionalist was Bolod Temiir, son of Chaghan Temiir's 
former superior, Dash Badulugh. Bolod Temiir had earlier 
been sent by his father to command troops in Hopei; he was 
there in February, 1358, when his father died and the court 
ordered him to succeed to the command of his father's 
army.83 During 1358, when the rebels were campaigning in 
various parts of North China, Bolod Temiir and his men held 
the main cities east of Shansi, where the T'ai-hang Mountains 
drop down to the Hopei plain. Early in 1359, however, the 
court moved him and part of his army to the extreme north 
of Shansi and there put him in charge of a newly established 
system of military-agricultural colonies.84 Bolod Temiir spent 
the year 1359 crushing rebel remnants in north Shansi, at 
the same time that Chaghan was busy with his attack on Pien-
liang. 
Conflict between Chaghan and Bolod in Shansi broke out 
within a few months after the conclusion of Chaghan's cam-
paign in Honan. In the course of chasing rebels and rounding 
up leaderless and rampaging government troops, Bolod's 
generals had penetrated into the area north of Ki-ning, which 
was part of Chaghan Temiir's unofficial personal domain.85 
Once there, Bolod was intent upon staying in order to take 
advantage of its grain supplies. According to Chaghan Temiir 
himself, the Ki-ning area was so productive a grain-growing 
region that for the past several years it had supplied almost 
all of his military needs.86 Bolod had a better claim to it—and 
indeed to all of Shansi—than did Chaghan, for the court had 
appointed him a Chief Administrator in the Central Chancel-
14 3 lery.87 Chaghan at this time held no post legitimizing his 
occupation of any part of the Shansi region. The Growth 
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out between Bolod and Chaghan over Ki-ning. Until Regionalism 
November, 1360, it sent envoys to urge both sides to cease 
fighting and recognize the Shih-ling Pass (about thirty-five 
miles north of Ki-ning) as their common boundary. On 
November 9, however, the court changed its mind and offi-
cially awarded Ki-ning to Bolod Temiir.88 
For Chaghan, this was a most critical juncture. The court 
was compelling him to make an uncomfortable choice 
between ceding Ki-ning and its grain to his rival, or openly 
flouting an explicit imperial directive at the expense of the 
loyalist pose he has so carefully cultivated thus far. Chaghan 
decided to disobey the imperial directive. 
Despite Chaghan's assertion, it is difficult to believe that 
the Ki-ning grain was all that vital to his army. He had 
occupied Ki-ning since the early summer of 1358, and in 
February, 1359, he sent 20,000 troops there, presumably to 
grow grain for him.89 Thus he probably had the benefit of 
only one crop, and that would have been harvested in the 
fall of 1359, too late to feed the troops who were then attack-
ing Pien-liang, 250 miles away in the southeast. Grain could 
be grown in the whole rest of the Fen valley south of Ki-ning; 
moreover, in January, 1360, Chaghan received court permis-
sion to establish a military-agricultural colony in Honan.90 
It seems clear that the loss of Ki-ning could not have had 
any catastrophic effect upon Chaghan's ability to continue 
the fight against the remaining Sung rebels on behalf of the 
Yiian Dynasty. The surrender of Ki-ning could have seriously 
damaged only his position against Bolod Temiir. In these cir-
cumstances, Chaghan's real choice becomes apparent. It was 
to postpone his campaign against the Sung remnants in east 
China, and to risk the consequences of defying the emperor, 





he had no officially recognized jurisdiction. The choice was 
clear and decisive; for the sake of regional independence, 
the loyalist mask could be sacrificed. 
Against Chaghan's breach of loyalty, there were no institu-
tional sanctions that the court could apply. It could not lightly 
declare him a rebel, for there was a remote possibility that 
Chaghan might then defect to the rebel side.91 The court 
attempted first to use personal pressure. A certain Li Shih-
chan, who knew Chaghan Temiir rather well, having visited 
him as an envoy of the government on an earlier occasion, 
wrote Chaghan a personal letter of advice. Li offered a little 
cajolery, a little flattery, and a few threats. In a transparently 
specious interpretation of court policy, Li stated that Bolod's 
occupation of Ki-ning was only a temporary measure designed 
to "bring a little peace to the Shansi area, and calm the minds 
of his troops." As soon as the area quieted down, the court 
would begin shipping all Ki-ning grain to the capital, and 
then Bolod and Chaghan could leave Shansi altogether and 
make a joint attack on the remaining Sung rebels. Li followed 
this cajolery with flattery. "That young bov," wrote Li, refer-
ring to Bolod, "sooner or later will bring himself to ruin. How 
can he be considered a match for you?" After this flattery 
came the threat. Li suggested that Chaghan's behavior was 
being widely interpreted as treason, and that someone might 
under these circumstances try to make a righteous name for 
himself by assassinating him. Li ended by listing as models 
the good and evil regionalists of Chinese history, leaving it 
for Chaghan to determine where he would take his stand.92 
As if to draw the two sides even more clearly, Bolod Temiir 
managed dutifully to ship 50,000 piculs of grain to the capital 
to relieve a shortage there.93 Chaghan, however, refused to 
be moved either by the letter or by Bolod's example. He 
sent no grain. Not only that; he continued to fight Bolod 
Temiir even after the court in February, 1361, finally changed 
its mind again and gave Ki-ning back to him.94 Late in the 
spring of 1361 Bolod Temiir gave up the struggle in Shansi 
and turned his attention to Shensi. Only then did Chaghan 
Temiir send tribute grain to the court and begin organizing 
his long-postponed attack on the remaining rebels in east 
China.95 Only with his personal power base secure did he 
resume the loyalist pose and once again court the good opin-
ion of the central government. It was absolutely clear that 
in Chaghan's personal order of priorities, his own interests 1 4 5 
came first, and loyalist considerations second. _ _ . 
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In the summer of 1361 Chaghan s legions marched down 0 jy ü a n 
from the Shansi highlands in several columns to put an end Regionalism 
to the remaining Sung rebels. Three local militarists of west-
ern Shantung, who had surrendered to the Sung rebels in 
1357-58, switched their allegiances and joined Chaghan 
Temiir soon after his forces entered their territories.96 Those 
more firmly committed to the rebel movement retreated to 
the Shan-tung city ofl-tn, determined to resist until the end. 
Chaghan pacified the remaining territory of Shantung, and 
then proceeded to bring I-tu down by siege. In October, 
he sent a subordinate to offer sacrifice at Confucius's shrine 
at Ch'ii-fou, and respectfully announce the coming reunifica-
tion of the Yuan empire to the Master's shade.97 In November 
the court shifted his position as Chief Administrator from 
Honan to the metropolitan province of Chung-shu, of which 
Shantung was a part. He retained his former posts in the 
Honan Branch Military Commission and in the Shensi Branch 
Censorate.98 
This, as it turned out, was as far as Chaghan Temiir ever 
got. I-tu continued to hold out, and Chaghan appeared to 
be in no hurry to take it. Instead, he began to capitalize 
upon the power and prestige his recent campaign had given 
him to intervene diplomatically in the warlord struggle in 
South China, and at the same time to support his old ally Li Ssu-
ch'i in his wars against Bolod Temiir's adherents in Shensi.99 
It was in the midst of these activities that on July 7, 1362, 
Chaghan Temiir was assassinated by two warlords, T'ien Feng 
and Wang Shih-ch'eng, who had surrendered to him the year 
before. Chaghan, they felt, was no loyalist, no "leader of a 
Yiian restoration" (Yiian-ch'ao chung-hsingjen-wu) at all, but 
a warlord and a bandit like themselves.100 The assassination, 
apparently carried out in a spirit of pure righteousness, strik-
ingly confirmed the seriousness of Li Shih-chan's threat of 
a few years earlier. 
If the assassination of Chaghan Temiir was a blow struck 
in the name of political righteousness, the Yiian court was 
unable to capitalize upon the act and dismantle Chaghan's 
146 regional machine. After the assassination some of Chaghan's 
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of Yuan a ( j o p t e d s o n Kókó Temiir their ruler and rebel against the 
Regionalism Y { i a n Dynasty altogether. But the Yiian court stepped in very 
quickly to recognize and confirm Koko Temiir in the succes-
sion to his father's command, and to award Chaghan Temiir 
the highest of posthumous honors.101 In so doing, however, 
the Yiian court gave clear and final recognition to the fact 
that it could no longer hope to control the provinces of North 
China. It recognized the autonomous regional machine as 
a permanent institution, and conceded the point that its own 
direct power hardly extended further than the walls of the 
capital. 
Epilogue 
The Last Days of the Yiian Court in China 
The story of court politics after the dis-
missal of Toghto in January, 1355, seems to be properly 
epilogue. After 1355 the central government directly control-
led little more than the capital city and its immediate envi-
rons. Most of the rest of North China was surrendered by 
default to autonomous regional machines. The true center 
of history-making activity shifted to South China, where 
between 1355 and 1363 Chu Yiian-chang, harboring imperial 
ambitions of his own, emerged as the very likely founder 
of a successor dynasty. 
Yiian court history from 1355 to 1368 has features of inter-
est, if hardly of great moment. Even in its death agonies, 
however, it continued to act upon the assumption that some-
how, with the right men in charge, it could revive and restore 
itself. An air of unreality infected the court; it knew its cause 
was lost, yet it refused to act upon that assumption. 
Ayushiridara was fully invested as heir apparent on April 
20, 1355.1 Toghto's immediate successor as Chancellor of the 
Right was the Qangli Ting-chu, who was appointed to that 
post on May 29. Ting-chu objected strongly to the continued 
presence of the Qangli Qama, organizer of the overthrow 
of Toghto, whom the emperor had appointed Chancellor of 
the Left. For his part, Qama hoped to bring about the retire-
ment of Toghon Temiir as emperor, and his replacement by 
the erratic but more energetic Ayushiridara. After a long 
struggle, Ting-chu gained the support of both the emperor 
and the Censorate against Qama; Qama was impeached and 
shortly afterwards flogged to death.2 
In June, 1357, Ting-chu was followed as Chancellor of the 
Right by the Kereid Mongol Chosgem, scion of a distin-
guished ministerial family, who as Censor-in-Chief earlier 
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had led the attack against Qama. Ho Wei-i returned to court 
life, and was appointed Chancellor of the Left. By this time, 
however, the Central Chancellery and the Censorate were 
clearly beginning to split into two equally conservative yet 
irreconcilable alignments. One alignment supported the 
emperor against the ambitions of his son, and for outside 
support attached itself to the warlord Bolod Temiir. The other 
alignment supported Ayushiridara against the ineffectual 
Toghon Temiir, and for outside support looked to the warlord 
Kókó Temiir, the adopted son and after 1362 the successor 
of Chaghan Temiir. 
These tensions eventually forced a rift between Chosgem 
and Ho Wei-i. In 1358 Ho gave no support to the Censorate 
when it impeached Chosgem on the charge that a younger 
brother of one of his concubines was heading a counterfeiting 
ring in the capital.3 When after this impeachment Chosgem 
returned as Chancellor of the Right in 1360, with the support 
of Ayushiridara and Kókó Temiir, Ho Wei-i refused to cooper-
ate. He demonstrated his support for the opposing factional 
alignment, and in so doing helped to exacerbate the split 
that widened further as time went on.4 
In 1363 the Censorate supported its Censor-in-Chief Lao-
ti-sha in a vigorous impeachment of the Chancellor of the 
Right Chosgem. Ayushiridara, however, exercising his power 
of review (ch'i), blocked the memorial of impeachment and 
refused to pass it up to the emperor. The censors vehemently 
protested this act. The Censorate, they insisted, was not 
expressing its private views, it was expressing the public opin-
ion of the whole empire, and that only after having carefully 
examined the case. The censor Ch'en Tsu-jen, a chin-shih 
of 1342, managed to make contact with the emperor and scold 
him for his weakness and his failure to take a strong stand 
in the matter. Ayushiridara, however, won out and dismissed 
all of the opposition censors; Lao-ti-sha, in fear for his life, 
fled to Bolod Temiir s camp in north Shansi for protection. 
A new corps of censors more favorable to the heir apparent 
then impeached Ho Wei-i, charging him with treason and 
other crimes. Ho Wei-i, dismissed, committed suicide.5 
The conflict then escalated. The emperor's faction, crushed 
at court, looked to the outside warlord Bolod Temiir for sup-
port. Since 1362 Bolod Temiir had been engaged in a military 
confrontation with Koko Temiir, who had succeeded to his 
foster-father's command and destroyed the last remaining 
rebels in Shantung. Along a front that stretched about six Epi\ogue: Last 
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the rival armies of Bolod and Koko faced each other. By late Yiian Court 
1363 it was evident that Bolod was losing this match. He 
was successful in the east, but had difficulty in the west, 
and he lost an important battle to Koko at Ki-ning (T'ai-yiian), 
which demoralized his army.6 It was therefore probably 
desperation that prompted Bolod's decision first to threaten 
and then to occupy the capital city of Ta-tu in 1364. However, 
what more immediately provoked Bolod Temiir was 
Ayushiridara's rash and unenforceable order relieving him 
of command in retaliation for the protection he was giving 
to Lao-ti-sha, the fugitive Censor-in-Chief. Bolod decided 
that it was time to impose radical personnel changes in the 
capital. In May, 1364, he marched his army to the gates of 
Ta-tu, but withdrew after receiving the emperor's promise 
to remove and punish Chosgem. In August, when it turned 
out that the promise was not kept, and that Ayushiridara 
was ordering Kciko Temiir to increase his military pressure, 
Bolod Temiir marched into the capital and seized it. He then 
proceeded on his own to root out the opposition faction on 
the emperor's behalf. Ayushiridara fled from the capital to 
Koko Temiir's camp in Ki-ning. Chosgem and others were 
executed. Toghon Temiir's Korean empress was impeached 
by the Censorate for meddling in government, and confined 
to her quarters. In the palace, Bolod ordered that expenses 
be cut, Buddhist ritual suspended, and the eunuchs and Ti-
betan monks thrown out. In the bureaucracy, officials consid-
ered corrupt were executed.7 
Bolod Temiir was made first Chancellor of the Left, then 
Chancellor of the Right. The sources, however, make the 
assertion that, soon after his seizure of the capital, Bolod 
Temiir fell victim to its pleasures, and became swinish and 
lecherous. Militarily, his position in the east was disintegrat-
ing; perhaps Bolod saw the end coming and decided to live 
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his last days to the full. In any event, the party in support 
of Ayushiridara convinced the emperor that Bolod Temiir 
planned treason. An unemployed scholar by the name of Hsü 
Shih-pen was taken into the emperor's confidence and 
Epilogue- Last laid the plans for Bolod's murder. In August, 1365, 
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Yiian Court On August 16, as Bolod Temiir was on his way to present 
a memorial to the emperor, assassins sank an axe into his 
brain. His head was cut off, boxed, and sent to Ayushiridara 
as proof that it was now safe for him to return to the capital.8 
Throughout these vicissitudes, the Yiian court maintained 
an outward Confucian veneer. Except for the year 1357, when 
the capital was under rebel attack, the examinations for the 
chin-shih degree continued to be held as ever. Thirty-five 
candidates were passed in 1360, sixty-two in 1363, and 
seventy-two in 1366.9 While he was in power, Ho Wei-i 
sought throughout the empire, north and south, for worthy 
talents to come to the aid of the dynasty.10 The Censorate, 
besides preparing impeachments, offered hopeful suggestions 
on how to improve the court's military position.11 The court 
was, however, also distracted by other diversions. In 1361 
some of the steppe princes, angry with Toghon Temiir's weak-
ness and helplessness, began a march south to seize the 
throne from him. The court managed to defend itself, and 
put the princes down militarily.12 Early in 1364 it was not 
so fortunate; Ayushiridara sent a military expedition to Korea 
to avenge the king's executions of his mother's clansmen, 
but when this force reached the Yalu, it was routed and put 
to flight by the Korean army.13 Yet the court could still place 
new emphasis upon the necessity to find and appoint good 
local officials; the emperor modestly refused to accept birth-
day congratulations; he blamed himself for the renewed rebel 
troubles, and pledged himself to a strengthened program of 
imperial ritual sacrifices.14 
The elimination of Bolod Temiir in 1365 did not heal the 
terrible divisions in the fast-expiring Yiian Dynasty. Unity 
lasted only the length of time it took Koko Temiir to escort 
Ayushiridara back to the capital, for it soon became apparent 
that the Yiian court and Kókó Temiir were pursuing conflict-
ing strategies. 
Ayushiridara's strategy called for the redirection of all 
efforts toward the reconquest of the Huai and Yangtze regions 
and Szechwan. The emperor agreed with this plan, but 
decided to let Koko Temiir and not Ayushiridara assume over- 151 
all direction of it. Toward the end of November, 1365, Koko 
Temiir was made Prince of Honan, and was permitted to jjays 0f tjie 
establish a branch government of his own. This government, Yüan Court 
which numbered 2,610 men in 1367, was said to have been 
almost as large as the central government itself. The court 
gave Koko permission to formulate his own plans, arrange 
for his own supplies, and appoint and dismiss his men as 
he saw fit. In addition, most of the other semi-independent 
warlords of North China were put under his command.15 
After escorting Ayushiridara back to the capital, Koko 
Temiir refused to support his designs upon the throne. Unlike 
Bolod Temiir, he had no desire to remain in Ta-tu and 
dominate the court. The court officials resented his presence, 
and Koko, bored with court routine and ceremony, preferred 
to be with his troops in the field, where he could, as he 
is supposed to have said, "act without restraint/'16 He was 
thus not unwilling to leave the capital and take up the charge 
the emperor placed upon him. Yet once in the field, he was 
not at all eager to set forth on campaign. His official excuse 
was that he was still in mourning for his foster-father. Appar-
ently, however, his advisers convinced him that any campaign 
upon Chu Yiian-chang in the south would have to be a com-
bined effort involving the Shensi warlord armies of Chang 
Liang-pi, K'ung Hsing, and Torebeg, former followers of 
Bolod Temiir. The emperor had, after all, issued two orders: 
Koko Temiir was to attack the south, but the Shensi warlords 
were to submit to Koko Temiir's authority. Therefore it was 
only reasonable first to put the North China house in order 
and then proceed with the second part of the instructions. 
Koko may have suspected imperial treachery. Did the 
emperor send him off to South China so that his position 
in the North could be undermined? In March, 1366, Koko 
from his headquarters in Huai-ch'ing issued orders for the 
Shensi army of Chang Liang-pi, stationed near Feng-yiian 
(Sian), to move east. The court had clearly given Kókó Temiir 
command over Chang Liang-pi, but it gave him no such 
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authority over Li Ssu-ch'i, Chaghan's old comrade-in-arms, 
who was stationed further west at Feng-hsiang. It appears 
to have been the court's intention that Li Ssu-ch'i should 
remain independent and take charge of the proposed recon-
quest of Szechwan, although it did not order this specifically 
until November, 1366. In any event, Li Ssu-ch'i decided to 
support Chang Liang-pi's decision to disobey Koko Temür, 
and thus laid the foundations for civil war in North China. 
As Koko threateningly moved his forces toward Shensi, the 
four Shensi warlords exchanged hostages among themselves 
and formed a defensive alliance. In February, 1367, the four 
met together and elected Li the alliance president (meng-
chu). Fighting between Koko and the Shensi group broke 
out and continued for over a year.17 
The Yuan court viewed this civil war with dismay, but 
repeated orders to both sides to stop the fighting had no 
effect. In the fall of 1366, however, Koko ordered Mo Kao 
and two other commanders to move into Shantung in order 
to tighten the defenses against Chu Yiian-chang and soothe 
the anxieties of the court. This action, which Kókó announced 
as "the plan for purifying the Huai and Yangtze areas," was 
clearly only perfunctory. The few desultory stabs that Koko's 
lieutenants made in the direction of the south only served 
to provide Chu with pretexts for an attack on the North.18 
In the spring of 1367 Koko reestablished contact with the 
beleaguered loyalist warlords of the China coast; an embassy 
from Chang Shih-ch'eng visited Koko at Huai-ch'ing in a 
desperate attempt to get help in breaking Chu Yiian-chang's 
siege of Soochow, but Koko explained that there was nothing 
he could do.19 
In the summer of 1367 the military fragmentation of North 
China grew worse. It seemed that the more imminent an 
invasion from the south by Chu Yiian-chang became, the less 
the warring northern factions were willing to cooperate to 
hold the line. Kóko Temür had already received a number 
of threatening letters from Chu Yuan-chang, but he either 
considered them bluff or miscalculated the unity and strength 
of Chu's army. Whatever his calculations were, he decided 
to reduce his Shantung defenses for the time being in order 
to throw more men into the war against the Shensi alliance. 
This plan was not entirely reckless, since Chu still had 
the bulk of his forces committed to the siege of Chang Shih-
ch'eng's capital, and probably would not be ready to invade 1 5 3 
North China for some months, at least. But Koko miscalcu-
lated on two different counts: he did not consider the determi- Days oj \ 
nation of the Yiian court to maintain some vestige of control yüan C o 
over the defense of North China, and he misjudged the loy-
alty of Mo Kao, one of the commanders he pulled out of 
Shantung. Both these miscalculations acted in conjunction 
to upset Koko Temiir's plans. 
On August 27 the emperor issued an edict which reduced 
Koko from Prince of Honan to a mere commander, giving 
him orders to invade the Huai region, and rendering illegal 
his plan to attack Shensi. Kókó's over-all command functions 
were taken over by Ayushiridara, who now headed a supreme 
military bureau in the capital. In his edict the emperor made 
it clear that it was Koko's decision to pull Mo Kao's army 
out of Shantung that prompted this retaliatory action.20 
Mo Kao and his men must have been aware of the court's 
action when just before dawn on August 31 they mutinied 
against Koko Temiir. Many of the mutineers were former 
followers of Bolod Temiir. They were content to defend Shan-
tung against Chu Yiian-chang on behalf of the Yiian Dynasty, 
but they refused to act as Koko's private retainers and fight 
the Shensi alliance. They therefore repudiated Koko, elected 
their commander Mo Kao as Koko's replacement, sent the 
court a written impeachment of Koko, and on their own initia-
tive attacked Huai-ch'ing and Chang-te, Koko's main camp-
sites. 
To the court the Mo Kao mutiny was an opportunity to 
move further to break up Koko Temiir's power. The new 
supreme military bureau (Ta fu-chün-yüan) was an emer-
gency extra-constitutional body, with command over military 
operations and local civilian government. One of its first steps 
was to move new forces under the command of the central 
commander Yesii into Shantung, and have him set up a 
branch government there. The court failed, however, in its 
attempt to remove a local militarist by the name of Wang 
Hsin. It was unable to induce him to move out by offering 
him a branch government of his own elsewhere. Further, 
on November 1 the court relieved Koko of all authority what-
1 5 4 ever, on the grounds of his refusal to attack the Huai region. 
He was banished to Ho-nan-fu (but he actually chose not 
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Mo Kao.21 
The court's attempt to provide coordination and unity for 
the defense of the North had less chance of success than 
Kókó Temiir's, for Kókó had greater military power at his 
disposal. The court placed false hopes in the prospects for 
Mo Kao's army; while its mutiny was timely and dramatic, 
it was too small to challenge Kóko Temiir successfully, and 
having no means of supply, it was forced to resort to plunder. 
If the court anticipated cooperation from the Shensi warlords, 
it was disappointed here, too. Li Ssu-ch'i simply ignored the 
court's orders and directives. The court thus found itself in 
the same position that Koko Temiir had found himself in, 
and it took the same path out that it had chastised Koko 
for taking. While the court tried to hold the Shantung line 
as best it could, it went to war on its own dissidents.22 It 
went to war upon Koko Temiir by encouraging his lieutenants 
to desert him. It used these deserters, together with Mo 
Kao's army and the Shensi forces of K'ung Hsing and Tórebeg 
to try to drive Koko out of his vital Shansi supply base. 
In January, 1368, in order to forestall this move, Koko 
begged the court for forgiveness and reinstatement. On the 
advice of the Censorate, the court decided, for the sake of 
the dynasty, to reinstate Koko Temiir with the stipulation 
that he should proceed at once to Shantung to stop the forces 
of the newly announced Ming Dynasty of Chu Yiian-chang, 
who had by this time defeated Chang Shih-ch'eng, and was 
already embarked upon his long-threatened northern expedi-
tion. Koko, however, ignored the stipulation; he was deter-
mined to recover his Shansi base first, and so he marched 
into Ki-ning and murdered the central officials the court had 
posted there. 
With the Ming forces already in Shantung territory, the 
Yiian court decided, on the grounds of this latest outrage, 
to destroy Koko Temiir once and for all. In February, 1368, 
it in effect declared Koko to be a rebel and an outlaw. His 
command of troops and all of his honors and titles were taken 1 5 5 
away; all of the generals, troops, and officials who deserted 
him were promised good treatment by the court. Li Ssu-ch'i E p i l o ^ : Li 
and Chang Liang-pi were ordered to join Mo Kao and make yuln Court 
war upon him. 
Li and Chang, however, may have guessed that it was Chu 
Yiian-chang's intention to march west from Shantung against 
them before turning northward against the Yiian capital. In 
any event, they made contact with Kókó and informed him 
that they did not intend to carry out the court's order. Mo 
Kao and the others, meanwhile, began moving into Shansi. 
Kókó Temiir bided his time until August, 1368, when he 
caught Mo Kao and another general off guard and captured 
them both in a nocturnal surprise-raid. The Yiian court's war 
upon Kókó Temiir thereupon collapsed. 
The psychology of the court at about this time may perhaps 
be discerned in the stories we have, possibly apocryphal, 
that the shade of Chinggis Qan began appearing in dreams. 
According to one such story, Chinggis Qan appeared in the 
dreams of Qarajang, grandson of the one-time Chancellor of 
the Right Arughtu, a descendant of one of Chinggis's "Four 
Heroes." Chinggis's message was: get rid of Ayushiridara. 
During the spring of 1368 the Ming emperor chased Li 
Ssu-ch'i and Chang Liang-pi back into Shensi, and then spent 
the first part of the summer conducting small operations in 
Honan. On August 15, as the grain harvest was coming in, 
the Ming forces finally began their march upon the Yiian 
capital. Meanwhile, the Yiian court, heeding the advice of 
the Censorate, if not of Chinggis Qan, reversed itself once 
again and ended its policy of opposition to Kókó Temiir. On 
August 14 Kókó was given permission to execute Mo Kao. 
On September 1, with the Ming army within 200 miles of 
the Yiian capital, the court abolished the supreme military 
bureau (Ta fu-chii-yiian), executing all of the chief officials, 
and reprimanding its head, Ayushiridara. 
Court policy had come full circle since it first gave Kókó 
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Temiir supreme command, three years before. But it was 
now too late to save the dynasty. On September 10 the 
emperor and part of the central government fled the capital 
for Mongolia. Not long afterward, Koko retreated to the far 
west.23 
Summary and Conclusion 
Later Yiian political history may he con-
veniently said to have begun with the restoration of 1328-29. 
After the date, one is safe in assuming that Yiian history is 
Chinese history. Before that date, one is never so sure. Before 
the restoration, it was not entirely impossible that the 
emperors of the Yiian Dynasty might still under certain cir-
cumstances act as qaghans of the Mongol world empire. It 
was still not out of the question that an emperor in China 
might owe his throne to Mongol support from outside. Not 
until the assassination of Qoshila in the summer of 1329 was 
it finally made clear that the Yiian Dynasty in China- had 
become a self-enclosed political entity, impermeable to force 
or pressure from outside its defined borders. When Qoshila 
was murdered, the last trace of political pan-Mongolism was 
destroyed and the political powerlessness of the Mongolian 
homeland confirmed. Issues of a purely Mongolian nature, 
unrelated to the problems of China, no longer existed to per-
mit the Yiian emperors to function simultaneously as Mongol 
qaghans. In these circumstances, the conquerors in China 
fell captive to the forces of Chinese history, inasmuch as the 
leading problems of the realm were now entirely domestic 
Chinese problems. 
The leaders of the restoration erased from political influ-
ence the last remnants of the financial cliques that had con-
trolled the Yiian bureaucracy with few interruptions since 
early in Qubilai's reign, about seventy years before. The 
leaders permitted the Confucian movement to emerge from 
minority opposition status to a position of recognized domi-
nance in the bureaucracy. After 1328 it would no longer be 
possible for the Yiian emperors to play Confucians and anti-
Confucians against each other, as the emperors from Qubilai 
down to Yesün Temür had done. In addition, because it was 
not an emperor that sponsored the Confucian triumph, but 
rather the leaders of the restoration clique, the Yuan 
158 monarchy suffered a great decline in its power as a functioning 
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ancl full leverage over the bureaucracy again. 
Conclusion In view of the final secession of the Yiian Dynasty from 
the Mongol empire, the restoration political orden was yet 
in some ways internally anachronistic. The leaders of the 
restoration had but weak links with the Confucian movement 
in the bureaucracy; El Temiir and Bayan were not themselves 
Confucian, nor were they Confucian spokesmen. The only 
tie that bound the restoration leaders together was their com-
mon service as young guardsmen under Prince Qaishan dur-
ing the final steppe campaigns against Qaidu. When they 
installed Qaishan's son Tugh Temiir as emperor after the coup 
d'etat of September, 1328, they installed not an emperor who 
was expected to function politically as such, but a figure who 
symbolized their personal association. The restoration order 
looked back to Qaishan, rather than Qubilai, as its justifying 
founding father; but it looked upon Qaishan less as an 
emperor than as an imperial prince and leader of the steppe 
wars in which the men of the restoration had been involved. 
Consequently, the restoration did not at all imply a revival 
of Qaishan's policies as emperor; rather it implied a revival 
of Qaishan himself in the person of his son. This state of 
affairs was anachronistic in that it did not precisely conform 
to current Confucian ideas as to the proper relationship 
between a sovereign and his ministers, but recalled more 
the old Mongol ties between the tribal or clan chief (qan) 
and his companions (riók'ód). 
The restoration order of 1328 permitted the eclipse of the 
monarchy as a ruling institution because Tugh Temiir's con-
stitutional prerogatives as emperor were overridden by his 
concrete function as a tangible symbol of his father and a 
rallying point for the clique. From this it followed that per-
sonal ties and personal loyalty should be the indispensable 
prerequisites for holding high bureaucratic office. These pre-
requisites the Censorate honored and upheld in numerous 
impeachments during Tugh Temiir's reign. 
The keystone of the entire restoration order was Tugh 
Temiir. With his death in 1332 that keystone was removed 
and the restoration order collapsed. Bayan allied with the 
Qunggirad consort clan to outmaneuver and finally destroy 1 5 9 
El Temiir's Qipchaqs and give the throne over to Qoshila's 
sons. Between them, Bayan and the Qunggirad Grand 
Empress Dowager managed to keep the monarchy in an Conclusion 
institutional limbo down to 1340. The paternity of the young 
emperor Toghon Temiir, officially declared to be spurious 
while Tugh Temiir was alive, remained officially in doubt 
until Bayan's overthrow in 1340. Thus the institutional debil-
ity of the monarchy continued after Tugh Temiir's death, but 
with the important difference that the original justification 
for that debility no longer applied. The meritorious and 
unique personal associations that justified the restoration 
order of 1328 were entirely destroyed by Bayan in his rise 
to political supremacy after 1332. For Bayan, the figure of 
Toghon Temiir did not serve as any kind of symbol. He was 
not an irreplaceable individual, for Bayan kept his cousin, 
Tugh Temiir's son, in reserve as his likely successor. 
Bayan's revival of the political figure of Qubilai in 1335 
was as clear a sign as any that the intensely personal basis 
of the restoration order had disintegrated, and that Qaishan 
was no longer of use as a symbol. Even more, Bayan's appeal 
to Qubilai was to Qubilai not as a person, but as the founder 
of the dynasty in a purely political and constitutional sense. 
Bayan needed Qubilai as the authoritative source for the 
orthodoxy of his attempt to show that the Confucian triumph 
of 1328 was only temporary, and that under his patronage 
an anti-Confucian coalition could be restored as an alternative 
factional group in the bureaucracy. Bayan's real and original 
aim was not to extirpate Confucianism root and branch, but 
simply to restore at Confucian expense the two-clique system 
that had existed in the bureaucracy from Qubilai's time until 
1328. The plan was a reasonable one; no chancellor desired 
to work with a monolithic Confucian bureaucracy, especially 
when he himself was not its patron or spokesman. 
The Confucian bureaucrats, however, interpreted Bayan's 
maneuvers as something positively sinister, a malevolent 
attempt to destroy Confucianism altogether. Bayan's appeal 
to Qubilai as his authority for abolishing the Confucian exami-
nation system appeared to have a false ring. The resemblance 
between Bayan's overt act of abolition and the fact that no 
1 6 0 examinations had been held under Qubilai was only casual. 
Summary ®ayan s opponents could easily argue that Qubilai always had 
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Conclusion the matter was never carried out, the system itself was already 
established. '71 Qubilai had paid sufficient court to Confucian-
ism in his long reign to render dubious any authority-seeking 
appeal to him as an anti-Confucian. The legacy of Qubilai 
was a broad one; Bayan seemed to be reviving only parts 
of it, and misinterpreting those.2 
Had Bayan not been completely alienated from the Confu-
cian movement, he might possibly have seen that it was really 
no monolith at all, but was potentially divisible into antagonis-
tic parts. He chose, however, to see it as a monolith that 
needed balancing off by the creation of a non-Confucian align-
ment within the bureaucracy. But Bayan miscalculated the 
very strong commitment among the Mongol and se-mu con-
querors to the Confucian movement, and he was unprepared 
for their vehement protest against his desire to limit and con-
tain it. Only when this happened did Bayan, in a desperate 
defensive measure, make an attempt to equate Confucianism 
with Chinese nationality, and appeal to the racial solidarity 
of the Mongols and se-mu as conquerors. This step was defen-
sive, and it was also deeply subversive of the entire founda-
tions of the Yiian conquest order. The Yiian system worked 
precisely because the major bureaucratic factional alignments 
were supranational in character. Were the ethnic classes to 
freeze into closed factional groups, and the bureaucracy 
engage in open ethnic or racial strife, then the whole system 
would cease to function together as a bureaucracy. One of 
the main purposes of the ethnic class system was to reserve 
certain official positions at all ranks in the bureaucracy for 
the Mongols and se-mu as their right by conquest. What made 
cooperation among the ethnic groups within the bureaucracy 
possible was that the factions were organized primarily on 
ideological, not ethnic lines. 
The strength of the Confucian movement did not derive 
solely from its function as a supranational unifying device 
within the bureaucracy. The financial cliques had, after all, 
been equally supranational in their membership. There were 
certain extra features in the Confucian movement that served 161 
to make it widely attractive. For example, it provided a new 
set of recognized relationships and channels of contact Sw™nanJ 
between the monarchy and the higher bureaucracy. After Conclusio 
Qaishan, the Yiian emperors were no longer martial figures; 
and after the passing of Tugh Temiir and the restoration 
order, the higher bureaucrats could no longer openly 
approach, or dominate, the monarch in the guise of compan-
ions (nókócl) rallying around a symbolic qan. Confucian 
institutions provided new means of approach which were 
unimpeachably correct in their ostensible purpose. As the 
Uighur Confucian Nao-nao explained it, Confucians had three 
regular means of bringing their demands to the ruler's notice. 
These were through the Central Chancellery itself; failing 
that, the Censorate; and as a last resort, recourse could be 
had to the "Classics Mat," private ideological sessions with 
the emperor during which matters of confidence could be 
brought to his attention.3 
The Confucian examination system, moreover, performed 
a vitally significant political and sociological role within the 
Mongol and se-mu conquest group. The system of ethnic pref-
erence provided the conquerors with a grossly disproportion-
ate advantage over the Chinese in access to the examination 
route to bureaucratic office. While the Mongols and se-mu 
combined constituted only about 3 percent of all registered 
households in China, they had a combined legal claim to 
50 percent of the total quota for all degrees. The degree-
takers were largely Mongols and se-mu from various provin-
cial garrisons scattered all over China, who had no other ready 
means of scaling the social and bureaucratic ladder except 
through success in the examinations. Without the examina-
tions, it would have been difficult for the court to ensure 
the commitment of these conquest provincials to the idea 
of a centralized Yiian state. With so many of them intermarry-
ing with the local Chinese gentry, it was not unthinkable 
that they might at some point divorce their interests from 
the court entirely. As Toghtos mentor Wu Chih-fang advised 
him: "When the examination system is in operation, not 
^ everyone will he ensured an official post and salary. But even 
so, it is by means of this that families will have students, 
Summary anc^ when everyone studies, naturally no one will dare to 
and do wrong things. This has an important bearing upon the 
Conclusion process of orderly rule/ 4 
This was one crucial arrangement that Bayan's anti-
Confucian measures disrupted. The threat of a movement 
for regional autonomy led by provincial Mongols and se-mu 
did not materialize until after Toghto s removal in 1355; yet 
the rise of such figures as Dash Badulugh and Chaghan Temür 
at that time perhaps showed that such a movement could 
have come into being earlier under the right circumstances. 
After Bayan's overthrow in 1340 Confucianism came into 
its own as the dominant ideological force, not simply in the 
lower bureaucracy, but in political life on higher levels. The 
emperor was committed to it, the chancellors were spokes-
men for it, and political discourse on all sides was articulated 
in Confucian language. In 1340 the Confucian movement 
went beyond its gains of 1328 to enroll the highest ministers 
of state, the real wielders of power, in its ranks. Confucian 
ideology and political power finally merged. Yet once again, 
as in 1328, the monarchy was only tangentially involved in 
a major Confucian political breakthrough. Once again the real 
management and guidance of a Confucian forward step was 
undertaken at the ministerial level. The Confucian movement 
was not in debt to the monarchy for the political gains it 
made; rather, its fortunes were tied to the occupant of the 
office of Chancellor of the Right. 
It is true that Toghto's coup against Bayan in 1340 liberated 
the monarchy from complete captivity. From 1340 it was 
understood that the emperor had the power to appoint and 
dismiss chancellors and their administrations. But this was 
a device of last resort, not a power that the emperor used 
every day. The emperor himself did not control the bureau-
cratic forces that now and then pressured him to exercise 
his prerogative of appointment and dismissal. 
When the victorious Confucian ranks split into reform and 
conservative wings soon after 1340, the question of bureau-
cratic control became a particularly uncertain one. Bureau-
cratic leadership appeared to shift at approximately five-year 
intervals. From 1340 to 1344 Toghto as reform leader control-
led the bureaucracy. From 1344 to 1349 the bureaucracy 
came under the control of Berke Buqa, Dorji, and Ho Wei-i 
and the conservative wing. In 1349, with popular disturb-
ances and natural disasters getting out of hand, Toghto over-
threw the conservative leadership and returned to power as 
Chancellor of the Right. Finally in 1355, in an especially vio-
lent swing of the political pendulum, the conservative opposi-
tion overthrew Toghto, and wrecked the political foundations 
of the state in so doing. The only part the emperor had in 
all of this was to legalize the overturn of bureaucratic adminis-
trations through the issuing of edicts. The monarchy had few 
defenses against the violent processes of partisan Confucian 
politics that ended in tearing the Yiian Dynasty to pieces. 
Considered as a factional movement, reform Confucianism 
in late Yiian China possessed an awareness of itself as a special 
group with specific policy objectives that it had defined and 
desired to implement. The members were conscious of a need 
to maintain internal discipline as an indispensable precondi-
tion for the realization of their aims. Within the group, power 
tended to concentrate itself in the hands of the leader, the 
Chancellor of the Right Toghto, supreme patron and protec-
tor of his factional adherents, chief sponsor of the group's 
programs, and omnipotent coordinator of all governmental 
activity. Although the process of policy formulation did 
encourage the free upward flow of ideas and proposals and 
the open debate of alternatives at court, once policy was 
decided and defined the group closed ranks and maintained 
an intolerant attitude toward outside criticism of policies or 
personnel. In return for its obedience and in recompense 
for its submission to the reform wing, the bureaucracy as 
a whole was generously funded, turned loose upon society, 
and given ample opportunity to occupy itself with the 





The Yellow River rechanneling was one typical product of 
this approach. Reform Confucianism as a factional movement 
appears to have been in some respects well-suited to the 
highly centralized official organization of the Yiian state, a 
Summary s t r u c t u r a l legacy bequeathed by Qubilai. 
ancj Conservative Confucianism in the late Yiian period had 
Conclusion a. much looser organization. It conceded a large measure of 
autonomy to such formal bureaucratic agencies as the Cen-
sorate and the provincial governments, and showed a strong 
predilection for adversary relationships within the formal 
bureaucratic order. Whereas the reformists' desire for 
definite and tangible material accomplishments demanded 
the precise definition of a series of policy goals and relied 
heavily upon factional loyalty and organizational discipline 
for their implementation, the conservative tendency aimed 
at the less definite, more diffuse goal of over-all harmony 
between state and society—a catch-all objective with no par-
ticular beginning, no precise ingredients, and no real 
end—and therefore did not demand tight factional organiza-
tion for its implementation. In fact, the conservatives con-
sciously rejected the whole idea of factional organization. 
They pictured themselves organizationally not as a faction 
(tang), but as a "flock" (ch'iin).5 Their general goal of societal 
harmony, unlike the various specific goals of the reformists, 
stood above factional considerations and, being entirely 
immune to attack, needed no organized partisan defense. As 
a "flock," the conservatives considered themselves individu-
ally distinct yet ultimately held together by spontaneous ties 
arising from individual moral exertion and commonly held 
patterns of thought, not by coercive discipline or the material 
bonds of profit and self-interest. The smooth working relation-
ship between the chancellors Dorji and Ho Wei-i seems to 
exemplify this form of voluntary cooperation at its most effec-
tive. 
Yet the conservatives' leading ideal of harmony tended at 
times to lose itself in impassioned controversy at the higher 
levels of government and in embarrassing compromise at the 
lower. These dysfunctions were related to the conservatives' 
preferred mode of rule, one in which power in the hands 
of high bureaucrats above was regulated, even challenged, 
by the uninterrupted flow of pressure and opinion from 
below. 
At the local level, where official goals and priorities im-
pinged most directly upon the life and activities of society, 
the contrasting ruling styles of the reformists and conserva- Conclusio 
tives tended to produce different symptoms of dysfunction, 
and each side used these as political ammunition against the 
other. The predetermined policy activism of the reformists 
seems in some cases to have aroused social opposition at the 
local level, which the reformists themselves, bound to their 
own internal discipline, could not always easily remedy. In 
this connection the conservatives consistently used against 
the reformists the argument that their various plans and pro-
jects were not only disruptive of the social order, but, in 
a much more positive and menacing sense, were outright 
provocations to social rebellion. For their own part, the con-
servatives were generally reluctant to undertake anything 
without first consulting the local gentry and obtaining their 
advice and consent, for only in that way could they get the 
gentry to cooperate in the business of applying suasion (chiao-
hua) and other deterrents to the perennially base drives and 
disorderly proclivities of the common population, and thus 
forestall what they saw as the ever-present likelihood of social 
explosion. As the conservatives saw it, the manpower require-
ments and other disruptions and impositions demanded by 
the innovating reform programs tended to frustrate and sub-
vert the existing bonds of authority in local society to the 
extent that the local officials and gentry became unable, or 
unwilling, to impose deterrents upon the generally wavering 
and riot-prone population. A breakdown in dialogue between 
state and society, such as the reformist tendency threatened, 
surely prefigured social disaster. This is why the Tangut Con-
fucian Yii Ch ueh, for example, as a magistrate felt strongly 
that the empire was a matter of concern to more than just 
its rulers, that its fortunes affected everyone's lives, and con-
sequently its integrity and well-being depended upon 
whether the views of a concerned (gentry and local official) 
public could be made known to the rulers on an unrestricted 
basis.6 
166 In practice, however, the conservatives' concern for the 
responsiveness of government to local opinion did not always 
Summary c 
ancj produce harmonious results. The enectiveness ol the inves-
Conclusion tigating commission of 1345 was seriously compromised in 
some areas by gentry ridicule of the personal venality of some 
of the commissioners, and, moreover, the government did 
not have the will or the power to enforce many of the indict-
ments that the commissioners made. Even worse, the whole 
logic of the conservative argument broke down in hopeless 
self-contradiction when the Berke Buqa administration 
decided in the face of gentry pressure not to set up a key 
naval commandery to check a mounting condition of coastal 
piracy that endangered both the dynasty's food supply and 
the local social order. Toghto made political capital of this 
impasse at the time of his return to power in 1349. 
At another level, within the central government itself, the 
preferred working style of the conservatives again had a ten-
dency to produce markedly discordant notes which disfigured 
and at times even drowned out the guiding theme of har-
mony. At the central level the high value the conservatives 
placed upon the unhindered expression of opinion invariably 
led them, when they were able, to unmuzzle the Censorate, 
the opinion-expressing organ par excellence, and after 1340 
a pivotal element in the overthrow of ruling administrations. 
The Censorate as an organ usually generated strong institu-
tional loyalties among its personnel, often its lower personnel, 
and in this connection was most audibly responsible for the 
production of discordant notes. If the conservatives had a 
poor sense of themselves as a party or faction, the conserva-
tives who were appointed Censors had an exceptionally keen 
group sense of themselves as holders of a unique office with 
a sacrosanct adversary role to play within the formal organiza-
tional structure of the state. The Censors periodically refused 
to submit either to a partisan political line or to the dominant 
ministerial personalities, and were apt to attack anyone, re-
formist or conservative, against whom they found charges or 
grievances to press. In doing this, however, the Censorate 
had to walk a very thin line—between fulfilling a due need 
for courageously impartial criticism and impeachment, but 
without going so far in this direction as to forfeit the basic 
political order and jeopardize the public tranquillity. As it 
turned out, the Censorate in the end proved deaf to the guid-
ing theme of harmony, and sacrificed the entire societal order 
to the assertion of its institutional prerogatives. When it 
impeached Toghto late in 1354, the Censorate openly crossed 
the thin line and as an institution took a prominent share 
in the responsibility for the collapse of government and the 
renewed rebel activity that resulted from its act. Thereafter, 
the Censorate continued to devote itself to providing criticism 
and formulating impeachments, thereby helping to destroy 
what little public order was left. 
Nevertheless, by 1355 it hardly mattered what the Cen-
sorate did, for by then the Yiian Dynasty was unsalvageable 
anyway. The failure of the Yiian expeditionary force under 
Toghto at Kao-yu had a fatally demoralizing effect upon the 
army, which was deprived of almost certain victory and its 
consequent due rewards. The commanders who succeeded 
to the various parts of this demoralized central army could 
neither make them fight nor prevent their plunder of the 
countryside. The Censorate knew very well that the new 
independent regional armies of Chaghan Temiir and Dash 
Badulugh were the only sure lines of defense against the 
revived and reorganized rebel movements, and it also 
realized how much reports of their anti-rebel victories did 
to lift sagging morale in the capital. Consequently, the Cen-
sorate bent over backwards to overlook their occasional 
failures and to ignore the menace to central power that their 
growing regional machines posed, and instead spent its moral 
capital upon the impeachment of unsuccessful central com-
manders and unpopular or ineffectual chancellors, thus help-
ing to keep the expiring central government in continual 
upheaval. Yet, thanks in large part to the efforts of the Cen-
sorate, the Yiian Dynasty withered and shrank in Confucian 
style and down to the very end made no overt retreat from 





newly declared Ming Dynasty of the ex-rebel Chu Yiian-
chang forced the Yiian court back to the grasslands 
whence it had originated, it departed still wearing a recogniz-
1 6 8 ably Confucian face. 
Summary w o u l c l b e a § r o s s overstatement to say that extremist 
and Confucian politics alone had 4 caused" the collapse of the Yiian 
Conclusion Dynasty, unless one is prepared to admit basic importance 
to the mere operations of government, with all of its inherent 
superficialities and limitations. Yet it is evident that, within 
the orb of government, one can trace through the late Yiian 
period a steadily narrowing scope of political choice and ma-
neuver that made a decisive response to crises and emer-
gencies ever more difficult to engineer. As the conquest 
establishment in Yiian China, represented by such men as 
El Temiir, forced the Yiian emperor to dissociate himself 
entirely from the Qaghanate and give up his prerogatives 
as qaghan, the monarchy lost all vestige of an important mar-
gin of leverage over China that it had held hitherto. The 
Yiian monarchy, once it fell captive to the conquest establish-
ment in China, could no longer override the preferences of 
that establishment by using against it the larger Mongol 
empire, the preserve of the princes and qans who were the 
blood descendants of Chinggis. The conquest establishment, 
having bound the monarchy to itself and its own particular 
interests in China, then came to find in turn that it could 
no longer assume an air of unconcerned detachment toward 
the country it occupied. Despite the reluctance shown by 
Bayan, the establishment was obliged to climb down from 
its eminence and fully involve itself on either side of a Confu-
cian argument that originally had nothing to do with the con-
quest, but was purely a product of Chinese history. This 
involvement came at a price, and the price was a painful 
circumscription of the conquest establishment's freedom of 
political choice in China. Once involved in the Confucian 
argument, the establishment had no way of transcending it. 
Faced with crisis, it could not grope back into the past and 
find there some ancient ledge of solidarity upon which to 
cling in safety, while the riot and the controversy swirled 
harmlessly by. It could no longer act as an establishment; 
neither could it act together as a Confucian establishment, 
for in adopting Confucianism the conquerors, following their 
Chinese mentors and teachers, had to swallow the violently 
irreconcilable divisions that lay within it. When the conquest 
establishment began to fall into divergent Confucian patterns 
of behavior and act contrary to its own best interests, the 
monarchy was already too limited and dependent an institu-
tion to rescue it, and could only go down with it. In a crisis, 
the monarchy could not choose between a Confucianized 
establishment and some other group; it could only choose 
one of two Confucianized extremes. The Yiian Dynasty finally 
collapsed exhausted from its playing too many antagonistic 
historical parts written in China: monarch against official, 
reformist official against conservative, central official against 
regionalist. 
The new political movement that in 1368 became the Ming 
Dynasty began to take shape in 1355, just after Toghto's dis-
missal demonstrated in a most dramatic way the Yiian Dynas-
ty's capacity for self-destruction. The Ming founders, Chu 
Yiian-chang and his gentry adherents, read the lessons of the 
late Yiian political experience very closely and, in resuming 
the thread of Confucian history, avoided both the institutional 
anarchism of the Yiian conservatives and the programmatic 
cliquism of the Yiian reformists. By annulling the Confucian 
argument, and by increasing enormously the power of the 
monarchy, they were able to resolve for their own generation 
many of the theoretical dilemmas and practical impasses that 







AM.DNADARA (d. 1332), eldest son of Tugh Temiir. He was 
Tiigh Temiir's heir apparent until his death in February, 
1332. 
ARA.DNASHIRI, Mongol prince, descendant of Qubilai 
through his eighth son A urughchi. Aradnashiri held various 
princely fiefs in Shensi and was an important supporter of 
the restoration of 1328. He later coordinated the anti-rebel 
defense of Shensi until Chaghan Temiir displaced him in 
1358. 
ARUGHTU, Mongol of the Arulad tribe. He held the posi-
tion of Chancellor of the Right from Toghto's resignation in 
L344 until Berke Buqa replaced him in 1347. 
AYURBARWADA (d. 1320), Yiian emperor, younger son o f 
prince Darmabala, who was the second son of Qubilai's one-
time heir apparent Jingim. As the "Chinese" candidate in 
L307, he was made heir apparent to his elder brother Qaishan. 
He succeeded Qaishan and reigned 1311-20. He reinstituted 
the Confucian examination system in 1315. 
AYUSHIRIDARA (d. 1378), son of Toghon Temiir by his 
Korean empress Oljei Qudu, nee Ki. He was invested as heir 
apparent in 1355, and became Mongol ruler in the steppes 
upon his father's death in 1370. 
BAYAN (d. 1340), Mongol of the Merkid tribe. He was a 
junior aide to Prince Qaishan during the final phases of the 
anti-Qaidu wars. He was a leader of the restoration of 1328, 
and an anti-Confucian chancellor from 1335 to 1340. 
BEBKE BUQA (d. 1350), Mongol of the Eljigid tribe. His 
Esther Aqutai, Chancellor of the Left during Temiir's reign, 
was executed in 1307 for his support of the imperial candidacy 
of Ananda. Berke Buqa was Chancellor of the Right for a few 
months in 1347, but remained an important leader of the 
conservative opposition to Toghto until 1349. 
BOXOD TEMÜR (murdered 1365), a son of Dash Badulugh. 
As the commander of an autonomous regional machine in 
north China after 1358, he was a rival of both Chaghan 
Temiir and later Koko Temiir. 
BUDASHIRI (exiled 1340), Mongol of the Qunggirad tribe, 
Tugh Temiir's empress, and mother of Aradnadara and El 
Tegiis. She was the ally and supporter of Bayan from 1332 
172 until 1340. 
CHAGHAN TEMÜR (assassinated 1361), a Turk of the Nai-
Biographical m a n tribe, from a landholding family settled in Honan prov-
Notes ince- After the dismissal of Toghto in 1355, he was the first 
to create an autonomous regional organization in north China. 
CHANG SHIH-CH'ENG (executed 1367), salt-smuggler and anti-
Yiian rebel leader. Chang was saved from almost certain an-
nihilation when Toghto \s siege of his stronghold at Kao-yu 
collapsed in January, 1355. Chang later migrated to the 
Yangtze Delta area, and as a regional warlord professed 
nominal loyalty to the Yiian until his defeat by the Ming 
founder Chu Yiian-chang in 1367. 
CH'I-T'AI-P'U-CHI (d. 1313), a Tangut. He was a commander and 
adviser to Prince Qaishan during the anti-Qaidu wars. He 
was made Chancellor of the Right upon Qaishan's enthrone-
ment, and received the princely fief of An-chi, which was 
later canceled. Yeh-erh-chi-ni and Li-jih were his sons. 
•CHONG'UR (d. 1322), a son of Tughtugha. He was a com-
mander and senior aide to Prince Qaishan in the wars against 
Qaidu. He received the princely fief of Chii-jung in 1309. El 
Temür was his son. 
CHOSGEM (executed 1364), Mongol of the Kereid tribe. He 
served as a Chief Administrator during Toghto's second ad-
ministration. As Censor-in-Chief after Toghto's dismissal, he 
led a successful censorial attack upon Qama, and became 
Chancellor of the Right in 1357. He was executed by Bolod 
Temiir at the time of his occupation of the capital. 
CHU YÜAN-CHANG (d. 1398), anti-Yiian rebel leader, and founder 
of the Ming Dynasty in 1368. 
DASH BADULUGH (d. 1358), Mongol o f the Salji'ud tribe. He 
led successful anti-rebel campaigns in the Han River area in 
1352-53, but achieved indifferent results against the Sung 
rebels in north China after 1355. His son Bolod Temiir in-
herited his campaign forces, and used them to build a re-
gional machine. 
DAULA-SHAH (executed 1328), a Moslem. He was Chancellor of 
the Right under Yesiin Temiir and his heir Aragibag, and 
surrendered to El Temiir's restoration forces in November, 
1328. 
DORJI, Mongol of the Jalair tribe, and a learned Neo-Confiician 
scholar. He succeeded to the Jalair viceroyship in 1328, but 
was removed by Bayan in 1338. Later, as Chancellor of the 
Left of Honan province, he protested Bayan's handling of the 
Fan Meng case. As a conservative, he served as Chancellor of 
the Right in the central government from 1348 to 1349. 
DORJIBAL, also a Jalair, and a Neo-Confucian scholar. He led an 
unsuccessful censorial attack upon the Berke Buqa govern- 173 
ment in 1349; and in 1352, as chief of the Shensi Branch Cen-
sorate, he attempted to impeach Toghto's younger brother Biographical 
Esen Temiir for his military failure against the Red Turbans. ^jotes 
Dorjibal was an active organizer and coordinator of the anti-
rebel effort. He died in south China sometime after 1355. 
EL TEGÜS (murdered 1340), second son of Tugh Temiir. He was 
twice bypassed for the succession in favor of Qoshila's sons, 
but was heir apparent to Toghon Temiir during Bayan's 
administration. 
EL TEMÜR (d. ca. 1334), Qipchaq Turk, and son of *Chong'ur. 
During the anti-Qaidu wars, he served as a junior aide to 
Qaishan. He led the restoration of 1328, and served as Chan-
cellor of the Right throughout the reign of Tugh Temiir 
(1328-32). 
ESEN TEMÜR, younger brother of Toghto, and his Censor-in-
Chief. His forces were routed by Red Turban rebels in 1352. 
He was exiled at the time of Toghto's dismissal in 1355. 
FANG KUO-CHEN (d. 1374), a Chinese pirate from Huang-yen on 
the Chekiang (Kiangche) coast. He achieved a position of 
strength at sea in 1348, and used his power over the maritime 
grain shipments to blackmail the Yiian court. By 1356 he 
also established himself on the mainland. He remained nomi-
nally loyal to the Yiian until his surrender to Chu Yüan-
chang in 1367. 
HO WEI-I (suicide, 1363). Northern Chinese, adopted into the 
Mongol nation with the name T'ai-p'ing in 1345. He served 
as Dorji's Chancellor of the Left, 1348-49. He returned to 
official life in 1355, and became Chancellor of the Left again 
in 1357. 
IRINJIBAL (d. 1332), Yiian emperor, younger son of Qoshila. He 
died in childhood after a reign of two months. 
IRINJINBAL (d. 1354), a Tangut. He was an opponent of Bayan's; 
later as Censor-in-Chief, he tried unsuccessfully to impeach 
the conservative government of Berke Buqa. He afterwards 
commanded the anti-rebel effort in Kiangsi province in south 
China. 
KÓKÓ T E M Ü R (d. 1375), Chinese, adopted son of Chaghan 
Temiir. He succeeded to the command of Chaghan's regional 
machine in 1361. After the expulsion of the Yiian Dynasty 
from China in 1368, he commanded steppe armies in Mon-
golia. 
LI SSU-CH'I (d. 1374). As a friend and ally of Chaghan Temiir's, 
Li became a semi-independent warlord in Shensi province. 
In 1369 he surrendered himself to the Ming Dynasty. 
LI-JIH (d. ca. 1316), a Tangut, and son of Ch'i-t'ai-p'u-chi. Dur-
174 ing the struggle against Qaidu, he was a commander to 
Qaishan, and was made Censor-in-Chief upon Qaishan's en-
Biographical thronement. He supported Qoshila's rebellion in Shensi in 
Notes 
MAJARTAI, brother of Bayan and father of Toghto. A patron of 
aspiring Confucians, Majartai briefly held the position of 
Chancellor of the Right after Bayan's overthrow in 1340. 
NARIN, a Tangut. As Censor-in-Chief, he attempted an impeach-
ment of the Berke Buqa government in 1349. As Censor-in-
Chief of the Kiangnan Branch Censorate, he was responsible 
for coordinating anti-rebel efforts in south China after 1352. 
QAIDU (d. 1301). Grandson of the qaghan Ógódei (r. 1229-41), 
Qaidu rebuilt the Ógódei patrimony in Central Asia, and in 
alliance with Duwa of the Chaghatai house he directed a 
powerful Central Asian opposition movement against Qubilai 
and Temiir in Yiian China. Qaidu's son Chapar and his de-
scendants were later granted a princely fief in China, where 
they came to settle. Qaidu's great-grandson Hula'atai sup-
ported the loyalist side during the restoration of 1328. 
QAISHAN (d. 1311), Yiian emperor, elder son of Prince Darma-
bala and elder brother of Ayurbarwada. As the "steppe" 
candidate in 1307, he succeeded Temiir and reigned 1307-11. 
The restoration of 1328 was carried out in his name. 
QAMA, a Turk of the Qangli tribe. A one-time partisan of 
Toghto's, he engineered his dismissal in 1355. He was later 
executed. 
QANGLI TOGHTO (d. 1327), a Turk of the Qangli tribe, popularly 
called "Qangli" Toghto in order to distinguish him from many 
other individuals with the same name. He was a junior aide 
to Qaishan during the anti-Qaidu campaigns, and was ap-
pointed to various high offices during Qaishan's reign as 
emperor. Later he became a Confucian patron and leader of 
the opposition group of former Qaishan bureaucrats. Many 
of his nine sons achieved high positions; the conservative 
Confucian Temiir Tash, for one, was Chancellor of the Left 
from 1345 until his death in 1347. 
QOSHILA (assassinated 1329), Yiian emperor, and "steppe" 
candidate during the restoration of 1328. He was Qaishan's 
elder son. He reigned in Mongolia for a few months in 1329. 
His sons Irinjibal and Toghon Temiir later became em-
perors. 
QUBILAI (d. 1294), ruled 1260 to 1294, formally founded the 
Yiian Dynasty in 1271. All of the succeeding Yiian em-
perors were descendants of Qubilai through his second son 
Jingim (d. 1285), whom Qubilai had made heir apparent. 
SHIDEBALA (assassinated 1323), Yiian emperor, son and suc-
cessor of Ayurbarwada, reigned 1320-23. His attempt to shift 175 
his support from the Temiider clique to the Confucianists 
was ultimately responsible for his assassination. Biogrt 
*TANGKISH (killed 1335), son of El Temiir s brother Sadun. Notes 
Bayan defeated and killed him along with the rest of El 
Temiir's family at the time of his rise to power in 1335. 
TEMÜR (d. 1307), Yiian emperor, grandson and successor of 
Qubilai. Temiir was Jingim's youngest son; Kammala (father 
of Yesiin Temiir) and Darmabala (father of Qaishan and 
Ayurbarwada) were his older brothers. Temiir ruled 1294-
1307. His only son predeceased him. 
TEMÜR BUQA (executed ca. 1335), Uighur Turk, and nominal 
ruler of the Uighur kingdom of Central Asia. Most of Temiir 
Buqa's career, however, was spent in bureaucratic service in 
China. He was one of the leaders of the restoration of 1328, 
and was executed by Bayan. 
TING-CHU, a Turk of the Qangli tribe. He served in the Central 
Chancellery under both Bayan and Toghto, and became 
Chancellor of the Right after Toghto's dismissal. 
TOGHON T E M Ü R (d. 1370), last Yiian emperor in China, eldest 
son of Qoshila. He ruled in China from 1333 to 1368. 
TOGHTO (poisoned 1356), a Mongol of the Merkid tribe, son of 
Majartai, and nephew of Bayan. He led the overthrow of 
Bayan in 1340, and served as reformist Chancellor of the 
Right in two incumbencies, 1340-44 and 1349-55. His dis-
missal in January, 1355, precipitated the collapse of Yiian 
central authority. 
TUGH T E M Ü R (d. 1332), Yiian emperor, and figurehead leader 
of the restoration forces of 1328. He was Qaishan's younger 
son, and was in part responsible for the assassination of his 
elder brother Qoshila in 1329. He reigned 1328-32 under the 
guidance of El Temiir. 
TUGHTUGHA (d. 1297), a Turk of the Qipchaq tribe, and 
builder of the Qipchaq inheritance in China. *Chong'ur was 
his son, and El Temiir his grandson. 
YEH-ERH-CHI-NI, a Tangut, son of Ch'i-tai-p'u-chi. He and his 
brother Li-jih were commanders to Qaishan during the wars 
against Qaidu. He was made Censor-in-Chief upon Qaishan's 
enthronement. Although he did not participate in the resto-
ration of 1328, he was recalled to government in 1329 and 
made a head of the Chief Military Commission. 
YESÜN T E M Ü R (d. 1328), Yiian emperor, eldest son of Prince 
Kammala. He came to the throne after the assassination of 
Shidebala in 1323, but repudiated the group which committed 
that act and backed his enthronement. 
*YOCHICHAR, a Mongol of the Hü'íishin tribe. He was a senior 
276 aide to Qaishan in the anti-Qaidu wars, and was appointed 
Chancellor of the Right of the new Mongolian province of 
Biographical Ho-lin (Ling-pei) during Qaishan's reign as emperor. *Yochi-
Notes char was granted the princely fief of Ch'i-yang, but after 
Qaishan's death his descendants suffered persecution and 
the fief was canceled. 
Emperors of the Yiian Dynasty in China 
1. QUBILAI 
Jingim 
Kammala Darmabala 2 . TEMÜR 
6 . YESÜN TEMÜR 3 . QAISHAN 4 . AYURBARWADA 
Aragibag 5 . SHIDEBALA 
7 . QOSHILA 8 . TUGH TEMÜR 
10. TOGHON TEMÜR 9. IRINJIBAL Aradnadara El Tegüs 
Ayushiridara 
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29. MWE, 13.15a. For the Yunnan rebellion, see Cleaves in 
H/AS, XXV (1964-65), 31-79, and G. Kara in AOASH, XVII (1964), 
145-73. The Yunnan and Szechwan troubles did not break out until 
after the overthrow of the loyalists at Shang-tu. On the interconnec-
tion of the Yunnan and Szechwan rebellions, cf. YS, 33.21a. 
30. YS, 32.10a-15b; 138.8a-12a. The battle accounts in the basic 
annals (32.10a-15b) and in El Temiir's biography (138.8a-12a) derive 1 8 5 
from two different sources and do not always agree with each other. 
31. For the Shensi famine, brought on by a four-year drought, n , 
see YS, 32.26b; 33.9a, lib. The population loss was estimated to ' W 
be from 70 percent to 90 percent; cf. YS, 97.13b and T'ung Shu, 
CKü-an chi, 3.9b-10a. The desolation was complete enough to 
inspire Yii Chi's hopeful suggestion that the property lines might 
be completely redrawn and the ancient well-field system reestab-
lished there. Cf. YS, 181.8b. 
32. Two of these dangers were pointed out by the Vice Adminis-
trator of the Left Shih Wei-liang; cf. Huang Chin, Chin-hua Huang 
hsien-sheng wen-chi, 26.11b-12a (spirit-way stela for Shih Wei-
liang). 
33. YS, 32.3b-13a passim; 35.11b; 184.9a. For Lü Ssu-ch'eng's 
willing cooperation in fulfilling the various new demands, cf. YS, 
185.1b. Lii was at the time a local magistrate in Hopei. 
34. YS, 32.3b-15a passim. 
35. The leading steppe princes who fought on the Shang-tu side 
were the Prince of Liao Toghto and the Prince of Liang Ongchan. 
Toghto, a descendant of Chinggis Qan's younger brother Temiige 
Odchigin, was made Prince of Liao by Ayurbarwada in 1316, and 
had his power base in northern Manchuria. He had been accused 
on two occasions of murder by the censors in Ta-tu, but the emperor 
Yesiin Temiir protected him. He had therefore a strong interest 
in supporting the Shang-tu side (cf. YS, 29.12a-b; MWE, 22.7b-9a; 
Hambis, Le Chapitre CVII1, p. 42). Ongchan and the Prince of 
Hsiang-ning Balashiri were both nephews of Yesiin Temiir and were 
given their fiefs by him (Hambis, Le Chapitre CVIII, pp. 6, 91). 
Other princes on the Shang-tu side included the Prince of Chao 
Majaqan, an imperial son-in-law and descendant in the fourth gen-
eration of the Onggud chief Ala Qush Digid Quri. Majaqan held 
his fief at least from 1321; the reasons for his loyalty to the Shang-tu 
side are unclear. He was, in any event, pardoned and given relief 
after the fighting was over (YS, 27.21a; 31.8a; 32.18b; MWE, 13.15a; 
36.3a; Hambis, Le Chapitre CVIII, pp. 23, 25, n. 6; Cleaves in 
HJAS, XII (1949), 527-28). The Prince of Yang-chai T'ai-p'ing, a 
descendant of Ogodei, was given his fief by Yesiin Temiir (Hambis, 
Le Chapitre CVll, p. 92, n. 4), as was the Prince of Ju-ning 
Hula'atai, grandson of Chapar, and great-grandson of Qaidu 
(Hambis, Le Chapitre CVll, p. 80, n. 5; Le Chapitre CVIII, p. 
96, n. 4). The personal background of six other princes (<chu-wang) 
known to have supported Shang-tu appears to be unclear. One 
186 
important non-princely commander, the Chief Administrator of Liao-
yang province Tiimender, had earlier been accused of complicity 
in the assassination of Shidebala and thus had good reason to sup-
port the Shang-tu side (YS, 29.12a-b; 143.8a). On the other side, 
a study of the imperial princes known to have backed the restoration 
II The t o P r°duce any special pattern. Most important was Arad-
Restoration nas^ i r i ' Prince of Hsi-an, and a descendant of Qubilai through his 
f 1328 eighth son A-urughchi. Another prominent prince was the Prince 
of Ch-i Grüg Temür, a descendant of Chinggis Qan's younger 
brother Jochi Qasar; he was given his fief by Yesiin Temiir in 1326 
(YS, 30.6a). After the surrender of Shang-tu on November 14, many 
more princes began to show support for the restoration and con-
tributed to the remaining operations. 
36. Among the elite units thus split were the Asud, or Alan 
Guards (YS, 32.5a; 138.9b); the Tung-lu Meng-ku, or "East-route 
Mongol" myriarchy, established in Manchuria at the time of Nayan's 
rebellion (YS, 131.16b; 138.12a); and even some qarachi, of whom 
many were of El Temiir's own Qipchaq tribe (Yii Chi, 24.3a-b, 
stela of merit for the princes of Tsao-nan). On the qarachi, see 
note 42 below. Other split units included the Lung-chen Guards 
(YS, 32.6a), and the Giiyiigchi (YS, 32.5a-b. On the latter, cf. Pel-
liot, Notes, I, 572-73). 
37. YS, 32.5a-b. 
38. Evidence for a measure of Qunggirad support for both sides 
may be discerned in a Sino-Mongolian inscription translated by 
Cleaves in HJAS, XIII (1950), 26, 99-100. Many Qunggirad tribes-
men were dependent upon relief from Ta-tu, a factor which must 
have helped prevent total Qunggirad support for Shang-tu (YS, 
30.2a). The Jalair viceroy (kuo-wang) *Dorotai, a Shang-tu partisan, 
was killed in 1328. His successor was Dorji, a learned Neo-
Confucian ideologue, and a Jalair who supported Ta-tu (YS, 32.14b; 
139.3b). A word about these two clans may be in order here. Aside 
from the imperial house, Mongol society in China was dominated 
by a small number of clans whose position and prestige derived 
from their intimate involvement in the family and personal history 
of Chinggis Qan. Chief among these were the Qunggirad and Jalair 
clans. The Qunggirads were descended from Chinggis Qan's father-
in-law Dei Sechen. They remained in later times the imperial con-
sort clan par excellence, a privilege expressly affirmed and sanc-
tioned by the qaghan Ogodei (Cleaves in H/AS, XIII [1950], 13-16; 
Hambis, Le Chapitre CVIII, table 2, opp. p. 18). The clan main-
tained an official residence of its own, the principality of Lu at 
Ch'iian-ning (now Wu-tan-ch'eng in north central Jehol; cf. Cleaves, 
ibid., p. 39, n. 55). It employed its own staff of palace guards and 
officials. Members of the clan had served in the Mongol armies 
from the time of Chinggis. They held at various times thirteen 
different princely fiefs; their nearest rivals, the Ikires, had three 
(data from Hambis, Le Chapitre CVIII). The clan obtained an 
enormous annual income from its appanage holdings in various parts ¿gy 
of China, which were managed by clan officials (cf. MWE, 23.6b-7a, 
for the holdings). The Qunggirad role in power politics derived jj jjw 
not from any commanding position within the Yiian bureaucracy, Restoration 
Lut rather from its extremely close relationship to the throne, from Qf 1328 
vwhich it derived its tremendous ability to influence succession ques-
tions. 
The position of the Jalair clan was significantly different. The 
Jalair were a clan subservient to the Borjigin clan of Chinggis Qan. 
The subservient status of the Jalair, like the consort relationship 
of the Qunggirad, was an ancient one predating Chinggis Qan him-
self (cf. Vladimirtsov, Le Regime Social des Mongols, pp. 58, 80-82). 
The position of the Jalair clan in China, however, owed much to 
their ancestor Muqalfs having been Chinggis's best general in his 
North China campaigns. Chinggis gave Muqali the tide "viceroy" 
(ikuo-wang), and this title was always inherited by one or another 
of his descendants (cf. Cleaves in HJAS, XII [1949], 96, n. 13). 
The Jalair held no princely fiefs, and did not intermarry with the 
imperial house. As the first of the hereditary "meritorious subjects" 
(Jisün-cKen), however, the Jalair did possess extensive appanages 
in China (YS, 95.28a). Although Muqali's position as chief com-
mander of the five t'ou-hsia, which included the Qunggirad, was 
lost by his descendants by 1294 when the Yiian military establish-
ment was reorganized and centralized, the Jalair viceroys did con-
tinue to control tribal forces (Ratchnevsky, "Zum Ausdruck 'touhsia 
in der Mongolenzeit," pp. 173-77; YS, 23.2a). But the real impor-
tance of the Jalair clan in later times lay in the fact that its members 
consistently attained leading positions in the Yiian bureaucracy as 
Confucians or Confucian sympathizers. 
39. YS, 32.16a, 17b (Hambis, Le Chapitre CVIII, p. 140, mis-
dates and mistranslates this passage), 23b. 
40. Cf. Feng Ch eng-chün in FJHC, IV, 2 (June, 1936), p. 6. 
41. YS, 184.8b; but also cf. YS, 32.2a, translated by Cleaves 
in HJAS, XIII ( 1950), 53, n. 173. 
42. YS, 128.14a-18b; Yen Fu in yüan-ch'ao ming-cKen shih-lüeh, 
3.5b-9a (stela commemorating the ancestral merits of the princes 
of Chii-jung); Yü Chi, 23.5b-10a (stela on the same subject). The 
earlier stela, by Yen Fu, does not mention the allotments in lands 
and households given Tughtugha. For the reading Tughtugha, pos-
sibly doubtful in view of Pelliot's remarks in Pelliot and Hambis, 
Histoire des Campagnes de Gengis Khan, pp. 97-98, see Cleaves 
in HJAS, XVIII (1955), 357 n. 2 and 400, n. 254. In HJAS, XIII 
(1950), 45, n. 120, Cleaves simply transliterated the same as T'u-
t'u-ha and offered no reconstruction. On the term qarachi, cf. Pel-
liot and Hambis, Historie des Campagnes, p. 280. For the same 
188 term, transliterated ha-la-ch'ih, Hambis in Le Chapitre CVIII, p. 
62, unaccountably offers the tribal name Qalach, which makes no 
II. The s e n s e- On the specialized functions of the Imperial Guards gener-
Restoration s e e Chavannes in TP, V (1904), 429-32. For the establishment 
of 1328 o i t h e Qipchaq Guards (iwei), cf. YS, 14.4a; 123.19b-20a; Pelliot 
and Hambis, Histoire des Campagnes, p. 109. The most recent 
general study of the fon-hsia feudal establishment in China may 
be found in Iwamura Shinobu, Mongoru shakai keizaishi kenkyu, 
pp. 404-69. 
43. Cf. YS, 34.25b-26a. 
44. YS, 138.6b. 
45. YS, 138.17a. Bayan was made Vice Censor-in-Chief and later 
Censor-in-Chief of the Southern (Kiangnan) Branch Censorate, and 
finally Chief Administrator of Kiangche province. 
46. YS, 28.7a; 138.5b-6a; 207.1b. 
47. El Temür was made Chief Minister of the Court of the 
Imperial Stud (T'ai-p'u ch ing) in 1325, Assistant Vice Commissioner 
in the Chief Military Commission in 1326, and Assistant Commis-
sioner in early 1328 (YS, 138.6b). Bayan was made Chief Adminis-
trator of Kiangsi province in 1325, and in 1326 was shifted to the 
same position in Honan province (138.17b). Bayan was content to 
ingratiate himself with the new imperial administration; he volun-
tarily surrendered about half of the office fields assigned him to 
the emperor and the Imperial Guards. 
48. The outstanding senior members of Qaishan's staff included 
(1) the Hü'üshin Mongol *Yochichar, a descendant of Boroghul, 
who was one of Chinggis Quan's close companions called the "Four 
Heroes." Qaishan enfeoffed *Yochichar as Prince of Ch'i-yang and 
made him Chancellor of the Right of Ho-lin province, i.e., Mon-
golia. Of *Yochichar's sons, Taraqai attained the Chancellorship 
of the Right in the central government under Qaishan, but he died 
in 1308. Another son, Esen Temiir, who succeeded to the prince-
dom, participated in the assassination of Shidebala and was executed 
by Yesiin Temür in 1323. The princely fief of Ch'i-yang was appar-
ently then canceled and the family proscribed. None of *Yochichar's 
sons participated in the restoration (YS, 29.3b-4a; MWE, 28.12b-
13b; Cleaves in HJAS, XVIII [1955], 394, n. 220). (2) Nanggiadai, 
a Naiman, served as a myriarch under Qaishan but left his service 
sometime before 1307 and joined Prince Ayurbarwada s entourage 
at Huai-chou. Thenceforth he was clearly Ayurbarwada's man rather 
than Quaishan's; Ayurbarwada conferred upon him the princely fief 
of Hsün-tu in reward for his participation in the arrest of Ananda. 
The fief was apparently later canceled, and none of Nanggiadai's 
sons achieved central positions (YS, 131.4a-6b). (3) The Alan Yii-
wa-shih, commander of the Alan Guards under Qaishan during 
the steppe wars, died in 1306; his son and grandson who succeeded iS9 
to his guards post played no known political roles (YS, 132.4b-6b). 
(4) The Ikires Mongol Ash—a descendant of Botu, who was a close // j j i e 
supporter of Chinggis Qan—served with distinction in the steppes Restoration 
and was made Prince of Ch'ang by Qaishan. Of Ash's seven sons, 0f 1328 
we know only about Balashiri, who succeeded as Prince of Ch'ang, 
but played no known part in the restoration (Chang Shih-kuan in 
Yiian wen-lei, 25.10b-13b [ancestral stela for Ash]; MWE, 23.7a-9b; 
Hambis, Le Chapitre CVIII, pp. 29-34; Cleaves in HJAS, XVIII 
[1955], 407). I have discovered only one exception: Qara Batur, 
whose father San-pao-nu was executed in 1311 as a member of 
Qaishan's Central Chancellery (Shang-shu sheng), aided in the 
restoration and was given bureaucratic office (YS, 24.3a-b; 32.13b; 
Yii Chi, 10.1a). 
49. YS, 24.3a-b, 5a-b. 
50. One leading personality associated with Qoshila was the Tan-
gut Li-jih, who disappeared after Qoshila's 1316 revolt. His brother 
Yeh-erh-chi-ni, who held provincial posts in China after Qaishan's 
death, of his own decision took no part in the coup, but was recalled 
to court and made head of the Chief Military Commission in 1329. 
Their father Ch'i-t'ai-p'u-chi died in 1313 (MWE, 121.3a-4a). 
Qabartu, a man long associated with both Qaishan and Qoshila, 
was impeached by the Censorate in 1330 (YS, 34.22a-b). 
51. On the location of the Qangli, see Pelliot and Hambis, His-
toire des Campagnes, pp. 109-10; and Bretschneider, Medieval 
Researches from Eastern Asiatic Sources, I, 301-2. For the origin 
of the name Qipchaq, cf. Pelliot in TP, XXVII (1930), 280-82. On 
the various transcriptions of the name, cf. Poppe in CAJ, I (1955), 
39. Also see below, note 53. 
52. YS, 138.5b-6a; MWE, 121.4b. 
53. Pelliot in J A, ser. XI, vol. XV (1920), 148-49, 165-67; Pelliot 
and Hambis, Histoire des Campagnes, pp. 102-12; Yen Fu in Yiian 
wen-lei, 3.6a. The sources for Qipchaq history are highly confused, 
as the studies by Marquart in 1914, Pelliot in 1920, and Ts'en 
Chung-mien in 1936 attest. In view of the recent availability of 
Yen Fu's inscription for Tughtugha in the photoreprint of the 1335 
edition of the Y'úan-cliao ming-clien shih-liieh, the problem is due 
for reexamination. 
54. Among the leading se-mu supporters of the restoration were 
the following men, none of whom was personally connected with 
Qaishan: (1) The Onggud Ma Tsu-ch'ang, a noted Confucian (YS, 
143.1a-3a); (2) the Alan Chiao-hua and his son Jaya'an Buqa, both 
guards commanders who were rewarded with bureaucratic office 
for their support of the restoration (YS, 123.17b-18a); (3) the Qarluq 
Taghai, a former qarachi follower of Tughtugha's, who also received 
1Q0 civil office for his military support of the restoration (YS, 122.7a-8a; 
Cleaves in HJAS, XII [1949], 109, n. 73); (4) the Uighur Alin Temür,' 
II The a l i t e r a r y m a n the Han-lin Academy, and a translator of the 
Restoration Chinese classics, he originally gave his support to Qoshila, but later 
of 1328 t o o k o f f i c e u n d e r T l lSh T e m i l r (ys> 124.5b; H. Franke in JOS, 
* ' II [1955], 302; Cleaves in HJAS, XII [1949], 115, n. 121); (5) the 
Prince of Kao-ch'ang Temür Buqa, nominal ruler (iduq qut, or 
"Holy Majesty") of the defunct Uighur kingdom of Qaraqojo, of 
whom more will be told in the following chapter; (6) the Onggud 
Chao Shih-yen, a Confucian whom Temiider nearly succeeded in 
executing in 1320 (YS, 27.10b-lla; 180.5a-10a); (7) the brothers 
Hui-hui and Nao-nao, known as the "twin jewels," of Qangli de-
scent, and avid Confucians. Hui-hui later clashed with El Temür 
and went into retirement (YS, 143.3a-7b; Sung Lien, Sung Wen-
hsien kung cKüan-chi, 41.15b-18b [spirit-way stela for Hui-hui]; 
Cleaves in HJAS, X [1947], 1-12); and (8) Arigh Qaya, an Uighur, 
and strongly pro-Confucian (YS, 137, 5b-10b; Yii Chi, 23. la-2a [stela 
tor the new Confucian temple school of the Wu Guards]; Cleaves 
in HJAS, XXVII [1967], 96, n. 1 for the name). All of the above 
men, with the exception of the Alans, were Turkish. 
55. Cf. Feng Ch'eng-chün in FJHC, IV, no. 2 (June, 1934), p. 
7, where he characterizes the restoration as a struggle of Alans 
and Qipchaqs against the incumbent Mongols and Moslems. The 
statement is true only in part. It describes the military aspect of 
the restoration best, but does not take into account the fact that 
there were Mongols on both sides. 
56. YS, 138.6a-b; Huang Chin, 8.10b-12a (inscription on the 
ancestral hall of Qangli Toghtos son Temiir Tash). 
57. YS, 140.9a, lib. Cf. note 54 above. 
58. YS, 32.19a-b. 
59. YS, 34. la-b, 5b; 138.12b. It was Qoshila who reappointed 
El Temür. 
60. YS, 138.13b-14a. 
61. For the title Lu chün-kuo chung-shih, see Otagi and 
Murakami in Iminzoku no Shina tochi kaisetsu, p. 125. El Temür 
shared this title with Bayan and the Prince of Kao-ch'ang Temür 
Buqa. The Ta-tu-tu-fu controlled the Left and Right Qipchaq, the 
Qarluq, the East-route Mongol, the East-route Qipchaq, and the 
Lung-i Guards (YS, 32.25a; 33.1a; 34.13b; 35.10b; 86.24b-27b; 
138.12a-b). El Temür commanded the Lung-i Guards personally. 
62. As in the summer of 1330 (YS, 34.13a-b; 138.14a). 
63. The record of censorial activity (YS, 33.13a-36.8a passim) 
during Tugh Temür's reign shows that it was mainly occupied with 
impeachments. It indicted twenty-seven men, mainly on the 
grounds of vice, incompetence, corruption, dereliction, and politi-
cal opportunism. 9̂1 
64. YS, 32.9b; 33.5b; 34.3b; 36.3b. For the Kuei-chang-ko 
Academy, see H. Franke, Beitr'cige zur Kulturgeschichte Chinas ¡j 
unter der Mongolenherrschaft, pp. 74-79; and Cleaves in HJAS, Restoration 
XX (1957), 396, n. 20, 456, n. 136. The K'uei-chang-ko appears 0f 132$ 
to have been an ambiguous institution. Although it served as an 
academy for the arts (cf. Lu Yu, Yen-pei tsa-chih, A.32b), it was 
primarily, according to the description of it in the Ching-shih ta-
tien, a Confucian institution (cf. the Yiian wen-lei, 41.5a). K'o 
Chiu-ssu, the subject of Cleaves's article above, was a litterateur 
who was a member of this academy until his impeachment in 1331. 
65. There was a strong demand on the part of such Confucian 
members of the K'uei-chang-ko as Yü Chi to have greater access 
to and influence over the emperor; cf. YS, 181.9a-b. 
66. YS, 34.7a; 35.11a, 16a; 89.21b-26b. For one of its component 
activities, textile manufacture at the northern town of Hsün-ma-lin, 
cf. Pelliot in /A, CCXI (1927), 261-79. 
67. YS, 32.9b; 34.3b; 95.34a. El Temür's annual allotment as 
Prince of T'ai-p'ing amounted to 10 ingots (ting) of gold, 50 of silver, 
10,000 in paper cash, plus 500 cKing (ca. 8,000 acres) of land in 
the T'ai-p'ing area. 
68. YS, 32.9b; 34.25b-26a; 35.9a, 11a. According to Tughtugha's 
biography in YS, 128.17b, Qubilai gave him 1,000 taxpaying house-
holds in the lu of Chien-k'ang (Nanking), Lu-chou (Ho-fei, Anhwei), 
and Jao-chou (P'o-yang, Kiangsi), and designated these as qarachi 
households. To these were added 1,700 captured households; where 
these were located is not stated. One of Tughtugha's sons was 
appointed darughachi for the purpose of collecting taxes on the 
qarachi households. The YS, section on annual allotments (95.32a), 
states that the year of these grants was 1284, but in contradiction 
to the above information, says that Tughtugha as qarachi was given 
4,000 households in Jao-chou lu, and that these together yielded 
an annual income of 160 ingots in cash. In *Chong'ur's time, 1,436 
unregistered households provided an annual income of 200 ingots 
in cash, which sum *Chong'ur did not collect himself (YS, 34.25b-
26a). These households must be the remnant of the original 1,700 
captured households. Now depleted by 15 percent, these house-
holds, located in An-feng, An-ch'ing, and Lu-chou (all in present-
day Anhwei province), reverted to El Temiir's control. It would 
thus appear that El Temiir did not regain control of any qarachi 
households. Since control over the qarachi guards troops seems 
to have passed at an unspecified date into the hands of a Qangli 
family (cf. YS, 133.16b), control over the qarachi households, which 
provided revenue for the troops* support, may have passed to this 
same family also. In the Yiian period, a ch'ing was roughly 16 acres; 
IQ2 cf. Amano in Jimbun Kenkyu, XIII (1962), 806. 
69. YS, 32.19a; 138.12a. There is a large literature on the term 
u The darqan, lit. "freeman." Cf. Cleaves in HJAS, XXIV (1962-3), 75, 
Restoration n ' References to some of the literature may be found in de 
of 1328 Rachewiltz's article in JESHO, IX (1966), 133, n. 1. 
70. YS, 35.21a. 
71. YS, 35.12a. For the sheng-tzu ("live sanctuary") cf. C. K. 
Yang, Religion in Chinese Society, p. 174. Also cf. YS, 35.16b. 
72. YS, 32.17b-18a. For *Chong'urs four wives, cf. Hambis, Le 
Chapitre CVIII, p. 164, n. 5. Here Hambis offers the starred form 
*Chagir; on p. 120, n. 3, of the same work, he gives the unstarred 
form Chakir, She was a descendant of Bochog, a brother of Qubilai. 
She helped plan El Temiir's dawn seizure of the palaces; cf. YS, 
138.7a. 
73. Hambis, Le Chapitre CVIII, table 15, opp. p. 164. 
74. YS, 138.15a. Hambis's table fails to show any of these mar-
riages. We know of only one of his wives by name; she was Oriig, 
and may have been a daughter of Qoshila. Cf. YS, 36.1a; Hambis, 
Le Chapitre CVIII, p. 34, n. 9. 
75. YS, 38.3b. El Temiir was, however, opposed to Toghon 
Temiir's enthronement; see Chapter III. 
76. YS, 32.16a-18b; 34.7b. Hambis, Le Chapitre CVIII, p. 119, 
n. 4, gives no genealogy for Buqa Temür. For the question of Buqa 
Temiir s exact relationship to El Temür, cf. A/WE, 155.26a-b. 
77. YS, 34.1b, 24b-25a; S7.15a-23b. 
78. YS, 33.1a, 21b; 35.4a, where the text, however, seems cor-
rupt. The Ta-hsi tsung-yin-yiian is translated as "Court of Ancestral 
Sacrifice for Grand Blessing" by Cleaves in HJAS, XX (1957), 397, 
n. 33. Cf. also YS, 32.14a, 34.20a, and 87.23b-31b. For the Office 
for Imperial Guisine (Hsüan-hui-yüan), cf. Ratchnevsky, Un Code 
des Yuan, pp. 143-46. On p. 145, n. 1, Ratchnevsky quotes Ch'ien 
Ta-hsin to the effect that only the Chung-shu-sheng, the Shu-
mi-yüan, and the Hsilan-cheng-yilan chose their own officials. But 
on p. 151, n. 3, he states, correctly, that the Hsüan-hui-yüan did 
have this privilege. For the name Sadun, cf. Cleaves in HJAS, 
XX (1957), 436, n. 29. *Tangkish is a tentative reconstruction by 
Hambis. 
79. Qaishan's revival of the Shang-shu sheng was a patently 
Legalist measure undertaken to raise money to pay the exorbitant 
expenses his enthronement incurred; on this, see H. Franke, Geld 
und Wirtschaft in China unter der Mongolen-Herrschaft, pp. 82-93. 
Whereas Qaishan never made much mention of Qubilai, Ayurbar-
wada made Qubilai the precedent-setting beacon-light of the dynas-
ty; cf. YS, 26.20a. 
80. YS, 32.5b. A special school (Kuo-tzu-chien) for Moslems, set 
up in 1289 and again in 1314, was already abolished in 1321; cf. 193 
O. Franke, Geschichte, IV, 509. There is evidence that the Mos-
lems were afraid of too much public prominence; cf. YS. 26.4b. /// Bayan and 
81. YS, 32.2b, 8a, 23b. Anti-Confucian 
82. YS, 32.6a, 14a; 33.2a; 134.24b. Reaction 
83. YS, 32.8b-9a. 
84. Yiian wen-lei, 41.37b (preface to a section of the Ching-shih 
ta-tien). 
85. YS, 175.7a ff. In April, 1329, Buddhist, Taoist, Nestorian, 
Jewish, and Moslem merchants were all ordered to pay taxes "ac-
cording to the old regulations" (YS, 33.7b), but in April, 1331, 
commercial tax exemptions were expressly stated to be in effect 
for Buddhist and Taoist merchants (YS, 35.8a-b). _ 
86. YS, 32.10b; Tazaka Kodo, Chugoku ni okeru kaikyo no denrai 
to sono kotsu, I, 813-30. 
87. YS, 32.17b-25b. 
88. YS, 32.16b; 33.2a; 178.14a-b. 
89. YS, 35.26a; 138.14a. 
90. YS, 34.20b-21a. 
Chapter III. Bayan and the Anti-Confucian Reaction 
1. Sheng-wu ch'in-cheng lu, ed. Wang Kuo-wei, pp. 150-51, 183-
84. Barthold's reconstruction of these events in Turkestan down 
to the Mongol Invasion (pp. 361-62, 370-72, 415) has been ques-
tioned by Pelliot in TP, XXVII (1930), 22. Cf. also Meng-ku pi-shih, 
tr. Hsieh Tsai-hsing, pp. 123-25, 151. 
2. Wang Yi'in, CKiu-chien chi, 50.2a-3a (ancestral stela for the 
Uriangqa clan); YS, 121.2b; 122.10b-lla; Pelliot and Hambis, His-
toire des Campagnes, pp. 115-16. 
3. The inscriptions composed by Yen Fu and Yii Chi for the 
Qipchaqs (cf. Chapter II, n. 42) make mention of the fugitive Mer-
kids, but there is nothing of the Qipchaqs in Bayan's ancestral 
record. 
4. Bayan's great-grandfather served in the Imperial Guard. Who 
was ruling at that time is not stated. His grandfather was a minor 
officer under the qaghan Mongke, and is said to have been killed 
in the course of the wars against the Southern Sung. Bayan's father 
served as commander of the guard in the palace of the consort 
of Jingim (d. 1285), Qubilai's son and heir apparent. Cf. YS, 138.16a; 
Hambis in J A, CCXLI (1953), 215-16. 
5. The Shang-tu partisans had possession of the imperial seal; 
cf. Chapter II. 
6. YS, 138.17b-19a. 
7. YS, 32.21a; 34.5a-b, 17a. 
8. Ys, 33.16a; 35. lb; 88.7b-8b. The institution for the heir appar-
194 ent was known as the Ch'u-cheng-yüan; for its organization and 
subordinate agencies cf. YS, 89.1a-4a. There were 400 personal 
III. Bayan and valets (isügiirchi, lit. "parasol bearer"). For the term, see Cleaves 
Anti-Confucian in H/AS, XX (1957), 438, n. 41. 
Reaction 9. YS, 35.25a, 26b; 89.21b. 
10. YS, 32.17b; Hambis in /A, CCXLI (1953), 248. 
11. YS, 35.20a, 21a-b, 26b; 35.8a; 36.8a; 143.9a. 
12. YS, 36.6a. The other place was Cho-chou (Cho-hsien, 
Hopei). Why a stela should have been placed there is unclear to 
me. 
13. YS, 37.1b. El Tegüs was originally named Gunadara; cf. YS, 
36.4b; Hambis, Le Chapitre CVII, p. 141, n. 2. Tugh Temür had 
a third son, Tai-pmg-nu, of whom practically nothing is known. 
El Tegüs remained a possible imperial candidate until his murder 
in 1340 (YS, 40,8a; KfíS, I, 558). 
14. YS, 37.1b-2a; 38.1b; 138.14b. Irinjibal's edict of accession 
was composed by Yii Chi; see Yiian wen-lei, 9.18a-19a. For the 
name Irinjibal, cf. Cleaves in HJAS, XIII (1950), 35, n. 35. 
15. YS, 37.5a. 
16. YS, 143.2b; 181.11b; 183.15b; Huang Chin, Chin-hua Huang 
hsien-sheng wen-chi, 26.14a-b (epitaph for Shih Wei-liang). 
17. YS, 33.20b. The Chiang-Huai tsai-fu tu-tsung-kuan-fu, 
established as the empress's personal patrimony in 1329, managed 
eleven revenue-producing agencies in the lower Yangtze region 
(YS, 89.20a-21a; Ratchnevsky, Un Code des Yuan, p. 293, n. 5). 
The number of its subordinate agencies, however, varied; at the 
time of its abolition in 1335 the bureau controlled three such 
agencies (YS, 38.14a-b). 
18. KSWS, 3a; YS, 143.14b. The evidence from the KRS, I, 555, 
does not seem clear enough to determine a definite date. The YS 
biography of El Temiir consists of two parts; the first part, down 
to 1331, is based upon official documents and laudatory inscriptions; 
the second, beginning with 1333, is based solely upon anecdotal 
materials. 
19. YS, 38.9b. 
20. YS, 38.15a-b; KSWS, 3b. 
21. YS, 38.14a. 
22. YS, 38.14b-15b; KSWS, lb-3b. 
23. YS, 38.14b-15b; 39.7b; KSWS, 4a. Toghon Temür s next 
empress was a member of the Qunggirad clan. 
24. Cf. Toghon Temür s edict in YS, 38.14b-15a. 
25. YS, 39.2b, 3b. Bayan received the 1,500 households in 
Central China, originally given Tughtugha by Qubilai; the house-
holds in Chii-jung which Qaishan had given *Chong'ur as part of 
his fief; and half of El Temiir s brother Sadun's valuables. The other 
half of Sadun's property went to Ting-chu, a Qangli adherent of 
Bayan's. For Ting-chu's biography, cf. HYS, 210.6a-7a; also MWE, 195 
155.24a. 
26. YS, 39.7a-b. Another adherent of Bayan's, the Tangut Narin, m Bayan and 
arranged for this. His biography is in YS, 142.13a-15b; those of Anti-Confucian 
his ancestors are in YS, 125.11a-13b. For the name Narin, cf. Pelliot Reaction 
in/A, CCXVII (1930), 258. 
27. YS, 38.4b, 12b; 39.3a. 
28. YS, 40.1b. Cf. Hambis in J A, CCXLI (1953), 245, n. 1, for 
a discussion of one of these stelae, done in 'Phags-pa script, now 
cemented into the Great Wall and inaccessible. Bayan's sheng-tzu 
in Pien-liang and Cho-chou were also refurbished (YS, 37.14a). 
29. YS, 40.2b-3a. 
30. YS, 38.5a. Bayan's former fief of Shun-ning was of the third 
grade. For the fief rankings, cf. Hambis, Le Chapitre CVIII, pp. 
v-x. 
31. According to an unofficial account (KSWS, 4b), Bayan has-
tened to explain that "Ch'in" referred not to Shensi, as one would 
expect, but to the city of Kao-yu on the Grand Canal, known also 
as Ch'in-yu, where he had a fief in property (shih-i). It might be 
pointed out that Bayan was not the first outsider to obtain a first-
class fief; he was preceded in this by El Temiir's brother Sadun, 
appointed Prince of Jung in December, 1333 (YS, 38.4b; Hambis, 
Le Chapitre CVIII, pp. 56-59). Jung, however, was a newly created 
fief, and Sadun was the first holder of it. 
32. The note-maker was Yang Yü, cf. H. Franke, Beitrage zur 
Kulturgeschichte Chinas unter der Mongolenherrschaft, pp. 67-68, 
71-73, 107-9. For a study of Yang Yii, cf. H. Franke in JOS, II 
(1955), 302-8. 
33. Before the destruction of the Qipchaqs, both Sadun and 
Bayan were allowed three concurrent positions (YS, 38.3b). After 
that, Bayan was sole holder of the privilege. 
34. Toghon Temiir's probable mother, Mai-lai-ti, a Qarluq, died 
soon after Toghon Temiir's birth. The fate of Irinjibal's mother, 
Naimanjin, appears uncertain. 
35. YS, 38.15b; 143.14b; 182.10a. Budashiri's YS biography has 
been translated by Cleaves in HJAS, XIII (1950), 35, n. 35. 
36. YS, 38.2a. 
37. Much has been written on the subject of Toghon Temiir's 
paternity. Ch'uan Heng (KSWS, 9b-10b), probably repeating the 
version current in official circles, has it that Toghon Temiir was 
actually the son of the Chinese scion of the defunct Sung imperial 
house and a Moslem girl, and had been adopted by Qoshila. See 
also YS, 181.11b, where it is stated that Tugh Temür himself 
ordered it written down that Toghon Temiir was not a son of 
Qoshila. In an edict of 1340, issued after the dismissal of Bayan, 
Toghon Temiir for the first time denounced vigorously the asper-
196 sions cast on his ancestry; cf. YS, 40.6b. 
38. During Tugh Temiir's reign, there was a certain amount of 
III. Bayan and submerged friction between Bayan and El Temiir. As Censor-
Anti-Confucian in-Chief, Bayan appears to have used the censorial voice to pressure 
Reaction the emperor and El Temiir for larger rewards. This led first to 
the appointment of another man as concurrent Censor-in-Chief and 
later to the removal of Bayan from the Censorate altogether (YS, 
32.5b, 24a-b, 25b). Following this, in September, 1329, Bayan was 
appointed Chancellor of the Left, second in command to El Temiir 
within the Central Chancellery. A month later, however, Bayan 
gave notice of "illness" and departed the capital in order to con-
valesce, but he was soon called back. In January, 1330, both El 
Temiir and Bayan resigned outright their Chancellery positions, 
but were "consoled" and reinstated. These charades ended in 
March, when Bayan left the Chancellery altogether. From that 
point, as an edict made clear, El Temiir was in charge in the Chan-
cellery and Bayan in the Chief Military Commission (YS, 33.13a, 
18b; 34.1a-b, 5a-b). The Korean sources state that Bayan and El 
Temiir clashed strongly over the question of the Korean royal suc-
cession, and that Bayan "hated El Temiir's monopoly of power" 
(KfíS, I, 555). 
39. For the first plot, in July, 1330, cf. YS, 34.15b; 40.6b-7a; 
KfíS, I, 552. Toghon Temiir was exiled in the same month; in 1332, 
he was moved from Korea to Kwangsi (YS, 38.1b; KfíS, I, 555; 
H. Franke in Oriens, III [1950], 122). For the second plot, cf. 
YS, 34.13a-b; 38.2b, 138.14a. 
40. YS, 34.26b. Aradnadara died in February 1332 (YS, 35.2b). 
41. Hsii Yu-jen, 44.1a-6a (inscription for a Confucian temple at 
Shang-tu). 
42. YS, 38.17a. 
43. YS, 38.17b-18a, 183.9a. 
44. YS, 39.8b. 
45. There is a good deal of evidence that many Chinese advanced 
into office through competence in the Mongol language; several 
of the epitaphs in Huang Chin's written works, for example, show 
this. Bayan's order forbidding language study was soon rescinded; 
cf. YS, 182.10b. 
46. YS, 138.20a. 
47. YS, 38.17a; 142.12b. This "community chest" system for the 
support of Confucian students has been described by Ho Ping-ti 
in The Ladder of Success in Imperial China, pp. 203-5. 
48. YS, 182.10a-b. 
49. KSWS, 4a-b; cf. Schulte-Uffelage, Das Keng-shen wai-shih, 
pp. 31-32. 
50. YS, 81.12b; Otagi and Murakami in Iminzoku no Shina tochi 
kaisetsu, p. 132. 197 
51. YS, 142.11b-12a, _translated into Japanese by Miyazaki 
Ichisada in Toyoshi kenkyu, XXIII (1965), 448. For the biographies ///. Bayan and 
of Chang Meng-ch'en (Chang Ch'i-yen), Ma Po-yung (Ma Tsu- Anti-Confucian 
ch'ang), and Ou-yangHsiian, cf. YS, 182. la-4a; 143. la-3a; 182. 4a-7a. Reaction 
The three men together with Hsü were all chin-shih of 1315. 
52. Cf. Yü Chi, Tao-yiian hsiieh-ku lu, 6.2a-b (preface to poems 
written in honor of the chin-shih Chou Tung-yang, about to take 
up his post as assistant magistrate in Ling-ling county); Hsü Yu-jen, 
Chih-cheng chi, 32.3b-4a (a departing message for the inspector 
[chao-mo] Feng). For the bitterness and frustration that existed 
among the large numbers of underpaid clerks hoping for appoint-
ment to the regular bureaucracy, cf. Hu Chih-yü, Tzu-shan ta-
cKüan-chi, 23.17b. The clerkships themselves were generally filled 
on a hereditary basis by the sons of low-ranking officials; cf. Makino 
Shuji in Tohogaku, no. 32 (1966), p. 62. 
53. YS, 183.12b-13a. 
54. Cf. YS, 185.10a-b. 
55. YS, 81.7a-b. The triennial chü-jen quota was 300, divided 
equally among the four ethnic classes. The 11 percent figure may 
be a little too high if the quotas were not filled each time. 
56. For example, the Confucian Huang Chin began his career 
as a local clerk; for committing some misdemeanor he was flogged, 
and so quit his job and studied. He passed the 1315 examination 
for the chin-shih degree. His biography in YS, 181-18b-21a, neg-
lects to mention his clerkly experience; this we learn from Ch'ang-
ku Chen-i, Nung-fien yü-hua, A.20b-21a. Yüan Ming-shan (d. 
1322), who was very closely associated with the Confucian move-
ment, came up through the clerkly ranks; cf. YS, 181.1a-4a. 
57. This is evident from the large number of epitaphs and biog-
raphies written by Confucians for relatives or acquaintances who, 
in order to support their families, are said to have had no recourse 
but to accept clerkships. Ayurbarwada's Chinese mentor once 
remarked to him: 'There are, after all, worthy men among the 
clerks; it is simply a matter of encouraging and transforming them." 
Ayurbarwada supposedly replied: "You are a Confucian, one would 
think that you would be unsympathetic towards them, yet you make 
this concession to them. Truly you speak as a superior man." (YS, 
175.19a-b). 
58. Chieh Hsi-ssu, Chieh Wen-an kung cKüan-chi, 9.5b. 
59. Chieh Hsi-ssu, 9.5b-7a (a departing message for Yesüderchi). 
Part of this piece has been translated by Ch'ien and Goodrich in 
their English translation of Chen Yiian, Western and C entral Asians 
in China under the Mongols, p. 38. I have paraphrased rather than 
translated this long and rather rambling souvenir. 
198 60. These metaphors and illustrations are borrowed from Yiian 
writings of the 1340s and 1350s; cf. Hu Han, Hu Chung-tzu chi, 
111. Bayan and 3.8a-b (a second discussion on medicine); and Liu Chi, Ch'eng-i-po 
Anti-Confucian wen-chi, p. 109 (a departing message to the magistrate Chang of 
Reaction the subprefecture of Hai-ning, leaving office upon the fulfillment 
of his term), and p. 188 (miscellaneous explanations). 
61. YS, 39.6a, 8a-b. 
62. YS, 39.6b-7a; Lu Shen, Pmg-hu lu, p. 1; KSWS, 5a. In a 
rare slip, Cleaves mistranslated Pang Hu ("Stick" Hu) as "cudgel 
barbarians." Cf. HJAS, XV (1952), 50. 
63. YS, 39.8a. His self-given title "Chao king of the Southern 
Court" makes it clear that he had the Sung Dynasty (960-1279) 
in mind. 
64. YS, 39.13b, 14a; 188.9a-b. 
65. YS, 39.8a; 40.1b. 
66. Yeh Tzu-ch'i, Tsao-mu-tzu, 3.6b. 
67. YS, 39.8b-9a; 182.10b. 
68. YS, 182.10b. 
69. YS, 143.10b-lla. 
70. KSWS, 10b-lla. 
71. Ch'ang-ku Chen-i, Nung-t'ien yii-hua, A.9a-b. 
72. YS, 39.9a; Ch ang-ku Chen-i, A.9b; and KSWS, 5a, all report 
the same rumor. 
73. YS, 39.12a. 
74. KSWS, 5a. 
75. Otagi in Iminzoku no Shina tochi kaisetu, p. 121; Otagi and 
Murákami in ibid., p. 132; YS, 81.5b. Northern Chinese made up 
15 percent of the registered households, and Southern Chinese 
82 percent, based on figures of the late thirteenth century. The 
non-Chinese were encouraged to take the more difficult examina-
tions, with the reward of appointment at a higher grade if they 
passed. Examples of examination questions put to non-Chinese can-
didates may be found in Huang Chin, 20.1a ff. 
76. YS,_8_1.12b. Miyazaki Ichisada makes the assumption I use 
here in Toyoshi Kenkyii, XXIII (1965), 447-48. 
77. Otagi and Murakami in Iminzoku, p. 132. 
78. A possible exception is Ma Tsu-ch'ang, chin-shih of 1315, 
who was for a time a Vice Commissioner in the Chief Military 
Commission. Cf. YS, 143.2b; Ch'en Yiian, Western and Central 
Asians, p. 78. 
79. On the basis of the chin-shih list of 1333, Ho Ping-ti notes 
that "practically all the Mongol candidates who gave their family 
statuses were from families of Mongol garrisons." Cf. The Ladder 
of Success in Imperial China, p. 55. The case of Chieh Hsi-ssu's 
friend, the Qarluq Yesiiderchi, was thus not an isolated one. On 
the provincial level, relations between the sons of Mongol or se-mu 
commanders and the Chinese scholar gentry were sometimes close, 199 
and led, as in Yesiiderchi's case, to intermarriage. The Suldus 
(Mongol) Óriig Buqa, whose father was a chiliarch in Kiangche, 777 Bayan and 
studied under the famous Confucian teacher Han Hsing and Anti-Confucian 
attained the chin-shih degree in 1333 (YS, 145.4b-5a; 190.12b-13b). Reaction 
Although he obtained no degree, the Salji'ud (Mongol) Tegiider, 
a commander in Kiangche, was able to discuss the classics with 
the local scholar gentry (Cheng Yii, Shih-shan hsien-sheng wen-chi, 
144(7).2b stela of appreciation). The Bayaud (Mongol) Tai Buqa, 
born in the South China coast city of Tai-chou, studied under the 
Confucian master Chou Jen-jung, and at the age of seventeen 
attained the chin-shih degree. He was also a calligrapher, author, 
and compiler. His father was a local civil official (YS, 143.14a-17b; 
190.16a-b; Pelliot and Hambis, Histoire des Campagnes, p. 106). 
Hsii Yu-jen devotes an inscription to a Khotanese Moslem who 
had a Chinese mother and passed the chin-shih examination of 1315 
(Chih-cheng chi, 51.4b-8a). The examination system was important 
to these provincials, who had little opportunity to enter the Imperial 
Guards at Ta-tu, the main recruiting base for Mongol and se-mu 
officials. 
80. The most famous examples of such Confucian patrons were 
the Jalair clansmen, descendants of Muqali. Many other examples 
could be selected from among the Qanglis, the Uighurs, etc. 
81. YS, 139.3a. 
82. YS, 139.la-5b. 
83. Yii Chi, Tao-yiian hsiieh-ku lu, 23.1a-2a; also cf. Chapter 
II, note 54. We last hear of Arigh Qaya in September, 1334, when 
he was dismissed as Chief Administrator (YS, 38.10b). In April, 
1336, his personal library was confiscated (YS, 39.1b). Arigh Qayas 
is one of the YS biographies which was never completed; cf. YS, 
137.5b-10b, of which the source was probably an officially ordered 
stela of merit (YS, 35.17a). 
84. YS, 145.1b. 
85. YS, 38.16b; 138.15b-16a; Huang Chin, Chin-hua Huang 
hsien-sheng wen-chi, 25.6b (spirit-way stela for the Kereid Pa-shih). 
For the term Qonqor, cf. Pelliot in TP, XXXVII (1944), 77, n. 
1. 
86. H. Franke, Beitrage zur Kulturgeschichte Chinas, p. 101. 
87. Temiir Buqas YS biography (YS, 122.4a-5a) stops with the 
cession of his titles to his younger brother in 1329. Ch en Ssu-ch'ien 
owed his career to Temiir Buqa s recommendation; cf. YS, 184.9b. 
Franke s doubt (Beitrage, p. 101, n. 4) whether this Temiir Buqa 
was indeed the ex-iduq qut appears to be unnecessary; cf. Liu Chi, 
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Ch'eng-i po wen-chi, p. 154 (inscription commemorating the official 
accomplishments of the Kiang-Huai salt transport commissioner 
Sung). 
88. YS, 39.7b; 138.16a; KSWS, 4b. 
89. YS, 183.3a. Cf. also YS, 41.17a; 186.2a; 187.8a; 139.5a. 
90. YS, 117.6b-8a, 9a; 144.8b. For the correct order of Qubilai's 
sons, cf. Pelliot, Notes, I, 569. 
91. KSWS, 6b-8a; also cf. YS, 40.3a; 186.6a-b. Other references, 
mostly brief, to the Fan Meng incident may be found in YS, 185.3a; 
139.4a; Huang Chin, 24.7b (spirit-way stela for Tung Shou-chien); 
Liu Chi, pp. 153-54; Su T'ien-chiieh, Tzu-ch'i wen-kao (Tientsin, 
1931), 27.15a-17b. 
92. YS, 139.4a; 185.3a; Liu Chi, pp. 153-54. 
93. YS, 139.4a. 
94. YS, 138.25b. 
95. I know of only one man who was personally distressed over 
the murder of Qoshila: the Qangli Hui-hui (cf. Chapter II, note 
54). 
96. On the overthrow of Bayan, cf. YS, 40.3b-4a; 138.21a-22a, 
24b-26a; KSWS, 8b-9b; Chang-ku Chen-i, B.16b-17a; Sung Lien, 
Sung Wen-hsien kung ch'iian-chi, 41.7a (account of conduct for Wu 
Chih-fang); and Yang Yii in H. Franke, Beitrage zur Kultur-
geschichte Chinas, pp. 33-34, 61-62. Yang Yii had the foresight 
to have the emperor provide extra rice supplies ahead of time for 
the people of the captial in order to prevent rising prices caused 
by the locking of the gates. 
Chapter IV. The Triumph of Confucian Politics 
1. YS, 40.6a-7a (dated July 9, 1340; the same text is given in 
KRS, I, 558, there dated May 25); 40.8a-10a; 36.10a; KSWS, 9b. 
2. The use of the term keng-hua in this context may be found 
in Huang Chin, 26.15a (spirit-way stela for Shih Wei-liang); and 
in Wang I, Wang Chung-icen kung chiy 168(3).6a-7a, where he 
speaks of the Chih-cheng period as being one of keng-hua. 
3. YS, 142.12b; 182.10b. Hsii Yu-jens YS biography has been 
translated by Cleaves in HJAS, XV (1952), 46, n. 54. 
4. These were Shih Wei-liang (Huang Chin, 26.15a); Keng Huan; 
and Chang Yu-liang (YS, 40.5a). 
5. YS, 40.8b; MWE, 16.11a-b. The KSWS (lib ff.) insists that 
a certain iduq qut was Chancellor of the Right during this time, 
an assertion for which I have found no corroborating evidence what-
ever. It may be that the KSWS author somehow confused the pres-
ent Temiir Buqa with the ex-iduq qut Temiir Buqa, who was 
executed by Bayan (cf. Chapter III, note 87). The KSWS is often 
inaccurate, especially for the period before 1351. 
6. YS, 140.la-3b, 9a; MWE, 157.34b; Hsü Yu-jen, 49.1a-5a. 
7. YS, 138.25b. 
8. YS, 113.3b-4a. 
9. YS, 181.20a; 182.2b-3a, 5b-6a; Sung Lien, 41.11b (account 
of conduct for Huang Chin). 
10. For the translation "Classics Mat," cf. Cleaves in HJAS XIV 
(1951), 35, n. 13. The establishment of the Classics Mat had long 
been a Confucian demand in the Yüan period; cf. YS, 178.12b, 
and Wang Chieh, Wang Wen-chung chi, 4.3b-4a, where it was 
put first in the famous eight points on government which Wang 
Chieh submitted to the emperor Temür. It was finally set up under 
Yesün Temür. For its interruption under Bayan, cf. YS, 187.1b. 
Before the reopening of the Classics Mat, the young emperor 
Toghon Temür had already learned the rudiments of Confucian 
political and moral ideology from his tutors, the Uighurs Alin Temür 
and his son Sharabal. Cf. YS, 124.5b, and H. Franke, Beitrage 
zur Kulturgeschichte Chinas, pp. 63, 66. 
11. For example, it was probably Huang Chin who recom-
mended Cheng T'ao of the famous Cheng clan of P'u-chiang (in 
present-day Chekiang province) to the Classics Mat, where he com-
piled the discussions held there into a book, now apparently lost. 
Cf. Wang I, 163(3).6a-7a, and 172(7).3a. The importance of the 
appointment in the eyes of the region may be discerned in Wang 
I's disquisition on the true nature of the Confucian, presented to 
Cheng on his departure; cf. ibid., 166(1).21b-23b. 
12. These included Yang Yü of Hang-chou and Wu Chih-fang 
of P'u-chiang, plus Fan Hui from Kiangsi and a few others whom 
I am unable to identify. 
13. The basic source for the life of Wu Chih-fang is Sung Lien's 
detailed account of conduct in Sung Wen-hsien kung cJiüan-chi, 
41.5a-8b. The Confucian slogan Wu used to justify the ouster was 
ta-i mieh-ch'in, translated by Legge as "great righteousness is su-
preme over the affections" (cf. The Chinese Classics [London and 
Hong Kong, 1872] Vol. V, part I, p. 17), but perhaps translatable 
in the circumstances of 1340 as "for the sake of great righteousness, 
one may destroy relatives." The phrase is from the Tso chuan. 
Wu Chih-fang died in 1356. His son Wu Lai was a noted Confucian 
philosopher; cf. YS, 181.21a-b; Sung Lien, 41.1a-2b; and E. H. 
Schafer in Oriente Poliano (Rome, 1957), pp. 67-69. 
14. He patronized Wu Chih-fang, and also one Lou Shih-pao 
from the same area; cf. Sung Lien, 49.11b-13a. 
15. YS, 40.5b. 
16. YS, 40.8a. On this matter, see Ch'en Yüan, Western and 
Central Asians, pp. 226-75 and esp. pp. 249-52. The Qipchaq 
Sadun, for example, had married his maternal aunt; cf. Huang Chin, 
26.13b. In November, 1340, a non-Chinese censor further proposed 
201 




IV. The Triumph 
of Confucian 
Politics 
that Moslem and Jewish women be forbidden to marry their uncles 
(YS, 40.9a). 
17. YS, 40.8b; 138,23a, 26b. 
18. KSWS, llb-12a, 16b. 
19. Thus the philosopher Cheng Yii of She county in Kiangche 
discussed approvingly several precedents from Tang history, which 
he must certainly have written with recent Yiian events in mind. 
On the justifiability of Tang T'ai-tsung's removal of his father from 
the throne (for which read the justifiability of Toghto's removal 
of Bayan and/or Majartai), cf. Cheng Yii, 140(3). lb-3a; for his stric-
tures against the T'ang empress Wu (for which read his approval 
of the elimination of the grand empress dowager Budashiri), cf. 
ibid., 140(3).3a-4a and 4a-6a. In a preface to Cheng Yii's writings 
the Confucian Wang I expressed his earlier strong diagreement 
with these views; cf. Wang I, 178(13).32b-33b. 
20. YS, 40.4b. 
21. YS, 39.15a; 92.15b-16a; 138.26b, 27b; 190.22b-23a. 
22. YS, 138.26b, 28a. 
23. YS, 40.8a. The Tangut Irinjinhal, who suffered exile under 
Bayan, was appointed to this post on August 1, 1340; Esen Temiir 
was appointed to the same post on August 24. Probably they served 
concurrently for a time. This close alliance between the Chancellor 
of the Right and the Censor-in-Chief seems to have prompted the 
demand on the part of the lower censors that they be allowed to 
memorialize the throne directly, without going through the Censor-
in-Chief (YS, 187.4b). 
24. For example, Yii Chfs proposal during the reign of Yesiin 
Temiir, suggesting that the need for the annual rice shipments from 
the Yangtze delta could be obviated if the North China coast were 
dyked and reclaimed, was turned down on the grounds that it would 
only open opportunities for official corruption (YS, 181.7b-8a; Yii 
Chi, 6.9b-10a [a departing message to two envoys sent to offer 
sacrifice to the goddess of the sea]). Similarly, his plan to take 
advantage of the Shensi famine of 1328 to carry out a basic redis-
tribution of land on the ancient well-field model was not given 
serious consideration (YS, 181.8b; cf. Chapter II, note 31). 
25. YS, 41.1b; KSWS, 14a-b. 
26. YS, 181.17b; 182.6a. Another project undertaken at this time 
was the compilation of the Chih-cheng t'iao-ko; cf. Ratchnevsky, 
Un Code des Yuan, pp. xix, xxi ff. For the Chin-shih compilation, 
see Chan Hok-lam in JOS, VI (1967), 125-63. 
27. YS, 182.11a; KSWS, 12a-b. 
28. YS, 138.26b-27a. 
29. YS, 66.17b-18a. 
30. YS, 66. ISa-b. The YS historiographers add: "We append 
this incident here as a warning to those who may in future recklessly 
discuss hydraulics." 
31. YS, 40.11a-15b, passim; 41.2b. 
32. YS, 41.la-2a. 
33. YS, 40.13a, 15a; 41.2a-b. 
34. YS, 138.27b-28a; KSWS, 16a-b. 
35. Cleaves in HJAS, XIX (1956), 394, n. 220; Hambis, Le 
Chapitre CVIII, pp. 145-48. For the reading Arughtu, cf. Hambis, 
p. 96. 
36. YS, 139.12b-13a. 
37. YS, 139.13b-14a. According to Arughtu's biography (YS, 
139.13b-14a), he resigned at once after being attacked by the cen-
sor. "Arughtu's in-laws were all dissatisfied over this. They pleaded: 
'What you the Chancellor did was entirely good. The censor spoke 
nonsense. Why don't you see the emperor and state your case? 
The emperor will certainly understand.' Arughtu replied: 'I am the 
heir of Boghorchu. Do you think I want to be Chancellor? But 
when the emperor so appointed me, I dared not refuse. Now a 
censor has denounced me and I must go at once. The Censorate 
was set up by Shih-tsu (Qubilai). If I oppose the censor, then I 
also oppose Shih-tsu. Speak of it no more.' " 
38. YS, 41.lla-b. 
39. YS, 140.1b, 2b, lOa-b. In 1342 as Chancellor of the Left 
of Kiangche province, Berke Buqa was credited with highly popular 
and effective measures for the relief of the Hang-chou fire. Both 
he and his first-ranking Chief Administrator, the Qangli Temiir 
Tash, handled the distribution of famine relief in 1345. 
40. YS, 41.6a-b. 
41. YS, 41.6a. For the reading a'urugh, cf. Cleaves in HJAS, 
XII (1949), 112, n. 102; and in HJAS, XXVII (1967), 92, n. 71. 
On the a'urugh^cf. Pelliot in /A, CCXVII (1930), 259; and Iwamura 
Shinobu in Toho gakuho, no. 24 (1954), 19, n. 5. 
42. YS, 41.9a. 
43. YS, 41.10b-lla. 
44. YS, 41.8b. 
45. YS, 185.12b. 
46. YS, 183.19b. 
47. Ch'ang-ku Chen-i, B.2b-3a. 
48. YS, 41.9b-42.3b passim. This was a rising of Yao tribesmen 
under one Wu T'ien-pao. 
49. Thus Chieh Hsi-ssu viewed the various frontier disturbances 
with alarm, fearing that similar trouble could easily flare up in China 
proper. Cf. Chieh Hsi-ssu, 9.10b-llb (a departing message to Hsieh 
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Yiian-p'u). Also cf. Sung Lien, 10.19b-21b (epitaph for Chou Ting). 
The Kiangsi Confucian teacher Chou Ting was profoundly worried 
about the possibility of general rebellion in China. 
204 50. YS, 41.11b. 
51. YS, 41.12a. 
IV. The Triumph 52. YS, 140.10b-lla. KSWS, 17a-b, purports to reproduce some 
of Confucian of Toghon Temiir's personal exhortations. 
Politics S3- YS> 41.12a, 13b; 140.4b. During 1347 the emperor asked 
for candid advice on how his rule might be improved, provoking 
at least one "ten-thousand word memorial" and undoubtedly many 
more. Cf. Wang I, 167(2).25a-26a. It is surprising that the YS does 
not mention this move of the emperor's, which was very 
praiseworthy from a Confucian standpoint. 
54. Cf. Hsiao Ch'i-ch'ing, pp. 59-61. 
55. Two old officials at the end of their careers, Ching Yen and 
Wang I, served as Chief Administrators in 1328 and 1329 respec-
tively. For their biographies, cf. HYS, 201.7a-10a, 14a. 
56. YS, 27.6b; 169.1a-3b, 179.1a-3a. 
57. YS, 41.6a; 140.3b, Ch'ien Ta-hsin, Nien-erh-shih k'ao-i, p. 
1507. Ho Wei-i's son Ho Chiin was similarly renamed Esen Qudu 
(YS, 140.8a). 
58. YS, 139.4b, 5b. Dorji acted very much in the Confucian 
tradition of the Jalair house. Very similar roles were played by 
his distant relatives An-t'ung, whom Qubilai used as a figurehead 
Chancellor of the Right mainly in order to exploit his popularity 
with the Confucianists; and Baiju, a Confucianizing Chancellor 
under the emperor Shidebala (cf. Hsiao Ch'i-ch'ing, pp. 63-65; YS, 
137.11a-18a). An-t'ung and his grandson Baiju were descendants 
of the oldest son of Muqali's son Bool; Dorji's branch of the Jalair 
descended from the second son of Bo'ol. Cf. Hambis, Le Chapitre 
CVIII, table 5, opp. p. 40). "As prime minister, Dorji was commit-
ted to preserving the transcendant order (ta-t i), while T ai-p ing 
(i.e., Ho Wei-i) took an equal share in managing the administration. 
At the time, the powers of state were mainly exercised by T'ai-p'ing, 
and many men attached themselves to him. Dorji was impassive 
in the face of this, and did not try to compete with him. But T'ai-
p'ing could also be deferential and exhaust decorum; people inside 
and out hailed him aŝ a worthy prime minister" (YS, 139.5b). For 
Muqali and Bo'ol (Bol), cf. de Rachewiltz in JESHO, IX (1966), 
127-28. 
59. Ys, 41.14a. 
60. YS, 41.15a, 16b. Cheng Yii's inscription of 1348, which 
describes the honors accorded the Kereid Mongol Qara Buqa, 
darughachi in Hui-chou lu, Kiangche province, notes that on April 
28 a panel of six men recommended Qara Buqa's name to the 
emperor. The six men included two Imperial Guardsmen, asii-
gürchi (parasol-bearer) and an iidiichi (sword-bearer); the Palace 
Censor Bolod Temür, the Supervising Secretary Maiju; the 
Assistant Administrator Fu-shou; and the Bureau Director Teri 205 
Temür. On June 8 an envoy from the capital arrived in Hui-chou 
with the honors, and the crowds thronged the streets in order to ¡y triumph 
see him. The inscription ends with a short account of the emperor s 0f Confucian 
recent and praiseworthy attempts to improve local government. p0UtiCs 
Cf. Cheng YÜ, 144(7).la-2a. 
61. YS, 41.16a. The she, or community system, was set up under 
Qubilai to inculcate better farming methods among the peasants 
and keep order in the villages. The system operated on a sub-official 
level; the community chiefs (she-chang) were unpaid local men, 
and probably few of them performed, or were capable of perform-
ing, as the government intended. Cf. Schurmann, Economic Struc-
ture, pp. 43-48. 
62. YS, 41.16a; 42.1b; 185.17a. 
63. YS, 41.4a; 66.1a. 
64. YS, 41.4a-b; 66. la-b; K'ung Ch'i, Ching-chai chih-cheng 
chih-chi, 3.25a. 
65. YS, 41.4b-42.2a passim. The Bayaud Tai Buqa, a chin-shih 
and President of the Board of Rites, was dispatched by the emperor 
to sacrifice to the god of the Yellow River. Tai Buqa proposed get-
ting laborers to stir up the silt and sand deposits where the prospec-
tive new bed of the Yellow River would enter the sea, so that 
the tides could take away the loose sediment. The project was begun 
but ended half completed, because the laborers were needed to 
open military-agricultural colonies (YS, 143.15a). 
66. The Yellow River flooded in August, 1345; December, 1347; 
and February, 1348 (YS, 41.5b, 13b, 14b). 
67 Nakayama Hachiro in Wada hakushi koki kinen toyoshi ronso 
(Tokyo, 1960), p. 653. 
68. YS, 97.9b-11a; 187.5b; KSWS, 20a. In May, 1349, it was 
necessary to cut salt production at Ho-chien by 30,000 yin owing 
to flooding (YS, 42.1b). 
69. The government was hard pressed for cash to meet expenses. 
In 1347 the Board of Revenue complained that, because of the 
high cost of suppressing rebellions in Yunnan and Hukuang, it could 
no longer meet expenditures. It urged that cuts be made in the 
ranks of the Imperial Guards in order to release funds for current 
need. The emperor, overwhelmed by protesting guardsmen, had 
to put a three-year moratorium on the question of reducing guards 
expenditures (YS, 41.13a). 
70. YS, 97.1b-2a. Around 1342 it was reported that only ten 
of an original forty patrol boats were still in existence, and that 
these actually never left port (YS, 183.4a-b). A Yuan picul was 
roughly 2.8 bushels. Cf. Amano in Jimbiin Kenkyu, XIII (1962), 
806. 
206 71. E.g., see the cases of piracy in 1344 listed by Wang I, 
173(8). 19a-2lb (record of law cases in Shao-hsing). 
IV. The Triumph 72. YS, 143.15b; MS, III, 1570; Yeh Tzu-ch'i, 3.6b-7a; Lu-cKiao 
of Confucian chih-lüeh, 6.7a-8a (Chang Chu's spirit-way stela for Fang Kuo-
Potitics chang). According to Chang Chu's flattering account of Fang Kuo-
chen's elder brother, Fang Kuo-chen voluntarily took the captured 
chiliarch to the Kiangche Administrative Vice Commissioner, who 
rewarded the Fangs out of gratitude. This version does not square 
with the other accounts. According to YS, 143.15b, Fang Kuo-chen 
refused the title offered him. According to MS, III, 1570, Fang 
accepted the title Ting-hai wei, or "Commandant who Pacifies the 
Seas." 
73. YS, 186.8a-b. The Fang Kuo-chen affair was used as ammuni-
tion in the censorial attack upon Berke Buqa; cf. YS, 186. lb-2a. 
74. YS, 194.7a. 
75. Even with the development of an efficient maritime route 
for shipping Yangtze delta grain to the capital, the inland canal 
transport routes continued to be used for a certain amount of such 
shipping. On the development of the Yiian maritime and canal 
routes, see Lo Jung-pang in FEQ, XIII (1953-54), 263-85; and 
Schurmann, Economic Structure, pp. 108-16. 
76. YS, 120.6a; 205.29b. 
77. Berke Buqa's father was Aqutai, executed by Ayurbarwada 
for having backed Ananda for the throne in 1307. Cf. Chapter I. 
78. YS, 41.13b, 14a. On the Branch Censorates of the Yiian 
period, cf. Hucker, The Censorial System of Ming China, pp. 26-27. 
79. YS, 41.13b, 16a; 140.5a. 
80. YS, 186.lb-2a. 
81. YS, 39.13a, 15b. This move of Bayan's was strictly illegal 
in that Qubilai had set no precedent for it. It was a point the opposi-
tion seized upon when marshaling support for Bayan's overthrow. 
82. YS, 138.25a-b; MW£, 125.2a. 
83. YS, 41.3b; MWE, 127.2a. 
84. YS, 139.8b-9a. Dorjibal was also descended from the second 
son of Bo'ol. As a participant in the Classics Mat in 1341, he com-
piled a book of Neo-Confucian maxims which the emperor entitled 
"Complete Instructions on the Fundamentals of Rule." Cf. YS, 
139.8a, 12a. Huang Chin wrote an inscription for his study; cf. 
Huang Chin 14.7b-9a (inscription for the Pao-chung t'ang). 
85. YS, 140.3a; 145.2a; 185.12a-b. Li Chi was a chin-shih of 1327. 
Ko Yong-bok's biography is in KfíS. 
86. YS, 182.3a. 
87. YS, 41.14b; 142.14a; 185.3b-4a. 
88. YS, 42.2a; 205.29b-30a. 
89. YS, 39.7b; MWE, 19.18b-19b. For the reading of Qudu, cf. 
Pelliot and Hambis, Histoire des Campagnes, pp. 104, 284-85. 
90. YS, 181.17a-b; Yamamoto Takayoshi in Tohogaku, no. 11 207 
(1955), pp. 81-99. 
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Chapter V. In Pursuit of "Merit and Profit" of "Merit ^ 
and Profit" 
1. YS, 42.2a-b; 140.3a-b, 5b; 205.29b-30a. 
2. These lower-level men were Wu-ku-sun Liang-chen, Kung 
Po-sui, Ju Chung-po, and Beg Temiir (YS, 138.28a-b). Wu-ku-sun 
was a Jiirched, classified as Northern Chinese during the Yiian 
period. He obtained office through the yin, or hereditary route 
(YS, 187.1a-4a). Kung Po-sui was from the Huai region; he was 
a former protege of the Onggut Confucian Ma Tsu-ch'ang (YS, 
181.11a). The other two men I cannot identify. 
3. YS, 141.1a; HYS, 210.6a. T'u Chi (MWE, 155.24a) thinks that 
Ting-chu was probably a descendant of Ya-ya, and hence related 
to the Qangli Toghto and his sons Temiir Tash, Dash Temiir, etc. 
Toghto refused to allow Ting-chu to retire when he asked to do 
so in October, 1349 (YS, 42.3a). The names Temiir Tash and Dash 
Temiir are peculiar as a pair, for one means "iron rock" and the 
other "rock iron." For the d/t alternation in Turkish, cf. Barthold, 
Four Studies, III, 124; and Cleaves in HJAS, XII (1949), 527-28. 
However, Huang Chin (8.10b) gives the first name as Temiir Dash. 
4. YS, 42.2b; 125.17b; MWE, 155.16b; 157.37b. For the name 
Chosgem, cf. Cleaves in HJAS, XV (1952), 30. 
5. For the name Üch Qurtuqa, cf. Pelliot and Hambis, Histoire 
des Campagnes, p. 240; and L. Rásonyi in AOASH, XII (1961), 
52. The name in Turkish means literally "three old women" and 
has a magical significance. Uch Qurtuqa was a son of the Qangli 
Toghto. 
6. YS, 184.14a; 185.11b. 
7. KSWS, 19a-b; cf. Schulte-Uffelage, Das Keng-shen wai-shih, 
p. 56. 
8. YS, 42.3a; 92.5b; 183.10a-b. Li Hao-wen, a Northern Chinese 
and a chin-shih of 1321, assiduously complied a number of texts 
consisting mainly of extracts from Confucian works for 
Ayushiridara s education. Cf. YS, 183.10a-llb. Ayushiridara began 
learning Uighur letters in May, 1348, and Chinese characters in 
July, 1349 (YS, 41.15a; 42.2a). 
9. YS, 42.3a. 
10. HYS, 213.4a-b. 
11. YS, 186.8a. 
12. YS, 42.5a; HYS, 213.4b; MWE, 45.5b. For Hsieh Che-tu s 
family, established in Kiangsi province, cf. Ou-yang Hsiian, Kuei-
chai chi, 11.3a-13a. In 1343 the Confucian Chieh Hsi-ssu, also from 
Kiangsi, had proposed the issuance of copper cash, but he was 
turned down by Toghto at that time (YS, 181.17b). 
208 13- YS> 42.5b, 8b; 97.5a. On the currency reform of 1350, see 
H. Franke, Geld und Wirtschaft in China unter der Mongolen-
V. In Pursuit Herrschaft,pp. 93-100; Ch'üan Han-sheng in CYYY, XV (1948), 41-
of "Merit anc* Maeda Naonori in Rekishigaku Kenkyu, no. 126 (1947), 
and Profit" P* ^' ^ * understand correctly Iwamura Shinobu's argument that 
the reform was intended to stop inflation, I disagree with it entirely. 
Cf. Iwamura in Toho gakuho, no. 34 (1964), pp. 122 ff. Gordon 
Tullock's article in Economic History Review, 2d ser., IX (1956-57), 
393-407, is disappointingly inadequate. 
14. YS, 43.1a. Of this amount, 1,900,000 ingots was in the new 
currency, and 100,000 in the old. The ingot (ting) was a unit equiva-
lent to 50 taels in silver; cf. L.S. Yang, Money and Credit in China, 
pp. 45-46. On Yüan currency units, see Maeda Naonori in 
Shakaikeizai shigaku, XIV (July, 1944), 1-22. 
15. On the Yüan paper money system in general, besides H. 
Franke's monograph mentioned above, see also Schurmann, 
Economic Structure, pp. 131-45. Since the withdrawal of the pre-
cious metal reserves by the financier Ahmad after 1276, it appears 
that the paper money was no longer fully backed. Cf. Ch'üanJHan-
sheng, CYYY, XV, 18-20; and Maeda in Rekishigaku kenkyu, no. 
126 (1947), p. 44. Paper money was instituted in China by Qubilai 
largely in order to prevent the drain of Chinese silver to Central 
Asia and the Middle East; cf. Blake in HJAS, II (1937), 325-28. 
16. The Yellow River project, completed in December, 1351, 
cost a total of 1,845,636 ingots in new (Chung-t'ung) paper currency; 
cf. YS, 66.10b. During 1351 the government printed a total of 
I,900,000 ingots in new currency; cf. note 14 above. The implication 
seems clear that the government financed the project by using this 
unbacked, or inadequately backed, paper money to pay for materi-
als and labor. 
17. Cf. Chapter II, note 14. 
18. Cf. H. Franke in Oriens, II (1949), 226. For the years 1292-
93, Schurmann calculates that salt revenues covered somewhat over 
50 percent of government expenditures. Franke's figures derive 
from explicit data for the year 1329, however. Cf. Schurmann, 
Economic Structure, pp. 169-70. 
19. For salt prices, which rose from about 1/5 ingot per yin in 
1276 to 3 ingots in 1315, cf. Schurmann, p. 172. In 1342 the price 
was still 3 ingots; cf. Maeda in Rekishigaku kenkyu, no. 126 (1947), 
p. 33. For salt production quotas down to 1329, cf. Schurmann, 
p. 190. For the downward revision of salt quotas after that date, 
cf. YS, 97.9b-25b. 
20. YS, 184.17a. 
21. K'un-shan hsien-chih, 9.8b-9a. 
22. YS, 42.5b; Wang I, 185(20).3b-4a (epitaph for Chao Kuan-
kuang); Hsii-I-k'uei, Shih-feng kao, 3.11b-12a (epitaph for Tsou 
Shih-wen); Che-chiang t'ung-chih, 33.30a. 209 
23. Cf. Wang I, 185(20).4a; 168(3). 12b (a departing message for 
Tang Tzu-ch'eng). v> In pursuit 
24. YS, 140.12a-b; Hsii I-kuei, 14.1b-2a (epitaph for Yeh Ying- 0f "Merit 
huai). Dash Temiir was a son of the Qangli Toghto's. anci Profit" 
25. YS, 140.12a-b; 143.15a. 
26. According to the Confucian Yeh Tzu-ch'i, Chia Lu was all 
along a staunch Toghto partisan and had had a hand in the Chin-k'ou 
canal project—the chief purpose of which, according to Yeh, was 
to provide irrigation. Yeh Tzu-ch'i was, however, a hostile^witness. 
Cf. Nakayama in Wacla hakushi koki kinen toyoshi ronso (Tokyo, 
1960), p. 651. But this might explain why it was the emperor, 
rather than the Berke Buqa leadership, that appointed Chia Lu 
at that time. 
27. YS, 138.28b; 186.18a-b. 
28. Actually, public opinion did not seem to be so definite on 
this point. Earlier, ca. 1344, the Tangut Confucian Yii Ch'iieh was 
of the opinion that the natural bed of the Yellow River lay north 
of the Shantung peninsula, and that it should be tamed by diverting 
its lower course into multiple channels; cf. Yii Ch'iieh, Ch'ing-yang 
chi, 129(1).2a-4a (a departing message for the clerk-registrar 
[ching-li] Yiieh Yen-ming [Oriig Buqa], about to take up position 
in the Branch Directorate of Water Control); and YS, 145.4b-5a. 
Also at this time, however, the Confucian Sung Lien took what 
was essentially the position of Chia Lu and Toghto, that the best 
route lay south of the Shantung peninsula, and away from the Huai 
River system. Sung asserted that many other people shared this 
view. See Sung Lien, 43.1b-2a (a discussion of Yellow River con-
trol). A certain Wang Hsi, whom I cannot identify, proposed divid-
ing the Yellow River in two sections along its lower course, half 
flowing north of the Shantung peninsula, and the other half south, 
the latter along much the same route suggested by Sung Lien. 
Cf. Wang Hsi, Chih-ho t'u-liieh, with maps. For the name 
Tughlugh, cf. Cleaves in H/AS, XII (1949), 55, n. 152. For the 
reading of Oriig, cf. Cleaves in H/AS, XV (1952), 30. 
29. YS, 186.18a-b. 
30. Yii Ch'iieh, 133(5).5b (colophon to Ho-lu I-chih's "Song of 
the Old Man of Ying-chou"). 
31. YS, 41.7b-8a; KSWS, 20a; Liu Chi, p. 154. 
32. Chi eh Hsi-ssu, 9.11a-b. 
33. YS, 41.13a, 14a. 
34. YS, 41.9b, 14a, 17a. 
35. YS, 42.5a; 92.13a. 
36. YS, 42.6a, 7a; 92.17b. 
37. 7TSL, I, 276. The Uighur Lien Qaishan Qaya, chin-shih of 
1321 and Vice Administrator of the Right of Honan province, pro-
210 tested the whole project on the grounds that the labor recruitment 
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province by the time of Qaishan's reign (YS, 129.3b-7a). Dash 
Badulugh's family, whose fortunes were so closely connected to 
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Summary and Conclusion 
1. YS, 81.4a. 
2. Bayan eventually hanged himself on the political legacy of 
Qubilai; as Toghto's mentor Wu Chih-fang pointed out, Qubilai 
had never issued an order barring Chinese from the leading posi-
224 tions in the Provincial Surveillance Offices (Lien-fang-ssu), as Bayan 
in the wake of the Fan Meng case was attempting to do. Cf. YS, 
Summary 138.25a. 
and 3. YS, 143.5a. The Confucian movement should not be under-
Conclusion stood as a movement for ethnic assimilation. For one matter, the 
idea of ethnic privilege by right of conquest was not clearly in 
violation of any recognized Confucian principle. There was a possi-
ble contradiction involved between Mencius's dictum that worthy 
men should be employed regardless of their origins and Qubilai's 
rule that ethnic affiliation was also a primary qualification for office 
holding. In his argument with Bayan, however, Hsü Yu-jen used 
Mencius's saying to justify the claim of examination graduates to 
office, not as an argument against ethnic preference. In addition, 
there was also the classical principle of the eight categories of legally 
privileged persons, of which the first two were the relatives of the 
sovereign (ch'in) and the old friends of the sovereign (ku), and 
the fifth and sixth the meritorious (kung) and the noble (kuei). 
This principle was once invoked by the Central Chancellery official 
Wang K'o-ching in defense of El Temür. Cf. YS, 184.6a-b; T'ung-tsu 
Ch'ü, Law and Society in Traditional China (Paris, 1961), pp. 177-
79. 
4. Sung Lien, 41.7a. 
5. These terms are used by Wang I, 180(15).24b-25a (Words with 
my wife). 
6. Yü Ch'iieh, 133(5). la-2a (Colophon to the Assistant Magistrate 
Ku's letter discussing cliques). 
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[Extracts from the biographieŝ  of outstanding Yiian ministers]. 
Edited by Su T'ien-chiieh ^ f f Peking: Chung-hua 
shu-chii, 1962. 
Yiian shih já^ [Yiian dynastic history]. Po-na-pen ed. 
Yiian tien-chang ^ J& Hp" [Casebook of Yiian administrative 
law]. Sung-fen-shih ts'ung-k'an ed. 
Yiian wen-lei ^ ^ [Classified literary pieces of the 
Yiian]. Edited by Su T'ien-chiieh. Taipei: Shih-chieh shu-chii, 
1962. 
B. INDIVIDUAL LITERARY WORKS ^ ^ 
Ch'ang-ku Chen-i, pseud. ^^ ^Ml Nung-t'ien yii-hua 
lIJ Pai-pu ts'ung-shu chi-ch'engved. 
Ch'en Chi f J t ^ l-pai-chai kao ^ & ^ Ssu-pu ts'ung 
kan ed. 
Cheng Yii J%Jh ¿C\ Sliih-shan hsien-sheng wen-chi 
^ ^ Ch'ien-k'un cheng-ch'i-chi ed. 
Cheng Yüan-yu \ ¿¿¿^¿o CKiao-wuchi % MS ed. 
Chieh Hsi-ssu \% ^k Chieh Wen-an kung cKüan-chi ^f) 227 
X ^ k A Ssu-pu ts'ung-k'aned.^ Biblio ra h 
Hsii I-k'uei fy - j^e Shih-feng kao Wu-lin wang-
che i-chu ed. ^ 
Hsü Yu-jen ^ Chih-cheng chi i t % MS ed. 
Hu Chih-yii Tzu-shan ta-cKüan-chi ^ 
J ^ Jf; San-i-t'ang ts'ung-shu ed. 
Hu Han tf\ Hu Chung-tzu chi %f{ Jj? ^ ^ Chin-hua 
ts'ung-shu ed. 
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Ch u-cheng yuan, palace office, 194»8 
Chü-jung, princely fief, 17, 43, 48-49, 
57, 195» 25 
Ch'üan Heng, quoted, 96-97, 105, 
222nl00, 223nl7 
Chung-shu, metropolitan province 
(incorporating modern Shantung, 
Shansi, Hopei): and 1328 coup, 40; 
banditry in; 80-81, 102-3; Yellow 
River flood in, 87; military supply 
in, 111-13; rebel invasion of Shansi 
sector, 130; Chaghan Temür and 
Bolod Temür struggle in Shansi 
sector, 140-45; rebel Sung retreat 
to Shantung sector, 145; defense of 
Shantung against Chu Yüan-chang, 
152-54; Koko Temür position in 
Shansi, 154-55 
Churig-shu sheng, see Central 
Chancellery 
Chung-shu fen-sheng, "detached" 
office, 111 
Chung-tu, 24 
"Classics Mat", see Ching-yen 
Clerks, 83, 217n42; advancement 
prospects, 63-64, 197n52; 
Confucian attitude toward, 66, 
197n57 
Commercial Tax Bureau, 48 
Commercial tax exemptions, 193n85 
Confucianism, Confucianists: Legalism 
in 215nl5; as unitary factional 
movement, 32-33, 37-38, 52, 60, 159, 
161; "reformist" variety, 2, 79-80, 
93-94, 116-17, 163-64; "conservative" 
variety, 2, 82, 89, 94, 104, 122, 
124-25, 148, 163-67; and Central 
Chancellery under El Temür, 51-52; 
and Bayan, 60, 64-66, 72-73, 
159-60; and Toghto, 74-78, 93, 162; 
and Berke Buqa, 82; and rebellion 
of Fang Kuo-chen, 100; and 
Censorate, 124; and growth of 
regionalism, 123, 138; and Mongols 
and se-mu, 160, 198n79, 224n3; and 
appanaged Mongol nobility, 183n6; 
and Chinese literary tradition, 183n4; 
see also Examination system 
Confucianization, 3; of government, 31; 
at ministerial level, 82, 93-94 
Currency: reform and expansion tinder 
Toghto, 97-99, 122, 208nn 12-16; 
special issues 40, 139 
*Darindari, 49 
Darma, see Tarmashirin 
Darmabala, 13, 175 
Darmashiri, see Tarmashirin 
Dar qan, a title, 48-49, 77, 117, 192n69 
Darqan Army, 212n67 
Darughachi, 17, 83, 85-86, 191n68, 2 3 9 
204n60 
Dash Badulugh, 107, 110, 113, 134-37, Index 
142, 162, 172, 218n53, 220n83 
Dash Temür, 100 
Daula-shah, 42, 51, 95, 172 
Dore Temür, 181n62 
Dorji, 69-70, 72, 84, 86, 95, 124, 
163-64, 172-73, 204n58 
Dorjibal, 91, 107, 112, 131, 173, 
206n84 
Duwa, 11-12, 23, 174 
Duwa Temür, see Dore Temür 
Dynastic histories (Liao, Chin, Sung), 
compilation of, 78-79, 81 
El Tegüs, 55, 58, 73, 75, 159, 173, 
194n13 
El Temür, 10, 17, 26-27, 32, 55, 75, 78, 
93, 159, 168, 173, 190n54; ancestry, 
42-43, 45; early career, 43-44, 
188n47; and 1328 coup, 39-42, 53; 
domination of Tugh Temür's court, 
46-48, 50, 190nn67, 68; private 
wealth, 48-49, 57, 191n67, kin ties, 
49-50; and purge of opposition, 51, 
59; and Confucianism, 52, 158; 
and succession to Tugh Temür, 55; 
biographical sources for, 194nl7 
Eljigedei, see Eljigitei 
Eljigitei, 28-29, 181n62 
Esen Buqa, 19, 178n32 
Esen Qudu, see Ho Chün 
Esen Temür, younger brother of 
Toghto, 76, 78, 106-7, 110, 117, 
121-22, 173, 202n23 
Esen Temür, son of *Yochichar, 188n48 
Esen Temiir, Hukuang Chief 
Administrator, 114 
Ethnic class system, 35, 45, 85, 160; 
and examination system, 36; and 
Central Chancellery, 85; reinforced 
by Bayan, 61, 196n45, 224n2; 
revised by Toghto, 123; and 
Confucianism, 224n3 
Examination system, 35-37, 79, 150, 
198n75; cancellation by Bayan, 
60-66, 160; graduates in bureaucracy, 
62, 64-65; and Mongols and se-mu, 
Examination system (Continued), 
68-69, 132, 161-62, 198n79; 
revived in Honan by Chaghan 
Temiir; 140-41 
240 
Fan Hui, 201» 12 
Index Fan Meng, incident, 71-72, 90, 224n2 
Fang Kuo-chen, 88-89, 99-101, 109, 
112, 128-29, 173. 206/i72. 223n7 
Feng-su, 34, 65-66 
Financial cliques, 32, 37, 38, 157. 183n6; 
see also Ahmad; Temiider 
Fukien province, rebellion in, 67 
Genghis Khan, see Chinggis Qan 
Golden Horde, 1, 22, 26, 182n62 
•Gongbubal, 105, 110 
Grand Canal, 89, 99, 101, 104, 109, 
112, 206ri 75 
Great Chin, rebel dynasty, 66 
Great Chou, rebel dynasty, 128 
Guaranteed recommendations, see 
Pao-chii 
Gunadara, see El Tegiis 
Giiyiigchi Guards, 1 H6n36 
Hainan, Tugh Temiir in, 20 
Hairy Gourd militia, 107, 120 
Han Fa-shih, 66 
Han Hsing, 199n79 
Han Yüan-shan, 96 
Han Yung, 96 
Han-chia-nu, 90, 92, 95 
Han-jen, see Ethnic class system 
Han-lin Academy, 33, 94 
Harghasun, 14 
Ho Bayan, see Ho Sheng 
Ho Chün, 95 
Ho Sheng, 184nl7 
Ho Wei-i, 84-87, 90, 95, 124, 148, 150, 
163-64, 173, 222n5 
Honan province: Ayurbarwada in, 13-14; 
and 1328 coup, 40, 53-54; and 
enthronement of Toghon Temiir, 56; 
Fan Meng putsch in, 71-72; Yellow 
River flood in, 87; banditry in, 102; 
Red Turban rebellion in, 103-9; 
military supply in, 111-12; rebel Sung 
dynasty established in, 130-38; rise 
of Chagan Temiir in, 132-37; see 
also Huainan province 
Hopei, see Chung-shu 
Hsi-li-mu, 135 
Hsiao Baiju, 184nI7 
Hsieh Che-tu, 98, 207nl2 
Hsien-tsung, see Mongke 
Hsii Heng, 34, 183n8 
IIsii Shih-pen, 150 
Hsii Yu-jen, 62-63, 75-76, 79, 83, 124 
215n 15, 224«3 
Hsi'mn-hui yiian, see Office of Imperial 
Cuisine 
H sitan-k'o t'i-chii-ssu, see Commercial 
'lax Bureau 
Hsim-tu, princely fief, 188n48 
Huai, princely fief, 20 
Huai-ch'ing, princely fief, 13 
Huai-ning, princely fief, II 
Huainan province, 109, 114-15, 119 
Huang Chin, 76, 197n56, 201nll 
Miii-hui, I90n54. 200n95 
Hukuang province: and 1328 coup, 40; 
rebellions in, 80, 84; Red Turbans 
in, 109; military supply in, 110, 112 
Hula'atai, Prince of Ju-ning, 174, 
185» 35 
Hiilegü, see Ilkhans 
Iduqqut, Uighur royal title, 70, 113, 
190ri54 , 200«5 
Ikires, Mongol clan, I87n38 
Ili region, 28, 182»62 
Ilkhans, 1. II, 22, 26, 181n56, 182»62 
Imperial Guards, 17, 42, 52, ,54, 61-62, 
85, 105, 132. 199»79, 205nn60, 69 
Imperial University, 33, 123 
India, 27 
Ingot, unit of currency, 178»28 
Irinjibal, .55, 173 
Irinjinbal, 70, 89, 92, 107, 124, 131, 
173, 202n23 
Irtysh River, 12. 23, .53 
Jalair, Mongol clan, 41, 183n6; role 
in conquest establishment, I87n38, 
204n58 
Jasagh, 10 
Jaya'an Buqa, 189n54 
Jen-tsung, see Ayurbarwada 
Jingim, second son of Qubilai, 13, 175 
Jingim, son of Toghon Temiir, 215nl6 
Ju Chung-po, 120, 207n2 
Jung, princely fief, 195n31 
Jiircheds, 23, ,35 
Kalka, battle of the, 53 
Kammala, Prince of Chin, 16, 175, 
184n19 
Kansu province: raids upon, 181n54; 
and 1328 coup, 40; Majartai's exile 
in. 90; Toghto's sons exiled to, 122 
Kebek, 26, 28, 181nn53, 62 
Keng Huan, 200n4 
Keng-hua, 75-76, 78-79, 93, 200n2 
Keshig, see Imperial Guards 
Khubilai, see Qubilai 
Khitans, 35 
Kiangche province: and 1328 coup, 
40; piracy in, 88; Red Turbans in, 
107-8; as supply base for Kao-yu 
campaign, 119; see also Chang Shih-
ch'eng; Fang Kuo-chen 
Kiangnan (Branch) Censorate, 18, 
114-15, 216n36 
Kiangsi province: and 1328 coup, 40; 
rebellion in, 67; Confucian ideology 
in, 93; Red Turbans in, 107, 109 
Ko Yong-bok, 92 
K'o Chiu-ssu, 191n64 
Kókó Temür, 133, 146, 148-56, 173 
Kókótei, 132 
Kóncheg Buqa, Prince of Wei-shun, 
71, 114 
Korea, Koreans, 23, 35, 40, 59, 67, 92, 
120, 125-26, 128, 150, 214n5 
Kuan-kuan, ia3-34, 136 
Kublai, see Qubilai 
Kuei Chang, 71, 97 
K'uei-chang-ko Academy, 48, 72-73, 
191n64 
Kung Po-sui, 207n 2 
Kung Shih-t'ai, 214n9 
Kung-hsiang tu -tsung-kuan-fu, palace 
office, 48, 19bi66 
Kung-li, 79, 94, 105, 118, 124 
K'ung Hsing, 151, 1,54 
Kuo-tzu chien, see Imperial University 
Kwangsi province: Toghon Temiir's 
exile in, 56; rebellion in, 80 
Kwangtung province, rebellion in, 66 
Lao-chang, 21 ln55, 214»5 
Lao-pao, see Pao-pao 
Lao-ti-sha, 148 
Left Guards, 43 
Li Ch'a-han, see Chaghan Temiir 
Li Chi, 91-92 
Li Hao-wen, 207n8 
Li Shih-chan, 144-45 
Li Ssu-ch'i, 133-34, 136, 138-39, 145, 
152, 154-55, 173-74 
Li Tan, 33 
Li-chin, see Clerks 
Li-jih, 16, 19, 174, 178nl7, 189n50 
Liang, unit of weight, 178n28 
Liao valley, 24 
Liaoyang province, 24, 112; and 1328 
coup, 40 
Lien Qaishan Qaya, 210n37 
Lingpei province, 180n47; and 1328 
coup, 40; see also Mongolia 
Liu Qara Buqa, 212n68; 217n49 
Lou Shih-pao, 201nl4 
Lu chün-kuo chung-shih, military policy 
position, 47, 54, 190n61 
Lu Lu-tseng, 108 
Lü Ssu-ch'eng, 185n33 
Lung-chen Guards, 110, 186n36 
Lung-i Guards, 190n61 
Ma Po-yung, see Ma Tsu-ch'ang 
Ma Tsu-ch'ang, 62, 189n54, 197n51, 
198n78, 207n2 
Mai-lai-ti, 195n34 
Majaqan, Prince of Chao, 185n35 
Majartai, 73, 77, 82, 90, 174 
Manchuria: Nayan's revolt in, 22-24; 
other revolts in, 80; see also Liaoyang 
province 
Manggala, 13 
Manzi Qaya, 114 
Maragha, Ilkhan seat, 11 
Maritime grain transport, 79, 87-89, 
99, 112, 179n45 
Merkids, Mongol tribe, 53, 126 
Miao army, 110, 115, 134, 217n47 
Ming Dynasty, 1, 3, 127, 132, 154, 
168-69 
Ming Tai-tsu, see Chu Yüan-chang 
Ming-tsung, see Qoshila 
Mo Kao, 152-55 
Móngke, 10, 70, 218n53 
Mongol Empire, 1, 7-9, 22, 28, 30, 
157, 168 
Mongol language: translations into, 34; 
competence in, 196n45 
Mongolia, 8, 12, 21-26, 29-31, 176, 
180n47; and Shensi revolt of 1316, 
178n30; see also Lingpei province 
Moslems, 13, 21, 27, 51, 80, 193n80, 
199n79 
Muqali, 183n6, 187n38, 204n58 
Naiman, Turkish tribe, 132, 217n39 
Naimanjin, 195n34 
Naimantai, Jalair viceroy, 70, 182n62 
oao Naimantai, grandfather of Chaghan 
Temür, 132 
Nan-jen, see Ethnic class system 
Index Nanggiadai, 189n48 
Nanggiatai, 218n53 
Nao-nao, 161, 190n54 
Narin, 92,_114, 174, 195ri26, 216n36 
Nasr ad-Din, 115 
National History (kuo-shih). 47 
Nayan, 22-24, 179n42 
Neo-Confucianism, see Confucianism 
Ne'üdigei, 222n5 
Ne'üril, 218n53 
Ning-tsung, see Irinjibal 
Nókód, 158, 161 
Office of Imperial Cuisine, 17, 49, 
192»78 
Ógódei, 10, 132, 182n62; patrimony 
of, 11-12, 23, 174 
Óljei Qudu, née Ki, 92, 125, 149 
Óljeitü, see Ilkhans 
Ongchan, Prince of Liang, 42, 185n35 
Orqon River, 11 
Órüg, 192n74 
Órüg Buqa, 199n79 
Órüg Temiir, Kiangche Chief 
Administrator, 131, 216n36 
Órüg Temür, Prince of Ch'i, 186n35 





Peking, see Ta-tu 
P eng Ying-yii, 67 
Persia, 27 
Picul (shih), unit of measure, 206ri70 
Pien-i hsingshih, authorization to "act 
at convenience", 111, 119, 135, 139, 
216n36 
Qabartu, 189n50 
Qadi, office of, in Ta-tu, 51 
Qaghan, qaghanate, 4, 7, 9-10, 22, 
27-28, 30, 45, 132, 157, 168 
Qaidu, 10-11, 22-23, 27, 158, 174 
Qaishan, 9, 18, 43, 99, 174; and anti-
Qaidu resistance, 10-12; and clique c 
adherents, 12, 16-19, 44, 188n48; 
assumes throne, 13-18; adminis-
tration in Mongolia, 24, 180n49; 
enfeoffs princes, 25, 180«50; as 
factional symbol, 42, 44, 46, 50, 
61, 158; see also Shang-shu sheng 
Qama, 120-21, 123, 125-26, 147, 174 
Qan, 4, 158, 161, 168 
Qangli, Turkish tribe, 43, 45 
Qangli Guards, 17 
Qangli Toghto, 11, 16, 76, 174, 207nn3, 
5, 222n5; as factional leader, 43-44; 
ancestry, 45; and Confucianism, 
45-46 
Qara Batur, 189n48 
Qara Buqa, 204n60 
Qarachi, 42, 186n36, 190n54, 191n68 
Qarajang, 155 
Qaraqojo, Uighur kingdom of, 23, 53, 
70, 132, 190n54; see also Iduq qut 
Qaraqorwn, 7, 10, 12, 23-25, 29, 38, 
179n3H 
Qarimtu, 114 
Qarluq Guards, 190n61 
Qipchaq, Turkish tribe, 10, 42, 45, 49, 
53, 70, 73, 110, 159, 186n36, 189n53, 
218n53; see also El Temür 
Qipchaq Guards, 17, 43, 47, 190n61 
Qonqor Buqa, 115 
Qonqor Temür, Prince of Chia, 70 
Qoshila, 9, 18, 52, 72, 157, 174; and 
revolt in Shensi, 19-20, 44; retreat 
to steppes, 26, 28, 181n54, 182n62; 
assumption of throne, 26-29; line 
restored, 75, 159 
Qubilai, 1, 4, 7-8, 13, 15-16, 25, 85, 
157, 164, 174-75; policies in Inner 
Asia, 21-24, 179nn38, 45, 46; and 
factions, 35, 183n8; as political 
symbol, 50, 61, 159-60, 192n79, 
224n2 
Qunggirad, Mongol consort clan, 41, 
49, 57, 159, 186n38 
Quriltai, 7 
Rebellions: in Bayan's administration, 
66-67; in Toghto's first adminis-
tration, 80-81; in Berke Buqa's 
administration, 84, 88; in Toghto's 
second administration, 102-9; shift in 
general strategy after 1,355, 130-32; 
see also Fang Kuo-chen; Chang Shi-
ch'eng; Red Turbans; Sung 
Red Turbans, 104-10, 113, 115, 129, 
131, 133, 135 
Regionalism: development of under 
Chang Shi-ch'eng, 128; under Fang 
Kuo-chen, 128-29; under Chaghan 
Temür, 130, 132 ff. 
Sadun, 49, 195nn25, 31, 33, 201nl6 
Salt monopoly, 208nl8; at Ho-chien, 87; 
prices, 98-99, 208nl9 
San-pao-nu, 189n48 
Se-mu (Central Asians), 2-3, 29, 33, 35, 
45-46 , 61, 67-69, 72, 77, 86, 96, 110, 
115-16, 132, 160-62, 189n54, 211n50, 
217n39; see also Confucianism; Ethnic 
class system; Examination system 
Sengge, 183n6 
Shang Yang, 79-80 
Shang-shu sheng, chancellery, 17, 44, 
I78n23, 189n48, 192n79 
Shang-tu, 15, 27-28, 105; as center of 
Yesün Temür's supporters, 26, 
38-42, 54 
Shansi, see Chung-shu 
Shantung,, see Chung-shu 
Sharabal, 201nl0 
She, local control system, 86, 205u61 
Sheng-tz'u, temple, 49, 55 
Shensi Branch Censorate, 19, 90, 106-7, 
123-24, 138-39 
Shensi province: defense against 
Qaidu, 13; Qoshila's revolt in, 19, 
44; and 1328 coup, 40; famine in, 40, 
185n31; military pacification in, 111; 
rebel invasion of, 130; Chaghan 
Temür in, 138-39; Bolod Temiir and 
Li Ssu-ch'i conflict in, 145; warlord 
alliance in, 151-52, 154; Chu Yüan-
chang attack on, 155; see also Agri-
cultural development; Currency 
Shidebala, 18, 20, 26, 37-38, 44, 175, 
186n35, 188n 48, 204n58 
Shih, unit of measure, see Picul 
Shih P'u, 119, 214n2 
Shih Wei-liang, 185n32, 200n4 
Shih-cheng fu, palace office, 54 
Shih-tsu, see Qubilai 
Shinggi, 114, 131 
Shiu Ta-ta, tribe, 23 
Shu-mi yiian, see Chief Military 
Commission 
Shun-ning, princely fief, 195n30 
Shun-ti, see Toghon Temür 
Sinicization, 3, 33 
Ssu-ma Kuang, 2 
"Stick" Hu, 66 
Sübü'ütei, 53 
Sügiirchi, 194n8, 205n60 2 4 3 
Su-wei, see Imperial Guards 
Sung, rebel dynasty, 130, 132, 135-42 Index 
Sung Lien, 209n28 
Sungari region, 23 
Szechwan province: Qubilai's invasion 
of, 85; and 1328 coup, 40, 218n53; 
rebellion in, 52, 66, 184n29; Esen 
Temür exiled to, 122 
Ta fu-chün-yüan, military bureau, 153, 
155 
Ta-hsi tsung-yin-yiian, palace office, 
50, 192n78 
Ta-tu, 7, 10-11, 13, 15, 24, 26-27, 
38-42, 51, 53-54, 105, 120, 140, 
149, 155-56 
Ta-tu-tu-fu, military bureau, 47, 
190n61 
Taghai, 190n54 
Tai Buqa, Baya'ud, 100, 199n79, 
205n65 
Tai Buqa, Qunggirad, 96, 106, 134-37, 
218nn52, 54,221n84 
T'ai-p'ing, Prince ofYang-chai, 185n35 
T'ai-p'ing, princely fief, 48, 57, 191n67 
T'ai-p'ing, see Ho Wei-i 
Tai-p'ing-nu, 194nl3 
T'ai-ting, see Yesün Temür 
T'ai-tsu, see Chinggis Qan 
Tai-tsung, see Ogodei 
Talas convention, 10 
Tamachi, 107, 110, 132, 212n68 
*Tangkish, 49, 57, 175 
Tangut region, 13, 24 
Tao Tsung-i, 210n44 
Taraqai, 188n48 
Tarbagatai region, 20, 28, 178n32 
*Targi, 13, 37 
Tarim area, 23-25, 27, 181n53 
Tarmashirin, 182n62 
Tegüder, 199n79 
Temüder, 37-38, 43, 52, 85, 183n6, 
190n54 
Temür, 10, 12, 24-25, 175, 180n50 
Temür Buqa, iduq qut and Prince of 
Kao-ch'ang, 70, 175, 190nn54, 61, 
199n87 
Temür Buqa, Prince of Hsüan-jang, 71 
Temür Buqa, Chancellor of the Left, 
75-76 
Temür Tash, 76, 84, 96, 203»39 
2 4 4 Teri Temür, 139, 142, 219n71 
T'ien Feng, 145 
T'ien-hsia, Qaishan's concept of, 16 
Index Ting, see Ingot 
Ting Wen-yüan, 62 
Ting-chu, 76, 96, 147, 175, 195»25, 
207» 3 
Toghon, 76 
Toghon Temür, 49, 98, 101, 105, 118, 
175; in exile, 56, 59, 196»39; 
enthronement, 56, 58; as factional 
symbol, 59; and partial revival of 
monarchic power, 92-93, 162-63; con-
flict with Ayushiridara, 147-55; 
paternity of, 58, 195n37; Confucian 
education of, 201»10 
Toghto, Prince of Liao, 185»35 
Toghto, 175; and overthrow of Bayan, 
72-74, appointees in first admin-
istration, 75-76; policies in first admin-
istration, 78-80, 162-63; attack on 
Berke Buqa, 89-93, 95-96, 100, 166; 
policies in second administration, 
96-99, 101-3, 123, 128-29, 163, 
212» 79; private wealth, 78, 117; 
princedom awarded to, 214»96; and 
suppression of Red Turban rebellions, 
105-9; and centralization of 
pacification effort, 109-17; campaign 
against Chang Shih-ch'eng at 
Kao-yu. 119-20, 127-28, 214»5; 
dismissal of, 121-27, I62-&3, 167; 
and monarchy, 125-26, 215» 18; 
popular view of his policies, 210»44; 
see also under Censorate; Central 
Chancellery; Confucianism; Ethnic 
class system 
Toghus Temiir, 215» 16 
Tore Temür, see Dore Temiir 
Torebeg, 151, 154 
T'ou-hsia, appanaged Mongol nobility, 
35, 183»6, 187»38 
Transoxania, 12, 23, 27-28, 181»53 
Tributan' terminology, use of, 181 «56 
Tuan-pen-t'ang, palace school, 97 
Tugh Temiir, 9, 18, 20, 26-27, 29, 
38, 175, 195»37; and 1328 coup, 
39, 44, 54; role as emperor, 46, 48, 
50-52, 55, 1.58-59; posthumous vili-
fication of, 75 
Tughchi, 105-6, 110, 210»48, 211»55 
Tugh Iugh, 102 
Tughtugha, 43, 175, 190»54, 191»68 
Tului, line of, 10, 178»20 
Turnan Temür, Prince of Wu-p'ing, 
181»54 
Tümender, sworn brother of Berke 
Buqa, 95 
Tümender, Liaoyang Chief 
Administrator, 186»35 
T'un-t'ien, military agricultural 
colonies, 24, 103, 107 
Tung T'uan-hsiao, 107 
Tung-lu Meng-ku myriarchy, 186»36, 
190» 61 
Tung-p ing school, 32-36, 183»6 
Ubaid-ullah, 51 
Üch Qurtuqa, 96, 207»5 
Uighur, Turkish tribe, 53, 113; see 
also Iduq qut; Qaraqojo 
VldüchU 205»60 
Uriangqatai, 22I»»84, 88 
Viceroy (kuo-wang), Jalair title, 69, 95, 
187»38; see also Dorji; Naimantai 
Volga River, 45 
Wang An-shih, 2, 79-80, &3 
Wang Chieh, 201» 10 
Wang Hsi, 209»28 
Wang Hsin, 153-54 
Wang I. Confucianist, 201» 11, 202» 19 
Wang I, Chief Administrator, 204»55 
Wang K'o-ching, 224»3 
Wang Pao-pao, see Koko Temiir 
Wang Shih-ch'eng, 145 
Wang Ssu-ch'eng. 123, 138, 214» 10 
Wang Wen-t'ung, 33 
Wang Yün, 183»6 
Water Tatars, see Shui Ta-ta 
Wei Sain Buqa, 217»42 
Wen-tsung, see Tugh Temür 
White Lotus Society, 104; see also 
Red Turbans 
Wu Ch'i, 97-98 
Wu Chih-fang, 74, 77, 82, 162, 
201»» 12-14, 224»2 
Wu Lai, 201» 13 
Wu Qudu Buqa, 76 
Wu Tang, 214»9 
Wu Tien-pao, 203» 48, 217» 47 
Wu-ku-sun Liang-chen, 207»2 
Wu-p'ing, princely fief, 49, 181n54 
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